Narrative:

First officer was PF. Last leg day 4 of a 4-DAY trip. We were vectored to ILS runway 11. First officer had briefly briefed the approach. Minimal briefing then 'to a visual approach.' the WX was above VFR minimums; but FAF would be in the clouds if WX was as reported. During the briefing I pointed out; and first officer noted; that I had the VOR tuned for DME. As we turned onto the localizer; a few mi outside plaza at 2000 ft MSL; I noted that the GS was alive and showing us about 1.5 dots low. I called out 'GS alive.' first officer was calling confign changes; and as we approached plaza we were gear down; flaps 15 degrees maybe 25 degrees; and slowing; and I noted that we were above the GS at about 1950 ft or 2000 ft MSL. I believe that the autoplt and autothrottle were both engaged at this time. The first officer had not armed the approach mode. I asked; 'are you going to get the GS?' first officer changed flight path to intercept the GS. During this approach called with an instruction to contact the tower and issued a crossing altitude that neither of us understood. First officer and I discussed the crossing assignment. I'm not sure what state of automation was being used at this point; and in debriefing the first officer later; he wasn't sure either. Looking up from my chart I saw the airspeed was low and decreasing. It was at about 110 KIAS. Reference was about 123 KIAS for this approach with flaps 30 degrees target at 128 KIAS. I called out airspeed and pushed the control column forward; while reaching over to push the throttles forward. The first officer got with it and pushed the throttles up and made positive control inputs to recover the airspeed. Our flight path was erratic and I stated that we needed to go around. In the next few moments it was apparent the first officer was still trying to capture the GS and I restated go around. I told the tower that we were going around and the first officer made normal go around calls and control inputs. The tower instructed us to maintain 1600 ft. We were climbing through 2000 ft and it seemed that the first officer had difficulty controling the aircraft. We were still climbing; even though first officer had acknowledged the need to descend to 1600 ft. First officer reduced power but the pitch attitude remained at about +10 degrees. I stated 'get the nose down.' prior to getting to 1600 ft; ATC instructed a climb to 3000 ft or 4000 ft. The first officer regained what appeared to be normal control of the flight path; and engaged the autoplt and autothrottle. The remainder of the flight was normal. Comments: this was the ugliest thing I have ever seen in an airplane. I was hesitant to and did not take over the controls for a couple reasons. 1) I was unsure of the trim condition of the plane and didn't want to sort it out at that moment; considering #2 below. I have been on reserve for the past couple yrs and have flown very little in the past 15 months or so. I am not terribly confident of my stick and rudder skills in the B737 these days. Changing aircraft types and then not flying it consistently is not a good thing. I've done ok on my pt and pc's primarily; perhaps; because they are very 'canned.' the approach did not require the use of DME; and looking back it is obvious I shouldn't have tuned it for first officer's (and my) convenience. Having come off the airbus I have become accustomed to being able to tune and monitor nearly any combination of radios. In the hardball planes I guess you have to cheat and use FMS distances instead of DME. First officer ignored my command to go around. Did he think I was joking? Maybe he didn't hear me; but I doubt it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW DURING ILS APCH ELECTS TO PERFORM A GAR DUE TO UNSTABLE APCH.

Narrative: FO WAS PF. LAST LEG DAY 4 OF A 4-DAY TRIP. WE WERE VECTORED TO ILS RWY 11. FO HAD BRIEFLY BRIEFED THE APCH. MINIMAL BRIEFING THEN 'TO A VISUAL APCH.' THE WX WAS ABOVE VFR MINIMUMS; BUT FAF WOULD BE IN THE CLOUDS IF WX WAS AS RPTED. DURING THE BRIEFING I POINTED OUT; AND FO NOTED; THAT I HAD THE VOR TUNED FOR DME. AS WE TURNED ONTO THE LOC; A FEW MI OUTSIDE PLAZA AT 2000 FT MSL; I NOTED THAT THE GS WAS ALIVE AND SHOWING US ABOUT 1.5 DOTS LOW. I CALLED OUT 'GS ALIVE.' FO WAS CALLING CONFIGN CHANGES; AND AS WE APCHED PLAZA WE WERE GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 15 DEGS MAYBE 25 DEGS; AND SLOWING; AND I NOTED THAT WE WERE ABOVE THE GS AT ABOUT 1950 FT OR 2000 FT MSL. I BELIEVE THAT THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE WERE BOTH ENGAGED AT THIS TIME. THE FO HAD NOT ARMED THE APCH MODE. I ASKED; 'ARE YOU GOING TO GET THE GS?' FO CHANGED FLT PATH TO INTERCEPT THE GS. DURING THIS APCH CALLED WITH AN INSTRUCTION TO CONTACT THE TWR AND ISSUED A XING ALT THAT NEITHER OF US UNDERSTOOD. FO AND I DISCUSSED THE XING ASSIGNMENT. I'M NOT SURE WHAT STATE OF AUTOMATION WAS BEING USED AT THIS POINT; AND IN DEBRIEFING THE FO LATER; HE WASN'T SURE EITHER. LOOKING UP FROM MY CHART I SAW THE AIRSPD WAS LOW AND DECREASING. IT WAS AT ABOUT 110 KIAS. REF WAS ABOUT 123 KIAS FOR THIS APCH WITH FLAPS 30 DEGS TARGET AT 128 KIAS. I CALLED OUT AIRSPD AND PUSHED THE CTL COLUMN FORWARD; WHILE REACHING OVER TO PUSH THE THROTTLES FORWARD. THE FO GOT WITH IT AND PUSHED THE THROTTLES UP AND MADE POSITIVE CTL INPUTS TO RECOVER THE AIRSPD. OUR FLT PATH WAS ERRATIC AND I STATED THAT WE NEEDED TO GO AROUND. IN THE NEXT FEW MOMENTS IT WAS APPARENT THE FO WAS STILL TRYING TO CAPTURE THE GS AND I RESTATED GAR. I TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE GOING AROUND AND THE FO MADE NORMAL GAR CALLS AND CTL INPUTS. THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 1600 FT. WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 2000 FT AND IT SEEMED THAT THE FO HAD DIFFICULTY CTLING THE ACFT. WE WERE STILL CLBING; EVEN THOUGH FO HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED TO DSND TO 1600 FT. FO REDUCED PWR BUT THE PITCH ATTITUDE REMAINED AT ABOUT +10 DEGS. I STATED 'GET THE NOSE DOWN.' PRIOR TO GETTING TO 1600 FT; ATC INSTRUCTED A CLB TO 3000 FT OR 4000 FT. THE FO REGAINED WHAT APPEARED TO BE NORMAL CTL OF THE FLT PATH; AND ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS NORMAL. COMMENTS: THIS WAS THE UGLIEST THING I HAVE EVER SEEN IN AN AIRPLANE. I WAS HESITANT TO AND DID NOT TAKE OVER THE CTLS FOR A COUPLE REASONS. 1) I WAS UNSURE OF THE TRIM CONDITION OF THE PLANE AND DIDN'T WANT TO SORT IT OUT AT THAT MOMENT; CONSIDERING #2 BELOW. I HAVE BEEN ON RESERVE FOR THE PAST COUPLE YRS AND HAVE FLOWN VERY LITTLE IN THE PAST 15 MONTHS OR SO. I AM NOT TERRIBLY CONFIDENT OF MY STICK AND RUDDER SKILLS IN THE B737 THESE DAYS. CHANGING ACFT TYPES AND THEN NOT FLYING IT CONSISTENTLY IS NOT A GOOD THING. I'VE DONE OK ON MY PT AND PC'S PRIMARILY; PERHAPS; BECAUSE THEY ARE VERY 'CANNED.' THE APCH DID NOT REQUIRE THE USE OF DME; AND LOOKING BACK IT IS OBVIOUS I SHOULDN'T HAVE TUNED IT FOR FO'S (AND MY) CONVENIENCE. HAVING COME OFF THE AIRBUS I HAVE BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO BEING ABLE TO TUNE AND MONITOR NEARLY ANY COMBINATION OF RADIOS. IN THE HARDBALL PLANES I GUESS YOU HAVE TO CHEAT AND USE FMS DISTANCES INSTEAD OF DME. FO IGNORED MY COMMAND TO GO AROUND. DID HE THINK I WAS JOKING? MAYBE HE DIDN'T HEAR ME; BUT I DOUBT IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.