ZAU controller described conflict resulting from confusion of departure procedures from both ord and...

Attributes
ACN	711974
Time
Date	200610
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	navaid : obk.vor
State Reference	IL
Altitude	msl single value : 11000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zau.artcc
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Regional Jet 200 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zau.artcc
Operator	general aviation : personal
Make Model Name	Gulfstream V
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Route In Use	departure : on vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : radar
Qualification	controller : radar
Experience	controller radar : 20 controller time certified in position1 : 20
ASRS Report	711974
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : published procedure
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted
Supplementary
Problem Areas	FAA
Primary Problem	FAA
Situations
ATC Facility	procedure or policy : zau.artcc

Narrative:

The FAA procedure when ord changes runways and thus changes departure boxes with mke approach does not work safely! This dangerous event happens all the time! Head on departures. I noticed CRJ200 climbing off ord in west box and took handoff. I noticed G5 climbing off of mke in east box and took handoff. I noticed the G5 turning hard west going to west box. I called ord-a and asked which box are they in; he said 'west box for 2 more flts -- CRJ200 and air carrier Y.' I then called mke-a and asked which box are you in; he said 'west box; that's what ord-a told him.' I then called ord-a immediately and told him to 'stop CRJ200 at 11000 ft and my control to insure separation.' the procedure in place to change boxes is dangerous and obviously does not work!

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAU CTLR DESCRIBED CONFLICT RESULTING FROM CONFUSION OF DEP PROCS FROM BOTH ORD AND MKE.

Narrative: THE FAA PROC WHEN ORD CHANGES RWYS AND THUS CHANGES DEP BOXES WITH MKE APCH DOES NOT WORK SAFELY! THIS DANGEROUS EVENT HAPPENS ALL THE TIME! HEAD ON DEPS. I NOTICED CRJ200 CLBING OFF ORD IN W BOX AND TOOK HDOF. I NOTICED G5 CLBING OFF OF MKE IN E BOX AND TOOK HDOF. I NOTICED THE G5 TURNING HARD W GOING TO W BOX. I CALLED ORD-A AND ASKED WHICH BOX ARE THEY IN; HE SAID 'W BOX FOR 2 MORE FLTS -- CRJ200 AND ACR Y.' I THEN CALLED MKE-A AND ASKED WHICH BOX ARE YOU IN; HE SAID 'W BOX; THAT'S WHAT ORD-A TOLD HIM.' I THEN CALLED ORD-A IMMEDIATELY AND TOLD HIM TO 'STOP CRJ200 AT 11000 FT AND MY CTL TO INSURE SEPARATION.' THE PROC IN PLACE TO CHANGE BOXES IS DANGEROUS AND OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT WORK!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

ZAU controller described conflict resulting from confusion of departure procedures from both ord and mke.