Flight crew of B737-500 continue unstabilized approach to touchdown.

Attributes
ACN	701082
Time
Date	200606
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : phx.airport
State Reference	AZ
Altitude	msl single value : 2500
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : phx.tower
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737-500
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	approach : visual
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 11000 flight time type : 8500
ASRS Report	701082
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 160 flight time total : 6800 flight time type : 2100
ASRS Report	701083
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : company policies other anomaly other anomaly
Independent Detector	other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted
Supplementary
Problem Areas	ATC Human Performance Aircraft Airport Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative:

On approach into phx; we were told to keep the speed up while turning base and onto final. First officer was holding 210 as instructed. In the turn to final; I told him he was high so he asked for the gear. I lowered the gear and lowered flaps and he called for a flaps 40 degree landing. I set the 40 speeds and we lowered the flaps on schedule. He slowed to approach speed and we were 2 dots high. At 1000 ft we were on speed but high and had about 1200 FPM sink. He called correcting and we continued the approach. He corrected to 1000 FPM sink and our aim point was long. He got a 'sink rate' call and corrected around 300 ft. We touched down about 2500 ft down the runway. Rollout was uneventful. Why didn't I say 'go around' early? There are no good answers to this. I should have. The first officer is a good stick and I didn't see it as dangerous. I had seen this 100 times in my career. I knew we had lots of runway. I knew it would cost 1500 pounds of gas to go around. Again; none of these are good reasons. Lessons learned: I thought a lot about this later in the evening. I realized what a horrible example I set for the first officer. I let him down and I let myself down. We both felt like crap. How could I expect him to direct a 'go around' when he is a captain after I let him slide this time? I am sure it will be somewhere in his mind when he is faced with the same situation. We talked about this at length and both realize that we should have gone around. It would have made the approach much safer; much more comfortable. I know there is no stigma attached to going around. I know there is a stigma attached to 'letting it slide.' I know I would have slept better knowing that I did it by the book. I know I won't let it happen again. Supplemental information from acn 101083: temporarily lost situational awareness due to a pack trip off light which was handled in accordance with procedure. I had never experienced airplane performance in this situation and continued to expect a stabilized approach at any moment.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737-500 CONTINUE UNSTABILIZED APCH TO TOUCHDOWN.

Narrative: ON APCH INTO PHX; WE WERE TOLD TO KEEP THE SPD UP WHILE TURNING BASE AND ONTO FINAL. FO WAS HOLDING 210 AS INSTRUCTED. IN THE TURN TO FINAL; I TOLD HIM HE WAS HIGH SO HE ASKED FOR THE GEAR. I LOWERED THE GEAR AND LOWERED FLAPS AND HE CALLED FOR A FLAPS 40 DEG LNDG. I SET THE 40 SPDS AND WE LOWERED THE FLAPS ON SCHEDULE. HE SLOWED TO APCH SPD AND WE WERE 2 DOTS HIGH. AT 1000 FT WE WERE ON SPD BUT HIGH AND HAD ABOUT 1200 FPM SINK. HE CALLED CORRECTING AND WE CONTINUED THE APCH. HE CORRECTED TO 1000 FPM SINK AND OUR AIM POINT WAS LONG. HE GOT A 'SINK RATE' CALL AND CORRECTED AROUND 300 FT. WE TOUCHED DOWN ABOUT 2500 FT DOWN THE RWY. ROLLOUT WAS UNEVENTFUL. WHY DIDN'T I SAY 'GO AROUND' EARLY? THERE ARE NO GOOD ANSWERS TO THIS. I SHOULD HAVE. THE FO IS A GOOD STICK AND I DIDN'T SEE IT AS DANGEROUS. I HAD SEEN THIS 100 TIMES IN MY CAREER. I KNEW WE HAD LOTS OF RWY. I KNEW IT WOULD COST 1500 LBS OF GAS TO GO AROUND. AGAIN; NONE OF THESE ARE GOOD REASONS. LESSONS LEARNED: I THOUGHT A LOT ABOUT THIS LATER IN THE EVENING. I REALIZED WHAT A HORRIBLE EXAMPLE I SET FOR THE FO. I LET HIM DOWN AND I LET MYSELF DOWN. WE BOTH FELT LIKE CRAP. HOW COULD I EXPECT HIM TO DIRECT A 'GAR' WHEN HE IS A CAPT AFTER I LET HIM SLIDE THIS TIME? I AM SURE IT WILL BE SOMEWHERE IN HIS MIND WHEN HE IS FACED WITH THE SAME SITUATION. WE TALKED ABOUT THIS AT LENGTH AND BOTH REALIZE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND. IT WOULD HAVE MADE THE APCH MUCH SAFER; MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE. I KNOW THERE IS NO STIGMA ATTACHED TO GOING AROUND. I KNOW THERE IS A STIGMA ATTACHED TO 'LETTING IT SLIDE.' I KNOW I WOULD HAVE SLEPT BETTER KNOWING THAT I DID IT BY THE BOOK. I KNOW I WON'T LET IT HAPPEN AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 101083: TEMPORARILY LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS DUE TO A PACK TRIP OFF LIGHT WHICH WAS HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROC. I HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE IN THIS SITUATION AND CONTINUED TO EXPECT A STABILIZED APCH AT ANY MOMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.