Narrative:

Upon executing the ILS 10; circle to runway 20R at dpa; we gained visual contact with the airport at 700 ft AGL. We stopped the descent at circling minimums; which happened to be just over 600 ft AGL. Upon visual identify of the airport; I transitioned my attention to inside the cockpit; in order to monitor the flight instruments while the first officer (PF) transitioned to visual references; outside of the cockpit. It was at night; with rain; turbulence; and a gusty wind from the south. The first officer acknowledged having the runway in sight. I was focused on monitoring his airspeed and vertical speed; as fluctuations were occurring. In the process; we were in a turn toward the landing runway; and I neglected to verify the correct runway alignment. The entire process happened very quickly. During landing; upon rollout; the tower advised us 'use caution; you are on runway 15.' we acknowledged; and turned onto an adjoining taxiway without further incident. The fact that it was night; marginal conditions; turbulent; gusty winds; and being in a turn towards the runway; all played a role in the event. As airspeed and vertical speed were fluctuating; I concentrated on keeping the first officer apprised of our indications in the cockpit; taking for granted that he had the correct runway in sight. The proper corrective action would have been to doublechk runway alignment with the HSI. The landing runway did not have an instrument approach for runway verification. A long duty day of over 12 hours also contributed to this situation. Had we executed the proper corrective actions for this situation; and realized we were lined up on the wrong runway; a missed approach should have been executed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CE560 CREW LANDED ON DPA RWY 15 VERSUS RWY 20R AS CLEARED; A 3400 FT RWY.

Narrative: UPON EXECUTING THE ILS 10; CIRCLE TO RWY 20R AT DPA; WE GAINED VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ARPT AT 700 FT AGL. WE STOPPED THE DSCNT AT CIRCLING MINIMUMS; WHICH HAPPENED TO BE JUST OVER 600 FT AGL. UPON VISUAL IDENT OF THE ARPT; I TRANSITIONED MY ATTN TO INSIDE THE COCKPIT; IN ORDER TO MONITOR THE FLT INSTS WHILE THE FO (PF) TRANSITIONED TO VISUAL REFS; OUTSIDE OF THE COCKPIT. IT WAS AT NIGHT; WITH RAIN; TURB; AND A GUSTY WIND FROM THE S. THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING THE RWY IN SIGHT. I WAS FOCUSED ON MONITORING HIS AIRSPD AND VERT SPD; AS FLUCTUATIONS WERE OCCURRING. IN THE PROCESS; WE WERE IN A TURN TOWARD THE LNDG RWY; AND I NEGLECTED TO VERIFY THE CORRECT RWY ALIGNMENT. THE ENTIRE PROCESS HAPPENED VERY QUICKLY. DURING LNDG; UPON ROLLOUT; THE TWR ADVISED US 'USE CAUTION; YOU ARE ON RWY 15.' WE ACKNOWLEDGED; AND TURNED ONTO AN ADJOINING TXWY WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE FACT THAT IT WAS NIGHT; MARGINAL CONDITIONS; TURBULENT; GUSTY WINDS; AND BEING IN A TURN TOWARDS THE RWY; ALL PLAYED A ROLE IN THE EVENT. AS AIRSPD AND VERT SPD WERE FLUCTUATING; I CONCENTRATED ON KEEPING THE FO APPRISED OF OUR INDICATIONS IN THE COCKPIT; TAKING FOR GRANTED THAT HE HAD THE CORRECT RWY IN SIGHT. THE PROPER CORRECTIVE ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO DOUBLECHK RWY ALIGNMENT WITH THE HSI. THE LNDG RWY DID NOT HAVE AN INST APCH FOR RWY VERIFICATION. A LONG DUTY DAY OF OVER 12 HRS ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SITUATION. HAD WE EXECUTED THE PROPER CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THIS SITUATION; AND REALIZED WE WERE LINED UP ON THE WRONG RWY; A MISSED APCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXECUTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.