Narrative:

The management at charleston with no input from the controllers realigned the radar room position. A radar scope was removed and the east scope was moved to 1 place further away from the west scope. This was supposedly done as a test. The fdio keyboard; printer and monitor were removed from the radar handoff position and moved to where the east scope was. This was all done with no regard to proper FAA rules. This confign of the position have created several major problems. First; the handoff position's ability to assist the radar position have been greatly reduced and complicated. The flight strips are no longer printed out at the handoff position but at the new position. The handoff person must now stand up; walk around the radar person; get the flight strips; then walk back to the handoff position or the radar person; who is working traffic; will hand them to the handoff person. This is very unsafe; before; the strips printed out at the handoff position. The radar controllers must now call each other to do a simple pointout; whereas before they could reach over and point at the aircraft and do the pointout faster and more efficiently. This has also complicated the process of sequencing aircraft to the airport. The new position had no procedures for about a month and then they finally threw some together. Most if not all of the controllers want the original and authority/authorized confign put back. Management has said that they do not care what the controllers want; that we would just have to get used to it. It is unconscionable that this type of attitude can exist in a safety-related profession. The FAA should make sure that the people in charge are held accountable for such blatant and dangerous actions and complete disregard for the safety of the flying public.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CHS CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING RECENT CHANGE IN LOCATION OF OPERATIONAL POSITIONS; ALLEGEDLY A WORKLOAD AND SAFETY ISSUE.

Narrative: THE MGMNT AT CHARLESTON WITH NO INPUT FROM THE CTLRS REALIGNED THE RADAR ROOM POS. A RADAR SCOPE WAS REMOVED AND THE E SCOPE WAS MOVED TO 1 PLACE FURTHER AWAY FROM THE W SCOPE. THIS WAS SUPPOSEDLY DONE AS A TEST. THE FDIO KEYBOARD; PRINTER AND MONITOR WERE REMOVED FROM THE RADAR HDOF POS AND MOVED TO WHERE THE E SCOPE WAS. THIS WAS ALL DONE WITH NO REGARD TO PROPER FAA RULES. THIS CONFIGN OF THE POS HAVE CREATED SEVERAL MAJOR PROBS. FIRST; THE HDOF POS'S ABILITY TO ASSIST THE RADAR POS HAVE BEEN GREATLY REDUCED AND COMPLICATED. THE FLT STRIPS ARE NO LONGER PRINTED OUT AT THE HDOF POS BUT AT THE NEW POS. THE HDOF PERSON MUST NOW STAND UP; WALK AROUND THE RADAR PERSON; GET THE FLT STRIPS; THEN WALK BACK TO THE HDOF POS OR THE RADAR PERSON; WHO IS WORKING TFC; WILL HAND THEM TO THE HDOF PERSON. THIS IS VERY UNSAFE; BEFORE; THE STRIPS PRINTED OUT AT THE HDOF POS. THE RADAR CTLRS MUST NOW CALL EACH OTHER TO DO A SIMPLE POINTOUT; WHEREAS BEFORE THEY COULD REACH OVER AND POINT AT THE ACFT AND DO THE POINTOUT FASTER AND MORE EFFICIENTLY. THIS HAS ALSO COMPLICATED THE PROCESS OF SEQUENCING ACFT TO THE ARPT. THE NEW POS HAD NO PROCS FOR ABOUT A MONTH AND THEN THEY FINALLY THREW SOME TOGETHER. MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE CTLRS WANT THE ORIGINAL AND AUTH CONFIGN PUT BACK. MGMNT HAS SAID THAT THEY DO NOT CARE WHAT THE CTLRS WANT; THAT WE WOULD JUST HAVE TO GET USED TO IT. IT IS UNCONSCIONABLE THAT THIS TYPE OF ATTITUDE CAN EXIST IN A SAFETY-RELATED PROFESSION. THE FAA SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE PEOPLE IN CHARGE ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR SUCH BLATANT AND DANGEROUS ACTIONS AND COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF THE FLYING PUBLIC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.