Narrative:

I was working the north departure and north high position combined at phl TRACON. This was a known time of day to be very busy. The traffic volume for both position could be easily validated by the tmu; which was fully staffed; and the display tools available to both the operations manager and controller in charge on duty. The facility is presently under direction to have these 2 position split under moderate traffic periods. At the time in question there was moderate traffic or greater for both position; yet both position were combined and stayed combined over a 20 min period in which departures were stopped twice and teterboro arrs were stopped. During this period an operational deviation took place. ZNY; mxe sector entered my airspace without coordination and without a proper handoff. This aircraft which I had no advance warning of; entered my airspace on a route opposite direction to the traffic flow at 9000 ft; both route and altitude were incorrect. At the time I had no strip on SR22 which would have required computer entries to change both route and altitude. At a less busier time I would have been able to accommodate this request. This was not a less busier time. A lot has been said of whether or not I asked for help. I did ask for help. While running a strip to another sector myself; I told the controller in charge that I was too busy for both sectors; that north high position should have been opened; and he agreed. After I stopped departures the first time I noticed the operations manager standing behind me; arms crossed saying; 'he won't answer the line.' the operations manager at this time is seeing SR22 well within our boundary; and is oblivious to the fact that I couldn't answer the line because other controllers and aircraft that were calling me. This scene is so descriptive of the working environment at phl. The operations manager who had ample time and knowledge of the developing situation; who is supposed to oversee the operation and the supervisor/controller in charge of the floor; who has a staff specialist designated (tmc) to advise him of the traffic picture; who has been directed by facility management to watch these 2 position specifically; who after approaching me and seeing how many strips were in front of me (10-12) and how fast I was talking; heard me stop departures a second time; could not offer the least amount of help. The operations manager could have plugged in or had someone else plug in to see how many aircraft were calling and how many developing situations I was watching. Had the operations manager taken any steps; this operational deviation would not have happened. The operations manager's reluctance to offer assistance may be due to his not being certified. A cursory monitoring of the position would have answered his question as to why I couldn't answer the line. Controllers work and resolve confliction mins before they happen. The operations manager/supervisor/tmc work problems hours before they happen. On this shift I went over 2 hours on position. There is no one available to work handoff position when a combined position gets saturated. Position are combined; controllers are working over 2 hours or up to 2 hours every cycle; yet 3 people (operations manager/satcs/tmc) don't see this coming. After I got the departures and the teb arrs started moving I coordinated with ZNY reference SR22. During the coordination I was asked why I did not take SR22 initially. I said that I was too busy to answer the line and the aircraft had not been appreqed (a term used to approve coordination on a flight prior to working him). Before I was relieved and after I coordinated with the center and took SR22; I had 3 aircraft in handoff status to the same sector in the center. The same controller was not taking the handoffs until after I called him back again and well after the normal handoff point. When I asked the same controller why he was not taking the handoffs he replied 'because they were not appreqed.' there is presently no accountability of the operations manager position and little or none for the supervisor/controller in charge. No one is accountable for the many mistakes that could have prevented this. I feel reporting the operational deviation and criticizing the operations manager will lead to retaliation against me; not only from fellow controllers at the center; who will never be told the unbelievably unfair position I was placed in by the operations manager; but also by the operations manager himself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PHL CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING UNRPTED OPDEV AND MGMNT'S RELUCTANCE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE POS STAFFING.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE N DEP AND N HIGH POS COMBINED AT PHL TRACON. THIS WAS A KNOWN TIME OF DAY TO BE VERY BUSY. THE TFC VOLUME FOR BOTH POS COULD BE EASILY VALIDATED BY THE TMU; WHICH WAS FULLY STAFFED; AND THE DISPLAY TOOLS AVAILABLE TO BOTH THE OPS MGR AND CIC ON DUTY. THE FACILITY IS PRESENTLY UNDER DIRECTION TO HAVE THESE 2 POS SPLIT UNDER MODERATE TFC PERIODS. AT THE TIME IN QUESTION THERE WAS MODERATE TFC OR GREATER FOR BOTH POS; YET BOTH POS WERE COMBINED AND STAYED COMBINED OVER A 20 MIN PERIOD IN WHICH DEPS WERE STOPPED TWICE AND TETERBORO ARRS WERE STOPPED. DURING THIS PERIOD AN OPDEV TOOK PLACE. ZNY; MXE SECTOR ENTERED MY AIRSPACE WITHOUT COORD AND WITHOUT A PROPER HDOF. THIS ACFT WHICH I HAD NO ADVANCE WARNING OF; ENTERED MY AIRSPACE ON A RTE OPPOSITE DIRECTION TO THE TFC FLOW AT 9000 FT; BOTH RTE AND ALT WERE INCORRECT. AT THE TIME I HAD NO STRIP ON SR22 WHICH WOULD HAVE REQUIRED COMPUTER ENTRIES TO CHANGE BOTH RTE AND ALT. AT A LESS BUSIER TIME I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THIS REQUEST. THIS WAS NOT A LESS BUSIER TIME. A LOT HAS BEEN SAID OF WHETHER OR NOT I ASKED FOR HELP. I DID ASK FOR HELP. WHILE RUNNING A STRIP TO ANOTHER SECTOR MYSELF; I TOLD THE CIC THAT I WAS TOO BUSY FOR BOTH SECTORS; THAT N HIGH POS SHOULD HAVE BEEN OPENED; AND HE AGREED. AFTER I STOPPED DEPS THE FIRST TIME I NOTICED THE OPS MGR STANDING BEHIND ME; ARMS CROSSED SAYING; 'HE WON'T ANSWER THE LINE.' THE OPS MGR AT THIS TIME IS SEEING SR22 WELL WITHIN OUR BOUNDARY; AND IS OBLIVIOUS TO THE FACT THAT I COULDN'T ANSWER THE LINE BECAUSE OTHER CTLRS AND ACFT THAT WERE CALLING ME. THIS SCENE IS SO DESCRIPTIVE OF THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT AT PHL. THE OPS MGR WHO HAD AMPLE TIME AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEVELOPING SITUATION; WHO IS SUPPOSED TO OVERSEE THE OP AND THE SUPVR/CIC OF THE FLOOR; WHO HAS A STAFF SPECIALIST DESIGNATED (TMC) TO ADVISE HIM OF THE TFC PICTURE; WHO HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY FACILITY MGMNT TO WATCH THESE 2 POS SPECIFICALLY; WHO AFTER APCHING ME AND SEEING HOW MANY STRIPS WERE IN FRONT OF ME (10-12) AND HOW FAST I WAS TALKING; HEARD ME STOP DEPS A SECOND TIME; COULD NOT OFFER THE LEAST AMOUNT OF HELP. THE OPS MGR COULD HAVE PLUGGED IN OR HAD SOMEONE ELSE PLUG IN TO SEE HOW MANY ACFT WERE CALLING AND HOW MANY DEVELOPING SITUATIONS I WAS WATCHING. HAD THE OPS MGR TAKEN ANY STEPS; THIS OPDEV WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. THE OPS MGR'S RELUCTANCE TO OFFER ASSISTANCE MAY BE DUE TO HIS NOT BEING CERTIFIED. A CURSORY MONITORING OF THE POS WOULD HAVE ANSWERED HIS QUESTION AS TO WHY I COULDN'T ANSWER THE LINE. CTLRS WORK AND RESOLVE CONFLICTION MINS BEFORE THEY HAPPEN. THE OPS MGR/SUPVR/TMC WORK PROBS HRS BEFORE THEY HAPPEN. ON THIS SHIFT I WENT OVER 2 HRS ON POS. THERE IS NO ONE AVAILABLE TO WORK HDOF POS WHEN A COMBINED POS GETS SATURATED. POS ARE COMBINED; CTLRS ARE WORKING OVER 2 HRS OR UP TO 2 HRS EVERY CYCLE; YET 3 PEOPLE (OPS MGR/SATCS/TMC) DON'T SEE THIS COMING. AFTER I GOT THE DEPS AND THE TEB ARRS STARTED MOVING I COORDINATED WITH ZNY REF SR22. DURING THE COORD I WAS ASKED WHY I DID NOT TAKE SR22 INITIALLY. I SAID THAT I WAS TOO BUSY TO ANSWER THE LINE AND THE ACFT HAD NOT BEEN APPREQED (A TERM USED TO APPROVE COORD ON A FLT PRIOR TO WORKING HIM). BEFORE I WAS RELIEVED AND AFTER I COORDINATED WITH THE CTR AND TOOK SR22; I HAD 3 ACFT IN HDOF STATUS TO THE SAME SECTOR IN THE CTR. THE SAME CTLR WAS NOT TAKING THE HDOFS UNTIL AFTER I CALLED HIM BACK AGAIN AND WELL AFTER THE NORMAL HDOF POINT. WHEN I ASKED THE SAME CTLR WHY HE WAS NOT TAKING THE HDOFS HE REPLIED 'BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT APPREQED.' THERE IS PRESENTLY NO ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE OPS MGR POS AND LITTLE OR NONE FOR THE SUPVR/CIC. NO ONE IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE MANY MISTAKES THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS. I FEEL RPTING THE OPDEV AND CRITICIZING THE OPS MGR WILL LEAD TO RETALIATION AGAINST ME; NOT ONLY FROM FELLOW CTLRS AT THE CTR; WHO WILL NEVER BE TOLD THE UNBELIEVABLY UNFAIR POS I WAS PLACED IN BY THE OPS MGR; BUT ALSO BY THE OPS MGR HIMSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.