|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : sfo.airport|
|Altitude||msl single value : 1000|
|Controlling Facilities||tower : sfo.tower|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B737-500|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||descent : approach|
|Route In Use||arrival star : n/s|
|Affiliation||government : faa|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 200|
flight time total : 10000
flight time type : 5000
|Anomaly||non adherence : published procedure|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : anomaly accepted|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
ATC Human Performance
Sfo tower is doing a test period and having pilots hold off contacting tower until 4.3 DME; however; this ATIS advises 3.4 DME. I find this procedure to be unsafe; as the check-in with tower occurs approximately 1000 ft; which coincides and potentially conflicts with our normal callouts and landing clearance verification. This is an example of de-standardizing the system and safety process. I still recommend contacting tower at the FAF and getting landing clearance; which can always be changed by ATC and execute a missed approach if necessary. This new procedure also is setting up the pilots for failure; because we have to manually enter a 4.3 point in the approach page for a reminder versus the FAF which is already displayed. Basically causing increased workload during critical phase of flight.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-500 PLT IS CONCERNED WITH A PROC ATC WAS TESTING REGARDING THE LOCATION CONTACTING TWR FOR LNDG AND THE INSTRUCTIONS ON ATIS.
Narrative: SFO TWR IS DOING A TEST PERIOD AND HAVING PLTS HOLD OFF CONTACTING TWR UNTIL 4.3 DME; HOWEVER; THIS ATIS ADVISES 3.4 DME. I FIND THIS PROC TO BE UNSAFE; AS THE CHK-IN WITH TWR OCCURS APPROX 1000 FT; WHICH COINCIDES AND POTENTIALLY CONFLICTS WITH OUR NORMAL CALLOUTS AND LNDG CLRNC VERIFICATION. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF DE-STANDARDIZING THE SYS AND SAFETY PROCESS. I STILL RECOMMEND CONTACTING TWR AT THE FAF AND GETTING LNDG CLRNC; WHICH CAN ALWAYS BE CHANGED BY ATC AND EXECUTE A MISSED APCH IF NECESSARY. THIS NEW PROC ALSO IS SETTING UP THE PLTS FOR FAILURE; BECAUSE WE HAVE TO MANUALLY ENTER A 4.3 POINT IN THE APCH PAGE FOR A REMINDER VERSUS THE FAF WHICH IS ALREADY DISPLAYED. BASICALLY CAUSING INCREASED WORKLOAD DURING CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.