Narrative:

Captain flying a night approach into rno. ATC put a heavy other carrier in front of us; which held us up 5000 ft above descent profile. At FL300 speed brakes were extended less than half and remained out for the rest of the descent. We were vectored wbound towards the localizer for runway 16R and told to follow the heavy aircraft to the field and cleared for the approach. I accepted; but the captain realized we were not going to be able to keep the heavy in sight due to a thin layer of clouds between us. I told ATC we were unable at that point and the approach clearance was cancelled. We were put on a vector until we reestablished contact with the airfield and traffic and again cleared for the visual approach behind traffic. The captain began to configure the aircraft for a flaps 30 degree approach and we noticed what appeared to be wake turbulence from the heavy traffic in front of us. We both commented on what appeared to be wake turbulence and then directed me to ask for runway 16L to get out of it. We were approved to sidestep to the other runway and the captain called for 40 degree flaps because we were a little high trying to stay above the GS of the heavy. The rumble increased even though we were lined up on the other runway. The captain directed a go around to assess. During the clean up and climb out; another captain from the back of the aircraft informed us that our speed brakes were out. Both crew members need to be aware of the aircraft confign no matter who is flying and who is monitoring. First officer's should not take for granted that the more experienced captain is properly configuring the aircraft during a very busy descent and approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLT CREW EXECUTES A GAR.

Narrative: CAPT FLYING A NIGHT APCH INTO RNO. ATC PUT A HVY OTHER CARRIER IN FRONT OF US; WHICH HELD US UP 5000 FT ABOVE DSCNT PROFILE. AT FL300 SPD BRAKES WERE EXTENDED LESS THAN HALF AND REMAINED OUT FOR THE REST OF THE DSCNT. WE WERE VECTORED WBOUND TOWARDS THE LOC FOR RWY 16R AND TOLD TO FOLLOW THE HVY ACFT TO THE FIELD AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. I ACCEPTED; BUT THE CAPT REALIZED WE WERE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO KEEP THE HVY IN SIGHT DUE TO A THIN LAYER OF CLOUDS BTWN US. I TOLD ATC WE WERE UNABLE AT THAT POINT AND THE APCH CLRNC WAS CANCELLED. WE WERE PUT ON A VECTOR UNTIL WE REESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH THE AIRFIELD AND TFC AND AGAIN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH BEHIND TFC. THE CAPT BEGAN TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR A FLAPS 30 DEG APCH AND WE NOTICED WHAT APPEARED TO BE WAKE TURB FROM THE HVY TFC IN FRONT OF US. WE BOTH COMMENTED ON WHAT APPEARED TO BE WAKE TURB AND THEN DIRECTED ME TO ASK FOR RWY 16L TO GET OUT OF IT. WE WERE APPROVED TO SIDESTEP TO THE OTHER RWY AND THE CAPT CALLED FOR 40 DEG FLAPS BECAUSE WE WERE A LITTLE HIGH TRYING TO STAY ABOVE THE GS OF THE HVY. THE RUMBLE INCREASED EVEN THOUGH WE WERE LINED UP ON THE OTHER RWY. THE CAPT DIRECTED A GAR TO ASSESS. DURING THE CLEAN UP AND CLBOUT; ANOTHER CAPT FROM THE BACK OF THE ACFT INFORMED US THAT OUR SPD BRAKES WERE OUT. BOTH CREW MEMBERS NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE ACFT CONFIGN NO MATTER WHO IS FLYING AND WHO IS MONITORING. FO'S SHOULD NOT TAKE FOR GRANTED THAT THE MORE EXPERIENCED CAPT IS PROPERLY CONFIGURING THE ACFT DURING A VERY BUSY DSCNT AND APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.