Narrative:

The problem arose while flying the runway 24 departure from teb. I had studied the teb 5 departure thoroughly prior to the passenger arriving and engine start. During taxi to runway 24; the co-pilot and I briefed the departure again clarifying to each other the details of the procedure. Once we were cleared into position and hold; we briefed the procedure one last time. The co-pilot said; 'climb to 1500 ft; at 4.5 DME right turn 280 degrees; then up to 2000 ft.' my reply was; 'no; it's climb to 1500 ft; right turn 280 degrees to 4.5 DME then up to 2000 ft.' the co-pilot double checked the departure and agreed. Then we were cleared for takeoff. As we were climbing out; teb tower handed us off to ny approach. After the co-pilot contacted approach; the controller said; 'maintain 1500 ft heading 280 degrees;' as I was climbing through it to 1700 ft and managed to level at 1800 ft and begin a descent back to 1500 ft. The co-pilot kept saying '1500! 1500!' somewhere between the final briefing before takeoff and that point; my mind somehow switched to an initial 2000 ft level off. It was then I got irritated at the controller for giving us a new altitude assignment as we were passing through it; even though he didn't give us a new one. The controller retorted that the departure was to maintain 1500 ft and I should read the departure when I got to altitude. After his retort; I realized my error and apologized. Thinking about the event during cruise; I think the reason I continued the climb was the last altitude I briefed prior to takeoff. Talking it over with the co-pilot; my solution was that I should have stated; 'climb and maintain 1500 ft; then right 280 degrees.' a suggestion from the co-pilot was that we should pull the power back right away with low altitude level offs. But even then; my mind was set on 2000 ft being the initial level off. Although we had been on duty already from over 12 hours; I do not believe fatigue was a factor in this case as indicated by my catching the co-pilot's switch of the heading and DME before takeoff. Both the co-pilot and I felt quite alert and remained so during the remainder of the flight.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FALCON 10 DEPARTING TEB EXCEEDED THE INITIAL 1500 FT LEVEL OFF ALTITUDE BY 300 FT.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE WHILE FLYING THE RWY 24 DEP FROM TEB. I HAD STUDIED THE TEB 5 DEP THOROUGHLY PRIOR TO THE PAX ARRIVING AND ENGINE START. DURING TAXI TO RWY 24; THE CO-PLT AND I BRIEFED THE DEP AGAIN CLARIFYING TO EACH OTHER THE DETAILS OF THE PROC. ONCE WE WERE CLRED INTO POSITION AND HOLD; WE BRIEFED THE PROC ONE LAST TIME. THE CO-PLT SAID; 'CLB TO 1500 FT; AT 4.5 DME RIGHT TURN 280 DEGS; THEN UP TO 2000 FT.' MY REPLY WAS; 'NO; IT'S CLB TO 1500 FT; R TURN 280 DEGS TO 4.5 DME THEN UP TO 2000 FT.' THE CO-PLT DOUBLE CHKED THE DEP AND AGREED. THEN WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. AS WE WERE CLBING OUT; TEB TWR HANDED US OFF TO NY APCH. AFTER THE CO-PLT CONTACTED APCH; THE CTLR SAID; 'MAINTAIN 1500 FT HEADING 280 DEGS;' AS I WAS CLBING THROUGH IT TO 1700 FT AND MANAGED TO LEVEL AT 1800 FT AND BEGIN A DSCNT BACK TO 1500 FT. THE CO-PLT KEPT SAYING '1500! 1500!' SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE FINAL BRIEFING BEFORE TKOF AND THAT POINT; MY MIND SOMEHOW SWITCHED TO AN INITIAL 2000 FT LEVEL OFF. IT WAS THEN I GOT IRRITATED AT THE CTLR FOR GIVING US A NEW ALTITUDE ASSIGNMENT AS WE WERE PASSING THROUGH IT; EVEN THOUGH HE DIDN'T GIVE US A NEW ONE. THE CTLR RETORTED THAT THE DEP WAS TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT AND I SHOULD READ THE DEP WHEN I GOT TO ALT. AFTER HIS RETORT; I REALIZED MY ERROR AND APOLOGIZED. THINKING ABOUT THE EVENT DURING CRUISE; I THINK THE REASON I CONTINUED THE CLB WAS THE LAST ALT I BRIEFED PRIOR TO TKOF. TALKING IT OVER WITH THE CO-PLT; MY SOLUTION WAS THAT I SHOULD HAVE STATED; 'CLB AND MAINTAIN 1500 FT; THEN RIGHT 280 DEGS.' A SUGGESTION FROM THE CO-PLT WAS THAT WE SHOULD PULL THE POWER BACK RIGHT AWAY WITH LOW ALTITUDE LEVEL OFFS. BUT EVEN THEN; MY MIND WAS SET ON 2000 FT BEING THE INITIAL LEVEL OFF. ALTHOUGH WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY ALREADY FROM OVER 12 HRS; I DO NOT BELIEVE FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR IN THIS CASE AS INDICATED BY MY CATCHING THE CO-PLT'S SWITCH OF THE HEADING AND DME BEFORE TKOF. BOTH THE CO-PLT AND I FELT QUITE ALERT AND REMAINED SO DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.