Narrative:

Everything was normal until we approached runway 17R for takeoff. I was finishing the start sequence of the second engine turning onto taxiway M northbound. At the same time these procedures were being completed; the final weights came to the ACARS printer and these final entries needed to be addressed. Of course; in order to complete this entry; the first officer by necessity has to have his head down and I verbalized this. As I was finishing the final weights entry into the mcdu; the 'cleared for takeoff; runway 17R' call was issued to us shortly after we were northbound on taxiway M. Just as I was finishing these procedures along with the before takeoff checklist; the captain was turning the corner eastbound towards runway 17R and I was assuming it was onto taxiway M10; as my head was slightly down finishing up the verification of the final items. Just as I looked up; I suddenly realized we were on taxiway M9 almost crossing the hold line. The difference in performance from this taxiway was negligible and I selected toga thrust for the takeoff from this intersection. If I remember correctly; we had an approximately 700 pound pad while using reduced thrust from taxiway M10. The point I am trying to emphasize in this safety program is I did not feel rushed finishing these required procedures until I realized a turn was made 1 taxiway short (M9) of where we should have been (M10) and commenced the takeoff. This mistake was made because of an incorrect emphasis on saving fuel (in the wrong place); now has created a severely decreased cushion of safety in a high threat environment -- that of taxiing to active runways. To be totally honest; there is no reason why single engine taxi should be attempted when using either runway 34R or runway 17R from the gates. I think this should be looked at in light of what happened to us and who knows what is not reported that crews might be missing because one set of eyes is down; or trying to catch up or rushing to finish the checklist. The margin of safety is too thin to attempt southeast taxi at some departure runways from where the aircraft are parked. I can only comment on our particular case today -- southeast taxi definitely contributed to this event and I will advocate to not commence southeast taxi to either runway 34R or runway 17R in denver in the future.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW DEPARTS RWY FROM THE WRONG INTXN WHILE THE FO IS HEADS DOWN ATTEMPTING TO FINISH PROCS AND CHKLIST PRIOR TO DEP.

Narrative: EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL UNTIL WE APCHED RWY 17R FOR TKOF. I WAS FINISHING THE START SEQUENCE OF THE SECOND ENG TURNING ONTO TXWY M NBOUND. AT THE SAME TIME THESE PROCS WERE BEING COMPLETED; THE FINAL WTS CAME TO THE ACARS PRINTER AND THESE FINAL ENTRIES NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED. OF COURSE; IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THIS ENTRY; THE FO BY NECESSITY HAS TO HAVE HIS HEAD DOWN AND I VERBALIZED THIS. AS I WAS FINISHING THE FINAL WTS ENTRY INTO THE MCDU; THE 'CLRED FOR TKOF; RWY 17R' CALL WAS ISSUED TO US SHORTLY AFTER WE WERE NBOUND ON TXWY M. JUST AS I WAS FINISHING THESE PROCS ALONG WITH THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST; THE CAPT WAS TURNING THE CORNER EBOUND TOWARDS RWY 17R AND I WAS ASSUMING IT WAS ONTO TXWY M10; AS MY HEAD WAS SLIGHTLY DOWN FINISHING UP THE VERIFICATION OF THE FINAL ITEMS. JUST AS I LOOKED UP; I SUDDENLY REALIZED WE WERE ON TXWY M9 ALMOST XING THE HOLD LINE. THE DIFFERENCE IN PERFORMANCE FROM THIS TXWY WAS NEGLIGIBLE AND I SELECTED TOGA THRUST FOR THE TKOF FROM THIS INTXN. IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY; WE HAD AN APPROX 700 LB PAD WHILE USING REDUCED THRUST FROM TXWY M10. THE POINT I AM TRYING TO EMPHASIZE IN THIS SAFETY PROGRAM IS I DID NOT FEEL RUSHED FINISHING THESE REQUIRED PROCS UNTIL I REALIZED A TURN WAS MADE 1 TXWY SHORT (M9) OF WHERE WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN (M10) AND COMMENCED THE TKOF. THIS MISTAKE WAS MADE BECAUSE OF AN INCORRECT EMPHASIS ON SAVING FUEL (IN THE WRONG PLACE); NOW HAS CREATED A SEVERELY DECREASED CUSHION OF SAFETY IN A HIGH THREAT ENVIRONMENT -- THAT OF TAXIING TO ACTIVE RWYS. TO BE TOTALLY HONEST; THERE IS NO REASON WHY SINGLE ENG TAXI SHOULD BE ATTEMPTED WHEN USING EITHER RWY 34R OR RWY 17R FROM THE GATES. I THINK THIS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAPPENED TO US AND WHO KNOWS WHAT IS NOT RPTED THAT CREWS MIGHT BE MISSING BECAUSE ONE SET OF EYES IS DOWN; OR TRYING TO CATCH UP OR RUSHING TO FINISH THE CHKLIST. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS TOO THIN TO ATTEMPT SE TAXI AT SOME DEP RWYS FROM WHERE THE ACFT ARE PARKED. I CAN ONLY COMMENT ON OUR PARTICULAR CASE TODAY -- SE TAXI DEFINITELY CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT AND I WILL ADVOCATE TO NOT COMMENCE SE TAXI TO EITHER RWY 34R OR RWY 17R IN DENVER IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.