|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0001 To 0600|
|Locale Reference||airport : phx.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B737-300|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : parked|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 195|
flight time total : 22000
flight time type : 17000
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
non adherence : company policies
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
other other : 2
Flight Crew Human Performance
Departing flight scheduled out of phx. Aircraft late inbound due to maintenance problems on previous flight. Captain debriefed me as follows: could not get #1 generator on line after pushback. Went back to gate to call contract maintenance. Got generator on line; but found aircraft to have a history of trouble with #1 generator. On takeoff; both engines overtemped with accompanying red light in egt instruments. Later finds out aircraft has also had a history of overtemp exceedances (3 times for #1 engine; 4 times for #2 engine). Temperature at elp for takeoff was 33 degrees C. After conferring with maintenance; I chose to refuse aircraft with a phx takeoff temperature of 38 degrees C and the aircraft's previous history. I promptly told dispatch and she said ok. I then received a new release with a new aircraft. Maintenance subsequently moved aircraft off gate; only to have it return to gate approximately 15 mins later; and I was told dispatch did not want to swap aircraft (trying to override my decision not to accept aircraft -- as I see it). All of this is going on in plain view of our passenger; who were evidently told by the operations agent that the aircraft had a maintenance problem and that we would be getting another aircraft for our flight. I felt very secure in making this decision to refuse the aircraft for safety reasons. It turns out that we had to use maximum power for takeoff when we finally departed smf (moderately heavy fuel load and approximately 100 passenger). It was clear to me that both engines would again have overtemped under the conditions in phx (38 degrees C). When I again told dispatch that I refused to take that aircraft; she initiated a conference call with the chief pilot on duty; supervisor of dispatch; my dispatcher and myself. Chief pilot on duty after listening to the facts; told the dispatcher that 'he tended to agree with the captain.' I was dropped from the conference call so they could discuss the issue further. Eventually (1 hour 45 mins after the previous aircraft blocked in) we got another aircraft and continued the trip (2 more legs).
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 FLT CREW HAS MAINT ISSUE WITH ACFT AND REQUESTS DISPATCH SUPPLY ANOTHER ACFT FOR THE REMAINING LEGS OF THE FLT.
Narrative: DEPARTING FLT SCHEDULED OUT OF PHX. ACFT LATE INBOUND DUE TO MAINT PROBS ON PREVIOUS FLT. CAPT DEBRIEFED ME AS FOLLOWS: COULD NOT GET #1 GENERATOR ON LINE AFTER PUSHBACK. WENT BACK TO GATE TO CALL CONTRACT MAINT. GOT GENERATOR ON LINE; BUT FOUND ACFT TO HAVE A HISTORY OF TROUBLE WITH #1 GENERATOR. ON TKOF; BOTH ENGS OVERTEMPED WITH ACCOMPANYING RED LIGHT IN EGT INSTS. LATER FINDS OUT ACFT HAS ALSO HAD A HISTORY OF OVERTEMP EXCEEDANCES (3 TIMES FOR #1 ENG; 4 TIMES FOR #2 ENG). TEMP AT ELP FOR TKOF WAS 33 DEGS C. AFTER CONFERRING WITH MAINT; I CHOSE TO REFUSE ACFT WITH A PHX TKOF TEMP OF 38 DEGS C AND THE ACFT'S PREVIOUS HISTORY. I PROMPTLY TOLD DISPATCH AND SHE SAID OK. I THEN RECEIVED A NEW RELEASE WITH A NEW ACFT. MAINT SUBSEQUENTLY MOVED ACFT OFF GATE; ONLY TO HAVE IT RETURN TO GATE APPROX 15 MINS LATER; AND I WAS TOLD DISPATCH DID NOT WANT TO SWAP ACFT (TRYING TO OVERRIDE MY DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT ACFT -- AS I SEE IT). ALL OF THIS IS GOING ON IN PLAIN VIEW OF OUR PAX; WHO WERE EVIDENTLY TOLD BY THE OPS AGENT THAT THE ACFT HAD A MAINT PROB AND THAT WE WOULD BE GETTING ANOTHER ACFT FOR OUR FLT. I FELT VERY SECURE IN MAKING THIS DECISION TO REFUSE THE ACFT FOR SAFETY REASONS. IT TURNS OUT THAT WE HAD TO USE MAX PWR FOR TKOF WHEN WE FINALLY DEPARTED SMF (MODERATELY HVY FUEL LOAD AND APPROX 100 PAX). IT WAS CLR TO ME THAT BOTH ENGS WOULD AGAIN HAVE OVERTEMPED UNDER THE CONDITIONS IN PHX (38 DEGS C). WHEN I AGAIN TOLD DISPATCH THAT I REFUSED TO TAKE THAT ACFT; SHE INITIATED A CONFERENCE CALL WITH THE CHIEF PLT ON DUTY; SUPVR OF DISPATCH; MY DISPATCHER AND MYSELF. CHIEF PLT ON DUTY AFTER LISTENING TO THE FACTS; TOLD THE DISPATCHER THAT 'HE TENDED TO AGREE WITH THE CAPT.' I WAS DROPPED FROM THE CONFERENCE CALL SO THEY COULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE FURTHER. EVENTUALLY (1 HR 45 MINS AFTER THE PREVIOUS ACFT BLOCKED IN) WE GOT ANOTHER ACFT AND CONTINUED THE TRIP (2 MORE LEGS).
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.