Narrative:

On the ILS runway 18R approach into mco in visual conditions we selected the gear down at 8 mi from the runway at 2400 ft AGL. On the landing checklist the gear response was called for by me and the first officer noted that the gear indicated 3 green and 3 red on the main panel; but 3 green on the overhead alternate gear indication. We notified tower that we were going around to troubleshoot. Our emergency checklist or QRH does not have a specific gear indicator section in tab 14 for this problem. The only reference is 'gear fails to extend' checklist. The note #2 states that if the overhead alternate panel shows 3 green then the gear is considered safe and down. So we completed the checklist and set up for the second approach. On the first go around tower and the airport ground operations people said that all 3 gear appeared down. We notified the flight attendants and the passenger of the issue; and that we had an alternate system giving us a safe gear indication. We set up for a second approach for landing and on short final we got the GPWS 'too low gear warning.' this made us uncomfortable and then went around again to re-troubleshoot. Again; the checklist did not have us turn off the gear warning inhibit switch; so we left the switch in the normal position. Both the first officer and myself concluded that the gear indication system had malfunctioned and that the overhead alternate indicators were accurate along with the drag felt in the aircraft and the tower gear down confirmation. I even went as far as to check that the gear handle was seated properly without raising it. We had the tower roll the emergency trucks as a precaution and I watched the HUD to see the 0 ft AGL at touchdown point so that if we did not feel a touchdown we would go around again. On the third approach with the too low gear verbal talking to us we landed without incident. The 3 red lights on the main panel went out on rollout. Taxied to the gate without incident. I put the write-up in the book; notified dispatch; maintenance control and operations. I also called our fodo and our B737 fleet manager about the issue. By this time we were tired after all the events and the long day we had had. There needs to be a gear disagreement indication checklist in our QRH. Especially an action that tells us to turn on the gear warning inhibit switch so we don't have to listen to the bogus warning. The GPWS obviously only looks at the main panel indications of unsafe gear; not the 3 green indications on the overhead. In hindsight we probably should have turned off that switch anyway. But; our training constantly emphasizes not to move any switches unless a checklist calls for it. In this case there was no real checklist for this malfunction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 FLT CREW NOTICED LNDG GEAR POSITION LIGHTS WERE RED AND GREEN AFTER GEAR EXTENSION. THE PROCEDURES HANDBOOK INDICATED THE GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED; AND THEY LANDED NORMALLY.

Narrative: ON THE ILS RWY 18R APCH INTO MCO IN VISUAL CONDITIONS WE SELECTED THE GEAR DOWN AT 8 MI FROM THE RWY AT 2400 FT AGL. ON THE LNDG CHKLIST THE GEAR RESPONSE WAS CALLED FOR BY ME AND THE FO NOTED THAT THE GEAR INDICATED 3 GREEN AND 3 RED ON THE MAIN PANEL; BUT 3 GREEN ON THE OVERHEAD ALTERNATE GEAR INDICATION. WE NOTIFIED TWR THAT WE WERE GOING AROUND TO TROUBLESHOOT. OUR EMER CHKLIST OR QRH DOES NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC GEAR INDICATOR SECTION IN TAB 14 FOR THIS PROB. THE ONLY REF IS 'GEAR FAILS TO EXTEND' CHKLIST. THE NOTE #2 STATES THAT IF THE OVERHEAD ALTERNATE PANEL SHOWS 3 GREEN THEN THE GEAR IS CONSIDERED SAFE AND DOWN. SO WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST AND SET UP FOR THE SECOND APCH. ON THE FIRST GAR TWR AND THE ARPT GND OPS PEOPLE SAID THAT ALL 3 GEAR APPEARED DOWN. WE NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THE PAX OF THE ISSUE; AND THAT WE HAD AN ALTERNATE SYS GIVING US A SAFE GEAR INDICATION. WE SET UP FOR A SECOND APCH FOR LNDG AND ON SHORT FINAL WE GOT THE GPWS 'TOO LOW GEAR WARNING.' THIS MADE US UNCOMFORTABLE AND THEN WENT AROUND AGAIN TO RE-TROUBLESHOOT. AGAIN; THE CHKLIST DID NOT HAVE US TURN OFF THE GEAR WARNING INHIBIT SWITCH; SO WE LEFT THE SWITCH IN THE NORMAL POS. BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF CONCLUDED THAT THE GEAR INDICATION SYS HAD MALFUNCTIONED AND THAT THE OVERHEAD ALTERNATE INDICATORS WERE ACCURATE ALONG WITH THE DRAG FELT IN THE ACFT AND THE TWR GEAR DOWN CONFIRMATION. I EVEN WENT AS FAR AS TO CHK THAT THE GEAR HANDLE WAS SEATED PROPERLY WITHOUT RAISING IT. WE HAD THE TWR ROLL THE EMER TRUCKS AS A PRECAUTION AND I WATCHED THE HUD TO SEE THE 0 FT AGL AT TOUCHDOWN POINT SO THAT IF WE DID NOT FEEL A TOUCHDOWN WE WOULD GO AROUND AGAIN. ON THE THIRD APCH WITH THE TOO LOW GEAR VERBAL TALKING TO US WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE 3 RED LIGHTS ON THE MAIN PANEL WENT OUT ON ROLLOUT. TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT INCIDENT. I PUT THE WRITE-UP IN THE BOOK; NOTIFIED DISPATCH; MAINT CTL AND OPS. I ALSO CALLED OUR FODO AND OUR B737 FLEET MGR ABOUT THE ISSUE. BY THIS TIME WE WERE TIRED AFTER ALL THE EVENTS AND THE LONG DAY WE HAD HAD. THERE NEEDS TO BE A GEAR DISAGREEMENT INDICATION CHKLIST IN OUR QRH. ESPECIALLY AN ACTION THAT TELLS US TO TURN ON THE GEAR WARNING INHIBIT SWITCH SO WE DON'T HAVE TO LISTEN TO THE BOGUS WARNING. THE GPWS OBVIOUSLY ONLY LOOKS AT THE MAIN PANEL INDICATIONS OF UNSAFE GEAR; NOT THE 3 GREEN INDICATIONS ON THE OVERHEAD. IN HINDSIGHT WE PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE TURNED OFF THAT SWITCH ANYWAY. BUT; OUR TRAINING CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZES NOT TO MOVE ANY SWITCHES UNLESS A CHKLIST CALLS FOR IT. IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NO REAL CHKLIST FOR THIS MALFUNCTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.