|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Locale Reference||airport : elp.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 300|
|Controlling Facilities||tower : elp.tower|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B737-300|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||descent : approach|
|Route In Use||approach : traffic pattern|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 205|
flight time type : 4200
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 183|
flight time type : 17000
|Anomaly||non adherence : company policies|
|Independent Detector||aircraft equipment : gpws|
other flight crewa
|Resolutory Action||none taken : anomaly accepted|
Flight Crew Human Performance
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
It was our 4TH leg of the day and the flight was to elp. I was the PF and everything was proceeding normally until we started to approach elp. The ATIS was calling the winds from the southwest at 3 KTS gusting to 18 KTS. With runway 26L being closed; our choice was to land on runway 22. We were on about a 15 mi final for runway 22 when the tower told us the winds had shifted around to the north at 18 KTS and the controller offered us runway 4. We agreed that we could not land on runway 22 so we accepted a left downwind to runway 4. We entered the left downwind for runway 4 and overflew biggs aaf; and as we got closer to the mountains southwest of the elp airport; I acknowledged the captain's concern for the mountains. He encouraged me to turn base early because of the mountains; and because I thought the winds were out of the north; I figured that the wind would help to slow us down as we turned base and final. However; the wind aloft was still very strong from the southwest and blew us back in towards the airport. As I was turning onto the base leg at approximately 800 ft; the captain told me to keep the turn going. I understood that to mean that we were too close and going to fly through final; so I asked the captain where the runway was and he pointed out the window behind us. I told him I couldn't see the runway and I offered for him to take the airplane and finish the approach since he had a better view of the airport. He immediately accepted the aircraft from me and turned toward the airport. We went through final at about 500 ft and he continued the turn to re-intercept. At about 300 ft we got a 'pull up' warning from the GPWS and I called for a go around. The captain continued flying the approach and at about 100 ft we got another 'pull up' warning from the GPWS and this time I turned to him and said 'are you going to go around?' again; he continued with the approach and rather than try to wrestle for control of the aircraft below 100 ft; I let him land the aircraft. Once on the ground; I expressed my displeasure with the approach and we discussed it. The captain told me that he didn't hear the first 'pull up' warning but he did hear me call the go around. The whole approach would have been easier for me if I had made a right downwind for runway 4; but that would have involved flying over the field and there was another aircraft on approach for runway 26R. I also could have tried to forcibly take control of the aircraft; but at that low an altitude; I didn't think it was a good idea. More than anything; I guess a crew has to trust each other; and even though the PF may not know why the pilot monitoring calls for a go around; he/she should trust the judgement of the other pilot. Supplemental information from acn 721433: the volume on the warning must have been relatively quite low; so when the first officer said go around and I felt the landing was assured and hadn't heard the pull up warning; I assumed he meant because of the bumpy air or something. It just didn't sink in.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 FLT CREW LANDS OUT OF UNSTABILIZED APCH TO ELP.
Narrative: IT WAS OUR 4TH LEG OF THE DAY AND THE FLT WAS TO ELP. I WAS THE PF AND EVERYTHING WAS PROCEEDING NORMALLY UNTIL WE STARTED TO APCH ELP. THE ATIS WAS CALLING THE WINDS FROM THE SW AT 3 KTS GUSTING TO 18 KTS. WITH RWY 26L BEING CLOSED; OUR CHOICE WAS TO LAND ON RWY 22. WE WERE ON ABOUT A 15 MI FINAL FOR RWY 22 WHEN THE TWR TOLD US THE WINDS HAD SHIFTED AROUND TO THE N AT 18 KTS AND THE CTLR OFFERED US RWY 4. WE AGREED THAT WE COULD NOT LAND ON RWY 22 SO WE ACCEPTED A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 4. WE ENTERED THE L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 4 AND OVERFLEW BIGGS AAF; AND AS WE GOT CLOSER TO THE MOUNTAINS SW OF THE ELP ARPT; I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CAPT'S CONCERN FOR THE MOUNTAINS. HE ENCOURAGED ME TO TURN BASE EARLY BECAUSE OF THE MOUNTAINS; AND BECAUSE I THOUGHT THE WINDS WERE OUT OF THE N; I FIGURED THAT THE WIND WOULD HELP TO SLOW US DOWN AS WE TURNED BASE AND FINAL. HOWEVER; THE WIND ALOFT WAS STILL VERY STRONG FROM THE SW AND BLEW US BACK IN TOWARDS THE ARPT. AS I WAS TURNING ONTO THE BASE LEG AT APPROX 800 FT; THE CAPT TOLD ME TO KEEP THE TURN GOING. I UNDERSTOOD THAT TO MEAN THAT WE WERE TOO CLOSE AND GOING TO FLY THROUGH FINAL; SO I ASKED THE CAPT WHERE THE RWY WAS AND HE POINTED OUT THE WINDOW BEHIND US. I TOLD HIM I COULDN'T SEE THE RWY AND I OFFERED FOR HIM TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE AND FINISH THE APCH SINCE HE HAD A BETTER VIEW OF THE ARPT. HE IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED THE ACFT FROM ME AND TURNED TOWARD THE ARPT. WE WENT THROUGH FINAL AT ABOUT 500 FT AND HE CONTINUED THE TURN TO RE-INTERCEPT. AT ABOUT 300 FT WE GOT A 'PULL UP' WARNING FROM THE GPWS AND I CALLED FOR A GAR. THE CAPT CONTINUED FLYING THE APCH AND AT ABOUT 100 FT WE GOT ANOTHER 'PULL UP' WARNING FROM THE GPWS AND THIS TIME I TURNED TO HIM AND SAID 'ARE YOU GOING TO GO AROUND?' AGAIN; HE CONTINUED WITH THE APCH AND RATHER THAN TRY TO WRESTLE FOR CTL OF THE ACFT BELOW 100 FT; I LET HIM LAND THE ACFT. ONCE ON THE GND; I EXPRESSED MY DISPLEASURE WITH THE APCH AND WE DISCUSSED IT. THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT HE DIDN'T HEAR THE FIRST 'PULL UP' WARNING BUT HE DID HEAR ME CALL THE GAR. THE WHOLE APCH WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER FOR ME IF I HAD MADE A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 4; BUT THAT WOULD HAVE INVOLVED FLYING OVER THE FIELD AND THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT ON APCH FOR RWY 26R. I ALSO COULD HAVE TRIED TO FORCIBLY TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT; BUT AT THAT LOW AN ALT; I DIDN'T THINK IT WAS A GOOD IDEA. MORE THAN ANYTHING; I GUESS A CREW HAS TO TRUST EACH OTHER; AND EVEN THOUGH THE PF MAY NOT KNOW WHY THE PLT MONITORING CALLS FOR A GAR; HE/SHE SHOULD TRUST THE JUDGEMENT OF THE OTHER PLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 721433: THE VOLUME ON THE WARNING MUST HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY QUITE LOW; SO WHEN THE FO SAID GAR AND I FELT THE LNDG WAS ASSURED AND HADN'T HEARD THE PULL UP WARNING; I ASSUMED HE MEANT BECAUSE OF THE BUMPY AIR OR SOMETHING. IT JUST DIDN'T SINK IN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.