Narrative:

While descending for an approach into lax; the first officer briefed the seavu one arrival to an ILS approach to runway 25R. Runway 25L was notamed closed and the ATIS advertised runways were for an ILS to either runway 25R or runway 24R. The first officer's briefing of the seavu one arrival chart was very thorough with particular emphasis placed on the many crossing restrictions and waypoint names. We discussed that we were both unfamiliar with this arrival and also not accustomed to approaching runway 25R as opposed to runway 25L. I verified all of the waypoint names and crossing restrictions in the FMGC matched those on the lax chart. We were cleared by lax center to cross the konzl intersection at 17000 ft. Just after passing konzl we were handed off to socal approach. After checking in with socal approach; we were cleared to descend via the seavu one arrival for runway 24R. I confirmed with socal that our runway assignment was runway 24R and reprogrammed the FMGC for the seavu one arrival to runway 24R. We started our descent to comply with our descend via clearance while the first officer rebriefed the seavu one arrival to ILS runway 24R. I verified that the new waypoints and crossing restrictions for the runway 24R transition now matched those displayed in the FMGC. When the first officer completed his approach briefing for our new runway assignment; I completed the approach descent checklist. I then went off VHF 1 to seat the passenger. When I returned to VHF 1 after making my required PA announcement; I verified where we were on the STAR and that we were still on profile and making our crossing restrictions. The STAR portion of the approach is normal up to dixxn intersection which we crossed at about 12500 ft at 290 KTS. After the dixxn intersection; I transitioned my scan of the STAR chart to the more detailed inset portion. I had considerable difficulty reading the chart restrictions and I made numerous errors while reading the charted altitudes due to the close text spacing of the various lead in depictions and crossing restrictions to each runway on the inset portion of the chart. I found the numbered notes which referred to crossing restrictions printed in the lower left hand portion of the chart inset to be particularly confusing and difficult to read. As we both struggled to interpret the STAR chart and cross check with the FMGC while setting the next crossing altitudes in the MCP window; we became distracted from monitoring our descent profile with the autoplt on and did not recognize that we were starting to get high on the profile. Being a little high on profile was not a problem at first; because most of the crossing restrictions were 'at or above' clrnces until we reached the decor fix; which has a restriction to cross between 9800 ft and 9000 ft. As we approached the decor fix; I recognized and called out that we were high. The first officer disengaged the autoplt; fully extended the speed brakes and lowered the nose in an attempt to make the restriction. I believe we ended up crossing decor at 10400 ft; 600 ft high. After passing decor; I set 8000 ft in the MCP altitude window for the breea fix. It was only then that I noticed we were at 280 KTS below 10000 ft. I called out; 'airspeed; we need to slow to 250 KTS' to the first officer; and he immediately leveled off and decelerated to 250 KTS. After correcting as best as we could for both our altitude deviation and overspd below 10000 ft; we were able to catch up with the profile and complete a stabilized ILS approach to runway 24R. The rest of our approach and landing was normal. After we parked; we took some time to debrief and talk about how we ended up getting behind on the arrival. Even though we thoroughly briefed the STAR; we both felt that the seavu one arrival chart was very difficult to read and interpret. We found three areas that were particularly difficult. First was the inset portion of the chart which contains the routing depiction and crossing restrictions for four different runways. This section of the chart is very cluttered and 'busy.' referring back to this section at a glance for cross check is nearly impossible. Second; the scale depiction of the distance between luvyn and minza makes the distance between these fixes look deceptively long; when in reality they are in total only 3 miles apart. We both discussed that this deceptive scale depiction gave us the false impression that we had a much greater distance in which to descend than we actually did. Third; the closely spaced notes referring to the crossing restriction at skoll; breea; and palac make missing the decor restriction very easy. It was in this area of the arrival that we both became distracted enough to fall behind the profile. Somewhere in there we were also supposed to slow to 250 KTS for the below 10000 ft speed restriction. Now that I have experienced the seavu one arrival; I will be even more vigilant as to its fast paced pitfalls. I have also highlighted and noted the STAR chart to remind me to pay particular attention to the many details of this chart that are hard to find in the heat of the battle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR PLT RPTS THAT THE LAX SEAVU ONE STAR CHART FORMATTING IS VERY DIFFICULT TO READ AND CAN CONTRIBUTE TO CREW DISTRACTION. AN ALT DEV OCCURRED.

Narrative: WHILE DSNDING FOR AN APCH INTO LAX; THE FO BRIEFED THE SEAVU ONE ARR TO AN ILS APCH TO RWY 25R. RWY 25L WAS NOTAMED CLOSED AND THE ATIS ADVERTISED RWYS WERE FOR AN ILS TO EITHER RWY 25R OR RWY 24R. THE FO'S BRIEFING OF THE SEAVU ONE ARR CHART WAS VERY THOROUGH WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS PLACED ON THE MANY CROSSING RESTRICTIONS AND WAYPOINT NAMES. WE DISCUSSED THAT WE WERE BOTH UNFAMILIAR WITH THIS ARR AND ALSO NOT ACCUSTOMED TO APCHING RWY 25R AS OPPOSED TO RWY 25L. I VERIFIED ALL OF THE WAYPOINT NAMES AND CROSSING RESTRICTIONS IN THE FMGC MATCHED THOSE ON THE LAX CHART. WE WERE CLEARED BY LAX CTR TO CROSS THE KONZL INTXN AT 17000 FT. JUST AFTER PASSING KONZL WE WERE HANDED OFF TO SOCAL APCH. AFTER CHKING IN WITH SOCAL APCH; WE WERE CLRED TO DSND VIA THE SEAVU ONE ARR FOR RWY 24R. I CONFIRMED WITH SOCAL THAT OUR RWY ASSIGNMENT WAS RWY 24R AND REPROGRAMMED THE FMGC FOR THE SEAVU ONE ARR TO RWY 24R. WE STARTED OUR DSCNT TO COMPLY WITH OUR DSND VIA CLRNC WHILE THE FO REBRIEFED THE SEAVU ONE ARR TO ILS RWY 24R. I VERIFIED THAT THE NEW WAYPOINTS AND CROSSING RESTRICTIONS FOR THE RWY 24R TRANSITION NOW MATCHED THOSE DISPLAYED IN THE FMGC. WHEN THE FO COMPLETED HIS APCH BRIEFING FOR OUR NEW RWY ASSIGNMENT; I COMPLETED THE APCH DSCNT CHKLIST. I THEN WENT OFF VHF 1 TO SEAT THE PAX. WHEN I RETURNED TO VHF 1 AFTER MAKING MY REQUIRED PA ANNOUNCEMENT; I VERIFIED WHERE WE WERE ON THE STAR AND THAT WE WERE STILL ON PROFILE AND MAKING OUR CROSSING RESTRICTIONS. THE STAR PORTION OF THE APCH IS NORMAL UP TO DIXXN INTXN WHICH WE CROSSED AT ABOUT 12500 FT AT 290 KTS. AFTER THE DIXXN INTXN; I TRANSITIONED MY SCAN OF THE STAR CHART TO THE MORE DETAILED INSET PORTION. I HAD CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY READING THE CHART RESTRICTIONS AND I MADE NUMEROUS ERRORS WHILE READING THE CHARTED ALTS DUE TO THE CLOSE TEXT SPACING OF THE VARIOUS LEAD IN DEPICTIONS AND CROSSING RESTRICTIONS TO EACH RWY ON THE INSET PORTION OF THE CHART. I FOUND THE NUMBERED NOTES WHICH REFERRED TO CROSSING RESTRICTIONS PRINTED IN THE LOWER LEFT HAND PORTION OF THE CHART INSET TO BE PARTICULARLY CONFUSING AND DIFFICULT TO READ. AS WE BOTH STRUGGLED TO INTERPRET THE STAR CHART AND CROSS CHK WITH THE FMGC WHILE SETTING THE NEXT CROSSING ALTS IN THE MCP WINDOW; WE BECAME DISTRACTED FROM MONITORING OUR DSCNT PROFILE WITH THE AUTOPLT ON AND DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT WE WERE STARTING TO GET HIGH ON THE PROFILE. BEING A LITTLE HIGH ON PROFILE WAS NOT A PROB AT FIRST; BECAUSE MOST OF THE CROSSING RESTRICTIONS WERE 'AT OR ABOVE' CLRNCES UNTIL WE REACHED THE DECOR FIX; WHICH HAS A RESTRICTION TO CROSS BETWEEN 9800 FT AND 9000 FT. AS WE APCHED THE DECOR FIX; I RECOGNIZED AND CALLED OUT THAT WE WERE HIGH. THE FO DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT; FULLY EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES AND LOWERED THE NOSE IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE RESTRICTION. I BELIEVE WE ENDED UP CROSSING DECOR AT 10400 FT; 600 FT HIGH. AFTER PASSING DECOR; I SET 8000 FT IN THE MCP ALT WINDOW FOR THE BREEA FIX. IT WAS ONLY THEN THAT I NOTICED WE WERE AT 280 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. I CALLED OUT; 'AIRSPD; WE NEED TO SLOW TO 250 KTS' TO THE FO; AND HE IMMEDIATELY LEVELED OFF AND DECELERATED TO 250 KTS. AFTER CORRECTING AS BEST AS WE COULD FOR BOTH OUR ALT DEVIATION AND OVERSPD BELOW 10000 FT; WE WERE ABLE TO CATCH UP WITH THE PROFILE AND COMPLETE A STABILIZED ILS APCH TO RWY 24R. THE REST OF OUR APCH AND LNDG WAS NORMAL. AFTER WE PARKED; WE TOOK SOME TIME TO DEBRIEF AND TALK ABOUT HOW WE ENDED UP GETTING BEHIND ON THE ARR. EVEN THOUGH WE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED THE STAR; WE BOTH FELT THAT THE SEAVU ONE ARR CHART WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO READ AND INTERPRET. WE FOUND THREE AREAS THAT WERE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. FIRST WAS THE INSET PORTION OF THE CHART WHICH CONTAINS THE ROUTING DEPICTION AND CROSSING RESTRICTIONS FOR FOUR DIFFERENT RWYS. THIS SECTION OF THE CHART IS VERY CLUTTERED AND 'BUSY.' REFERRING BACK TO THIS SECTION AT A GLANCE FOR CROSS CHK IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE. SECOND; THE SCALE DEPICTION OF THE DISTANCE BETWEEN LUVYN AND MINZA MAKES THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THESE FIXES LOOK DECEPTIVELY LONG; WHEN IN REALITY THEY ARE IN TOTAL ONLY 3 MILES APART. WE BOTH DISCUSSED THAT THIS DECEPTIVE SCALE DEPICTION GAVE US THE FALSE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAD A MUCH GREATER DISTANCE IN WHICH TO DSND THAN WE ACTUALLY DID. THIRD; THE CLOSELY SPACED NOTES REFERRING TO THE CROSSING RESTRICTION AT SKOLL; BREEA; AND PALAC MAKE MISSING THE DECOR RESTRICTION VERY EASY. IT WAS IN THIS AREA OF THE ARR THAT WE BOTH BECAME DISTRACTED ENOUGH TO FALL BEHIND THE PROFILE. SOMEWHERE IN THERE WE WERE ALSO SUPPOSED TO SLOW TO 250 KTS FOR THE BELOW 10000 FT SPD RESTRICTION. NOW THAT I HAVE EXPERIENCED THE SEAVU ONE ARR; I WILL BE EVEN MORE VIGILANT AS TO ITS FAST PACED PITFALLS. I HAVE ALSO HIGHLIGHTED AND NOTED THE STAR CHART TO REMIND ME TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE MANY DETAILS OF THIS CHART THAT ARE HARD TO FIND IN THE HEAT OF THE BATTLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.