Narrative:

Upon shutdown at the gate; maintenance personnel opened the fueling panel and found several switches on the fueling panel still on; including a defuel switch; which is never supposed to be used in normal fueling and should have been safety-wired closed. Training manuals state these switches are to be used by maintenance only and can cause fuel to xfer from tank-to-tank if left open with the electric boost pumps on. Contributing cause was also a broken device on the fuel door which contacts the switch covers; closing the switch when the panel is closed to prevent the switches from being left open. No one knew why the defuel switch was open to begin with. We were questioned as to whether the fuel imbal existed after fueling and we failed to notice it; but the captain and I were positive fuel was balanced after fueling. This was later confirmed by a test fueling with the defuel switch open; which resulted in proper fuel balance. Flight was preparing to depart. Gave fueler the fuel load of 1400 pounds a side; or 2800 pounds total. Aircraft had 700 pounds a side prior to fueling. Fuel was received and confirmed by 'before start checklist' as 1400 pounds a side as requested. Walkaround after fueling verified that there were no fuel leaks or abnormalities; and fuel service panel was shut properly. Engine start was normal and we taxied for approximately 15 mins to runway 27L. After takeoff; a large right wing down tendency upon liftoff was observed. Instrument scan indicated that fuel was imbal and decided to contact ATC to return to field. Left engine flamed out due to no fuel in the left tank. We performed the engine failure checklist and declared an emergency. We were vectored for a visual approach and landed without incident. I performed the takeoff and noted a large right wing down tendency upon liftoff. When scanning the instruments; I noted that all of the fuel from the left wing had somehow xferred into the right wing tank; resulting in a 2500-2600 pound imbal. When we realized the fuel imbal; we decided to return to the field as soon as possible. About 1 min later; passing about 2000 ft; the left engine flamed out due to no fuel in the left tank. The fuel xfeed was not open; and there is no way to xfer fuel from wing-to-wing by pilot action. We performed the engine failure checklist and declared an emergency. We were vectored for a visual approach and landed without incident. After the 'before start checklist;' there is no other checklist prior to takeoff which calls for rechking fuel quantity or balance. I would suggest that 'fuel balance/xfeed' be included not only on the before-start and before-takeoff checklists; but also on the climb; cruise; and descent checklists.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN UNSPECIFIED ACFT TYPE'S L ENG FLAMED OUT BECAUSE AN OPEN DEFUELING VALVE ALLOWED ALL L TANK FUEL TO XFER TO THE R TANK.

Narrative: UPON SHUTDOWN AT THE GATE; MAINT PERSONNEL OPENED THE FUELING PANEL AND FOUND SEVERAL SWITCHES ON THE FUELING PANEL STILL ON; INCLUDING A DEFUEL SWITCH; WHICH IS NEVER SUPPOSED TO BE USED IN NORMAL FUELING AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SAFETY-WIRED CLOSED. TRAINING MANUALS STATE THESE SWITCHES ARE TO BE USED BY MAINT ONLY AND CAN CAUSE FUEL TO XFER FROM TANK-TO-TANK IF LEFT OPEN WITH THE ELECTRIC BOOST PUMPS ON. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE WAS ALSO A BROKEN DEVICE ON THE FUEL DOOR WHICH CONTACTS THE SWITCH COVERS; CLOSING THE SWITCH WHEN THE PANEL IS CLOSED TO PREVENT THE SWITCHES FROM BEING LEFT OPEN. NO ONE KNEW WHY THE DEFUEL SWITCH WAS OPEN TO BEGIN WITH. WE WERE QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER THE FUEL IMBAL EXISTED AFTER FUELING AND WE FAILED TO NOTICE IT; BUT THE CAPT AND I WERE POSITIVE FUEL WAS BALANCED AFTER FUELING. THIS WAS LATER CONFIRMED BY A TEST FUELING WITH THE DEFUEL SWITCH OPEN; WHICH RESULTED IN PROPER FUEL BAL. FLT WAS PREPARING TO DEPART. GAVE FUELER THE FUEL LOAD OF 1400 LBS A SIDE; OR 2800 LBS TOTAL. ACFT HAD 700 LBS A SIDE PRIOR TO FUELING. FUEL WAS RECEIVED AND CONFIRMED BY 'BEFORE START CHKLIST' AS 1400 LBS A SIDE AS REQUESTED. WALKAROUND AFTER FUELING VERIFIED THAT THERE WERE NO FUEL LEAKS OR ABNORMALITIES; AND FUEL SVC PANEL WAS SHUT PROPERLY. ENG START WAS NORMAL AND WE TAXIED FOR APPROX 15 MINS TO RWY 27L. AFTER TKOF; A LARGE R WING DOWN TENDENCY UPON LIFTOFF WAS OBSERVED. INST SCAN INDICATED THAT FUEL WAS IMBAL AND DECIDED TO CONTACT ATC TO RETURN TO FIELD. L ENG FLAMED OUT DUE TO NO FUEL IN THE L TANK. WE PERFORMED THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST AND DECLARED AN EMER. WE WERE VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I PERFORMED THE TKOF AND NOTED A LARGE R WING DOWN TENDENCY UPON LIFTOFF. WHEN SCANNING THE INSTS; I NOTED THAT ALL OF THE FUEL FROM THE L WING HAD SOMEHOW XFERRED INTO THE R WING TANK; RESULTING IN A 2500-2600 LB IMBAL. WHEN WE REALIZED THE FUEL IMBAL; WE DECIDED TO RETURN TO THE FIELD ASAP. ABOUT 1 MIN LATER; PASSING ABOUT 2000 FT; THE L ENG FLAMED OUT DUE TO NO FUEL IN THE L TANK. THE FUEL XFEED WAS NOT OPEN; AND THERE IS NO WAY TO XFER FUEL FROM WING-TO-WING BY PLT ACTION. WE PERFORMED THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST AND DECLARED AN EMER. WE WERE VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER THE 'BEFORE START CHKLIST;' THERE IS NO OTHER CHKLIST PRIOR TO TKOF WHICH CALLS FOR RECHKING FUEL QUANTITY OR BAL. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT 'FUEL BAL/XFEED' BE INCLUDED NOT ONLY ON THE BEFORE-START AND BEFORE-TKOF CHKLISTS; BUT ALSO ON THE CLB; CRUISE; AND DSCNT CHKLISTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.