Narrative:

The flight originated at hou with a stop at E38 to pick up a passenger en route to dal. I was acting as sic and PF on the first and third legs. The general WX conditions were 1000 ft overcast; 5-10 mi visibility; and light winds across the state (tx) and clear skies at E38. The first leg was uneventful until gear extension at E38. An erroneous gear down indication was remedied; and the landing was routine. The second leg (E38 to dal) was a routine flight with light clear icing encountered on the descent into dal. There was once again an unsafe gear down indication while IMC on the ILS to runway 31L. The gear was cycled once and then indicated normally; so we landed uneventfully. We stopped at an FBO to drop off passenger and purchase fuel. For the third and final leg I was flying the jet as sic. The PIC was performing PNF duties. The PIC requested our IFR clearance back to hou from clearance delivery and had difficulty communicating due to interference we believe was caused by buildings between us and tower. After several broken xmissions we copied the clearance. We completed our checklists;; prepared for takeoff; then taxied out. There was some additional confusion with the radios (the PIC called clearance again instead of ground) on taxi after switching transmitters in an attempt to communicate clearly. We then successfully contacted ground after moving away from the FBO hangars and taxied to runway 31L for takeoff. The initial part of our clearance was the jpool 2 SID/ellvr transition and 5000 ft. The PIC handed me the govt terminal procedure publication sc-2 opened to the joe pool 2 departure. We both looked at the procedure; and I briefed my intended actions for departure. The graphic depiction indicated for 'runway 31: climb via heading 309 degrees to 1600 ft before turning sbound.' the text read; 'when entering controled airspace; fly assigned heading and altitude; expect vector to appropriate route...ellvr transition...from over TTT VOR/DME via TTT 166 degree radial to ellvr intersection.' as I remember; the tower cleared us for takeoff as we approached the hold short line. We informed him we were not ready and held short of the runway. After completing before takeoff checklists; we called tower ready for takeoff; and we responded 'cleared for takeoff.' the takeoff was uneventful and we climbed on runway heading to 1600 ft and turned left for ellvr. We contacted approach and were 'radar contact.' as our heading approached south; the departure controller asked if we were in a left turn to the south. The PIC affirmatively responded that we were flying the SID. He then gave us a vector to 130 degrees. I believe we were then given heading 150 degrees; a climb to 15000 ft; and a frequency change. The next controller gave us more vectors and altitudes and eventually direct to ellvr. We were then informed of a possible pilot deviation and given a name and number to contact after landing. The PIC called immediately after landing and was informed a report was to be filed. Once safely at our cruise altitude we discussed what had gone wrong. After looking over the SID; we realized what happened. We had flown the correct departure; but for the wrong airport. We had opened sc-2 to the JPOOL2 for dallas executive (rdb) instead of our departure airport dallas love field (dal). The simple fact was that we did not reference the correct departure procedure. There were; however; numerous factors I believe contributed to our mistake. Our day started earlier than normal which may have decreased our alertness. The WX was IFR and there was in-cloud icing; which did not directly affect our flight but added to the workload. We had an issue with erroneous gear indications that we assessed safe for our flight home; but we changed our procedures to extend the gear early to ensure plenty of time to troubleshoot if needed. Weak radio reception; broken xmissions; and a fragmented readback caused an unclr exchange of information with clearance delivery. Tower's early takeoff clearance hastened our habit patterns and gave us the perception of being pushed before we were ready. Sc-2 has 3 separate JPOOL2.TTT departures from dallas airports (dal; rbd; dfw) that have runway 31. There are valuable lessons to be learned from our mistake: CRM was not effectively utilized during preparation for takeoff. I don't believe either of us were 100% sure of the clearance but did not speak up and ask for clarification in the cockpit or from ATC. I assumed the PIC copied and understood the clearance; so I did not question it. I should have taken the time to ask the question and resolve any doubt. Several factors created a disruption of our normal flow and caused us to change our habit patterns. Confusion on the radios; a short taxi distance; and the feeling of being rushed by tower pushed us physically beyond the point we were mentally ready to accept. In a hurried state; we rushed our departure briefing and had poor attention to detail. Had we taken an extra min to completely brief the SID; one of us would have realized we were looking at the wrong JPOOL2 procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE501 CREW UTILIZED THE WRONG SID ON DEP OUT OF DAL RESULTING IN A PLTDEV.

Narrative: THE FLT ORIGINATED AT HOU WITH A STOP AT E38 TO PICK UP A PAX ENRTE TO DAL. I WAS ACTING AS SIC AND PF ON THE FIRST AND THIRD LEGS. THE GENERAL WX CONDITIONS WERE 1000 FT OVCST; 5-10 MI VISIBILITY; AND LIGHT WINDS ACROSS THE STATE (TX) AND CLR SKIES AT E38. THE FIRST LEG WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL GEAR EXTENSION AT E38. AN ERRONEOUS GEAR DOWN INDICATION WAS REMEDIED; AND THE LNDG WAS ROUTINE. THE SECOND LEG (E38 TO DAL) WAS A ROUTINE FLT WITH LIGHT CLR ICING ENCOUNTERED ON THE DSCNT INTO DAL. THERE WAS ONCE AGAIN AN UNSAFE GEAR DOWN INDICATION WHILE IMC ON THE ILS TO RWY 31L. THE GEAR WAS CYCLED ONCE AND THEN INDICATED NORMALLY; SO WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. WE STOPPED AT AN FBO TO DROP OFF PAX AND PURCHASE FUEL. FOR THE THIRD AND FINAL LEG I WAS FLYING THE JET AS SIC. THE PIC WAS PERFORMING PNF DUTIES. THE PIC REQUESTED OUR IFR CLRNC BACK TO HOU FROM CLRNC DELIVERY AND HAD DIFFICULTY COMMUNICATING DUE TO INTERFERENCE WE BELIEVE WAS CAUSED BY BUILDINGS BTWN US AND TWR. AFTER SEVERAL BROKEN XMISSIONS WE COPIED THE CLRNC. WE COMPLETED OUR CHKLISTS;; PREPARED FOR TKOF; THEN TAXIED OUT. THERE WAS SOME ADDITIONAL CONFUSION WITH THE RADIOS (THE PIC CALLED CLRNC AGAIN INSTEAD OF GND) ON TAXI AFTER SWITCHING XMITTERS IN AN ATTEMPT TO COMMUNICATE CLRLY. WE THEN SUCCESSFULLY CONTACTED GND AFTER MOVING AWAY FROM THE FBO HANGARS AND TAXIED TO RWY 31L FOR TKOF. THE INITIAL PART OF OUR CLRNC WAS THE JPOOL 2 SID/ELLVR TRANSITION AND 5000 FT. THE PIC HANDED ME THE GOVT TERMINAL PROC PUB SC-2 OPENED TO THE JOE POOL 2 DEP. WE BOTH LOOKED AT THE PROC; AND I BRIEFED MY INTENDED ACTIONS FOR DEP. THE GRAPHIC DEPICTION INDICATED FOR 'RWY 31: CLB VIA HDG 309 DEGS TO 1600 FT BEFORE TURNING SBOUND.' THE TEXT READ; 'WHEN ENTERING CTLED AIRSPACE; FLY ASSIGNED HDG AND ALT; EXPECT VECTOR TO APPROPRIATE RTE...ELLVR TRANSITION...FROM OVER TTT VOR/DME VIA TTT 166 DEG RADIAL TO ELLVR INTXN.' AS I REMEMBER; THE TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF AS WE APCHED THE HOLD SHORT LINE. WE INFORMED HIM WE WERE NOT READY AND HELD SHORT OF THE RWY. AFTER COMPLETING BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS; WE CALLED TWR READY FOR TKOF; AND WE RESPONDED 'CLRED FOR TKOF.' THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WE CLBED ON RWY HDG TO 1600 FT AND TURNED L FOR ELLVR. WE CONTACTED APCH AND WERE 'RADAR CONTACT.' AS OUR HDG APCHED S; THE DEP CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE IN A L TURN TO THE S. THE PIC AFFIRMATIVELY RESPONDED THAT WE WERE FLYING THE SID. HE THEN GAVE US A VECTOR TO 130 DEGS. I BELIEVE WE WERE THEN GIVEN HDG 150 DEGS; A CLB TO 15000 FT; AND A FREQ CHANGE. THE NEXT CTLR GAVE US MORE VECTORS AND ALTS AND EVENTUALLY DIRECT TO ELLVR. WE WERE THEN INFORMED OF A POSSIBLE PLTDEV AND GIVEN A NAME AND NUMBER TO CONTACT AFTER LNDG. THE PIC CALLED IMMEDIATELY AFTER LNDG AND WAS INFORMED A RPT WAS TO BE FILED. ONCE SAFELY AT OUR CRUISE ALT WE DISCUSSED WHAT HAD GONE WRONG. AFTER LOOKING OVER THE SID; WE REALIZED WHAT HAPPENED. WE HAD FLOWN THE CORRECT DEP; BUT FOR THE WRONG ARPT. WE HAD OPENED SC-2 TO THE JPOOL2 FOR DALLAS EXECUTIVE (RDB) INSTEAD OF OUR DEP ARPT DALLAS LOVE FIELD (DAL). THE SIMPLE FACT WAS THAT WE DID NOT REF THE CORRECT DEP PROC. THERE WERE; HOWEVER; NUMEROUS FACTORS I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTED TO OUR MISTAKE. OUR DAY STARTED EARLIER THAN NORMAL WHICH MAY HAVE DECREASED OUR ALERTNESS. THE WX WAS IFR AND THERE WAS IN-CLOUD ICING; WHICH DID NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT OUR FLT BUT ADDED TO THE WORKLOAD. WE HAD AN ISSUE WITH ERRONEOUS GEAR INDICATIONS THAT WE ASSESSED SAFE FOR OUR FLT HOME; BUT WE CHANGED OUR PROCS TO EXTEND THE GEAR EARLY TO ENSURE PLENTY OF TIME TO TROUBLESHOOT IF NEEDED. WEAK RADIO RECEPTION; BROKEN XMISSIONS; AND A FRAGMENTED READBACK CAUSED AN UNCLR EXCHANGE OF INFO WITH CLRNC DELIVERY. TWR'S EARLY TKOF CLRNC HASTENED OUR HABIT PATTERNS AND GAVE US THE PERCEPTION OF BEING PUSHED BEFORE WE WERE READY. SC-2 HAS 3 SEPARATE JPOOL2.TTT DEPS FROM DALLAS ARPTS (DAL; RBD; DFW) THAT HAVE RWY 31. THERE ARE VALUABLE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM OUR MISTAKE: CRM WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED DURING PREPARATION FOR TKOF. I DON'T BELIEVE EITHER OF US WERE 100% SURE OF THE CLRNC BUT DID NOT SPEAK UP AND ASK FOR CLARIFICATION IN THE COCKPIT OR FROM ATC. I ASSUMED THE PIC COPIED AND UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC; SO I DID NOT QUESTION IT. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE TIME TO ASK THE QUESTION AND RESOLVE ANY DOUBT. SEVERAL FACTORS CREATED A DISRUPTION OF OUR NORMAL FLOW AND CAUSED US TO CHANGE OUR HABIT PATTERNS. CONFUSION ON THE RADIOS; A SHORT TAXI DISTANCE; AND THE FEELING OF BEING RUSHED BY TWR PUSHED US PHYSICALLY BEYOND THE POINT WE WERE MENTALLY READY TO ACCEPT. IN A HURRIED STATE; WE RUSHED OUR DEP BRIEFING AND HAD POOR ATTN TO DETAIL. HAD WE TAKEN AN EXTRA MIN TO COMPLETELY BRIEF THE SID; ONE OF US WOULD HAVE REALIZED WE WERE LOOKING AT THE WRONG JPOOL2 PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.