Narrative:

Being vectored onto the ILS runway 24 at hya; approach control was becoming harder to hear. We could not identify the ILS and informed approach of this. ATC asked us what ILS frequency we were using and on readback of this frequency; we were told that it was the wrong one and to 'look it up.' ATC then relented and gave us 109.15 which gave us the correct indications and identify. I asked ATC for confirmation that we were indeed being vectored to the ILS 24 at hya but did not get a response. We were then given vectors for another approach. Communication was becoming progressively more difficult with ATC becoming very faint with much static intruding on the frequency. However; we could hear enough to read back a vector to 'intercept the localizer.' by this time; communication had become so degraded that I asked the first officer to try calling the tower. Tower came in loud and clear and returned us to a different approach frequency which also came in loud and clear. We were then cleared for the approach. The landing was uneventful. After disembarking the passenger; ground personnel (one of them a cfii instructing at hya) informed the first officer that ATIS was no longer broadcasting a notice of an ILS frequency change and that they had heard that commercial chart co had not yet issued a revision to the ILS 24 approach procedure although govt chart does reflect the change. 1) NOTAMS for hya read: hya 04/003 hya 24 ILS DME cmsnd. Hya 04/005 hya ILS 109.15 cmsn wef 0604151235. Hya 04/006 hya 24 ILS gp 331.25 cmsn wef 0604151235. This did not register with me as a change in the IAP. I should have crosschecked. 2) I personally witnessed the first officer updating the commercial approach plates for hya with the most current revision prior to departure. The frequency for the hya ILS 24 is given as 110.5. 3) according to the first officer; ATIS did not contain any reference to a change in frequency. 4) this potentially dangerous situation was exacerbated by what appears to be the failure of ATC (who was handling multiple frequencys) to assign us the appropriate approach frequency. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he did review the NOTAMS and that it did not register to him that they were related to the approach. Also; the ATIS was not reporting the change to the approach plate so he became concerned that he was not going to the correct airport. Additionally; the controller was working 2 frequencys and as the aircraft became further from the facility antenna the frequency became weak and communications was difficult. The controller eventually switched the flight crew to his other frequency and that solved the communications problem. Heavy precipitation and airframe noise was also a factor in communications. The reporter stated that he would be more cognizant in the future regarding NOTAMS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LEAR 55 FLT CREW HAS WRONG FREQ FOR ILS 24 HYA AND APCH CTLR HAS TO ASSIST WITH FREQ.

Narrative: BEING VECTORED ONTO THE ILS RWY 24 AT HYA; APCH CTL WAS BECOMING HARDER TO HEAR. WE COULD NOT IDENT THE ILS AND INFORMED APCH OF THIS. ATC ASKED US WHAT ILS FREQ WE WERE USING AND ON READBACK OF THIS FREQ; WE WERE TOLD THAT IT WAS THE WRONG ONE AND TO 'LOOK IT UP.' ATC THEN RELENTED AND GAVE US 109.15 WHICH GAVE US THE CORRECT INDICATIONS AND IDENT. I ASKED ATC FOR CONFIRMATION THAT WE WERE INDEED BEING VECTORED TO THE ILS 24 AT HYA BUT DID NOT GET A RESPONSE. WE WERE THEN GIVEN VECTORS FOR ANOTHER APCH. COM WAS BECOMING PROGRESSIVELY MORE DIFFICULT WITH ATC BECOMING VERY FAINT WITH MUCH STATIC INTRUDING ON THE FREQ. HOWEVER; WE COULD HEAR ENOUGH TO READ BACK A VECTOR TO 'INTERCEPT THE LOC.' BY THIS TIME; COM HAD BECOME SO DEGRADED THAT I ASKED THE FO TO TRY CALLING THE TWR. TWR CAME IN LOUD AND CLR AND RETURNED US TO A DIFFERENT APCH FREQ WHICH ALSO CAME IN LOUD AND CLR. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR THE APCH. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER DISEMBARKING THE PAX; GND PERSONNEL (ONE OF THEM A CFII INSTRUCTING AT HYA) INFORMED THE FO THAT ATIS WAS NO LONGER BROADCASTING A NOTICE OF AN ILS FREQ CHANGE AND THAT THEY HAD HEARD THAT COMMERCIAL CHART CO HAD NOT YET ISSUED A REVISION TO THE ILS 24 APCH PROC ALTHOUGH GOVT CHART DOES REFLECT THE CHANGE. 1) NOTAMS FOR HYA READ: HYA 04/003 HYA 24 ILS DME CMSND. HYA 04/005 HYA ILS 109.15 CMSN WEF 0604151235. HYA 04/006 HYA 24 ILS GP 331.25 CMSN WEF 0604151235. THIS DID NOT REGISTER WITH ME AS A CHANGE IN THE IAP. I SHOULD HAVE XCHKED. 2) I PERSONALLY WITNESSED THE FO UPDATING THE COMMERCIAL APCH PLATES FOR HYA WITH THE MOST CURRENT REVISION PRIOR TO DEP. THE FREQ FOR THE HYA ILS 24 IS GIVEN AS 110.5. 3) ACCORDING TO THE FO; ATIS DID NOT CONTAIN ANY REF TO A CHANGE IN FREQ. 4) THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION WAS EXACERBATED BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE FAILURE OF ATC (WHO WAS HANDLING MULTIPLE FREQS) TO ASSIGN US THE APPROPRIATE APCH FREQ. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE DID REVIEW THE NOTAMS AND THAT IT DID NOT REGISTER TO HIM THAT THEY WERE RELATED TO THE APCH. ALSO; THE ATIS WAS NOT RPTING THE CHANGE TO THE APCH PLATE SO HE BECAME CONCERNED THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO THE CORRECT ARPT. ADDITIONALLY; THE CTLR WAS WORKING 2 FREQS AND AS THE ACFT BECAME FURTHER FROM THE FACILITY ANTENNA THE FREQ BECAME WEAK AND COMS WAS DIFFICULT. THE CTLR EVENTUALLY SWITCHED THE FLT CREW TO HIS OTHER FREQ AND THAT SOLVED THE COMS PROB. HVY PRECIP AND AIRFRAME NOISE WAS ALSO A FACTOR IN COMS. THE RPTR STATED THAT HE WOULD BE MORE COGNIZANT IN THE FUTURE REGARDING NOTAMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.