Narrative:

I am a rated PIC on the aircraft but on this day I was the sic performing the function of the PF. The PNF was the company chief pilot; whom I do not usually fly with. After the occurrence; we discussed what happened in detail; and he indicated that he usually flies with the other pilots; which whom are extremely sharp; and that all checklist items from engine start to line up are automatically taken care of by the PF (he normally acts in the capacity of the PNF). The chain of events began when we began our takeoff roll to discover that the flaps were still in the 0 degree setting instead of the required 20 degrees. When the flaps were then selected; the current power setting would only allow 10 degrees to deploy. At this aircraft weight; we determined that an abort was not necessary; and the takeoff could be safely continued. I have flown the teb 5 departure from runway 24 countless times during my career; and this should have been no exception. I can only relate as to how I felt during those moments; no feeling of any danger; rather the indignation of how this could have happened; and the distinct realization of having 'screwed up.' in a short time we were airborne; and I flew the departure profile totally out of sequence. I required a runway heading to 1500 ft followed by a right turn to 280 degrees; until 4.5 DME from the teb VOR; continuing the climb to 2000 ft. I began the turn prior to 1500 ft; and reaching 2000 ft prior to the 4.5 DME. We checked in with departure reporting our altitude to be 2000 ft. There was a slight pause; with the controller commenting that we are supposed to be at 1500 ft for the procedure; but then told us to maintain 2000 ft. We were subsequently handed off to the next controller; and at no time were made aware of any conflict. As to the cause...I believe that I personally should have been more focused on my flows; and should have insisted on the sic following up with proper checklist procedure. This is not only proper company procedure but is essential; especially when a dissimilar flight crew works together; and not necessarily knowing what to ('automatically') expect from each other. There was definitely a lax atmosphere in the cockpit that day; and although the two pilots are supposed to back each other up; one cannot assume anything. It must take the initiative of at least one of the pilots; irregardless of the position to maintain proper cockpit discipline and procedure. This is something I have been made aware of countless times during my recurrent training sessions; but it took until now to land squarely in my face. 'Performance anxiety' may remotely have been a factor; where the harder one tries to please someone and not 'look bad;' the exact opposite may sometimes occur. In the future; my procedure as either PIC or sic will be to adhere to proper checklist procedure no matter how senior or experienced the pilot is that I'm working with. Another thing is to slow down to concentrate on the proper flows; and not try to impress anybody with how quickly I can have the airplane ready for taxi.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GLF4 FLT CREW; UNFAMILIAR WITH EACH OTHER AND LACKING SPECIFIED SOPS; DEPART TEB WITH IMPROPER FLAP SETTING AND FAIL TO COMPLY WITH ALT RESTRS ON THE TEB SID.

Narrative: I AM A RATED PIC ON THE ACFT BUT ON THIS DAY I WAS THE SIC PERFORMING THE FUNCTION OF THE PF. THE PNF WAS THE COMPANY CHIEF PLT; WHOM I DO NOT USUALLY FLY WITH. AFTER THE OCCURRENCE; WE DISCUSSED WHAT HAPPENED IN DETAIL; AND HE INDICATED THAT HE USUALLY FLIES WITH THE OTHER PLTS; WHICH WHOM ARE EXTREMELY SHARP; AND THAT ALL CHKLIST ITEMS FROM ENGINE START TO LINE UP ARE AUTOMATICALLY TAKEN CARE OF BY THE PF (HE NORMALLY ACTS IN THE CAPACITY OF THE PNF). THE CHAIN OF EVENTS BEGAN WHEN WE BEGAN OUR TAKEOFF ROLL TO DISCOVER THAT THE FLAPS WERE STILL IN THE 0 DEG SETTING INSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED 20 DEGS. WHEN THE FLAPS WERE THEN SELECTED; THE CURRENT POWER SETTING WOULD ONLY ALLOW 10 DEGS TO DEPLOY. AT THIS ACFT WT; WE DETERMINED THAT AN ABORT WAS NOT NECESSARY; AND THE TKOF COULD BE SAFELY CONTINUED. I HAVE FLOWN THE TEB 5 DEP FROM RWY 24 COUNTLESS TIMES DURING MY CAREER; AND THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO EXCEPTION. I CAN ONLY RELATE AS TO HOW I FELT DURING THOSE MOMENTS; NO FEELING OF ANY DANGER; RATHER THE INDIGNATION OF HOW THIS COULD HAVE HAPPENED; AND THE DISTINCT REALIZATION OF HAVING 'SCREWED UP.' IN A SHORT TIME WE WERE AIRBORNE; AND I FLEW THE DEP PROFILE TOTALLY OUT OF SEQUENCE. I REQUIRED A RWY HEADING TO 1500 FT FOLLOWED BY A R TURN TO 280 DEGS; UNTIL 4.5 DME FROM THE TEB VOR; CONTINUING THE CLB TO 2000 FT. I BEGAN THE TURN PRIOR TO 1500 FT; AND REACHING 2000 FT PRIOR TO THE 4.5 DME. WE CHKED IN WITH DEP RPTING OUR ALT TO BE 2000 FT. THERE WAS A SLIGHT PAUSE; WITH THE CTLR COMMENTING THAT WE ARE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 1500 FT FOR THE PROC; BUT THEN TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 2000 FT. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT CTLR; AND AT NO TIME WERE MADE AWARE OF ANY CONFLICT. AS TO THE CAUSE...I BELIEVE THAT I PERSONALLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FOCUSED ON MY FLOWS; AND SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON THE SIC FOLLOWING UP WITH PROPER CHKLIST PROC. THIS IS NOT ONLY PROPER COMPANY PROC BUT IS ESSENTIAL; ESPECIALLY WHEN A DISSIMILAR FLT CREW WORKS TOGETHER; AND NOT NECESSARILY KNOWING WHAT TO ('AUTOMATICALLY') EXPECT FROM EACH OTHER. THERE WAS DEFINITELY A LAX ATMOSPHERE IN THE COCKPIT THAT DAY; AND ALTHOUGH THE TWO PLTS ARE SUPPOSED TO BACK EACH OTHER UP; ONE CANNOT ASSUME ANYTHING. IT MUST TAKE THE INITIATIVE OF AT LEAST ONE OF THE PLTS; IRREGARDLESS OF THE POSITION TO MAINTAIN PROPER COCKPIT DISCIPLINE AND PROC. THIS IS SOMETHING I HAVE BEEN MADE AWARE OF COUNTLESS TIMES DURING MY RECURRENT TRAINING SESSIONS; BUT IT TOOK UNTIL NOW TO LAND SQUARELY IN MY FACE. 'PERFORMANCE ANXIETY' MAY REMOTELY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR; WHERE THE HARDER ONE TRIES TO PLEASE SOMEONE AND NOT 'LOOK BAD;' THE EXACT OPPOSITE MAY SOMETIMES OCCUR. IN THE FUTURE; MY PROC AS EITHER PIC OR SIC WILL BE TO ADHERE TO PROPER CHKLIST PROC NO MATTER HOW SENIOR OR EXPERIENCED THE PLT IS THAT I'M WORKING WITH. ANOTHER THING IS TO SLOW DOWN TO CONCENTRATE ON THE PROPER FLOWS; AND NOT TRY TO IMPRESS ANYBODY WITH HOW QUICKLY I CAN HAVE THE AIRPLANE READY FOR TAXI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.