Narrative:

During review of flight papers; we noted a deferred maintenance item: left engine high pressure shutoff valve (hpsov) inoperative and locked in closed position. Flight altitude was restricted to 35000 ft or below; as well as other notes which required flight crew action during cockpit prep; takeoff; and approach. In that this had been the second time this week I had been dispatched with a pneumatic valve deferral (can wait 10 days for repair); I asked to speak to the maintenance supervisor at egll. He was not there so I called maintenance control to express my concern that we were wasting too much fuel on these deferrals; both in restricted altitudes as well as additional APU usage; not to mention additional crew workload. Egll-jfk is flown by an unaugmented crew; even though the flight time frequently goes over 8 hours (our actual time on this flight was 7:59) and our line holders are assigned to fly 12 such atlantic crossings per month). Maintenance control advised me that the maintenance computer assigns the repair priority automatically and that it cannot be changed. Only the aircraft router decided when to bring the aircraft in for repair. Maintenance control informed me that our aircraft would fly 2 additional crossings before being routed for repair. I told him that I would not refuse the aircraft; but that I wanted to raise the priority to a higher level. He advised me that I did not have the authority to do that; nor did he. I accepted the aircraft. I then talked to the releasing dispatcher about the flight plan; WX issues; and the maintenance altitude restriction. Nothing of note on the flight; good WX en route and at jfk; no delays outbound or an arrival. I accepted the dispatcher's flight plan release #2 with an en route redispatch; 120 min ETOPS; total cleared fuel of 127200 pounds; including 5000 pounds hold; 5000 pounds extra fuel; no alternate; landing at jfk with 18000 pounds. We departed and accomplished all normal ETOPS checklist items as required. At xa:01Z; we requested oceanic clearance via datalink. Our request was for track 'east' crossing somax at xb:02Z; FL340; M.84. In optional text we entered; '2ND nat F FL340 maximum 350.' we were entering the shanwick oca from the shannon oceanic transition area (sota) at fix somax. We received our clearance at xa:20Z. The clearance read; '/pikclya.cl eggx clearance air carrier XXX cleared to jfk via somax nat echo somax 49/20 46/30 44/40 43/50 42/60 dovey FM somax mntn F310 M084 ATC/level change not before xb:02 at somax end of message.' I knew right away this would present a fuel issue; so I called dispatch via satcom using high priority. He agreed that we did not have enough fuel to complete the flight. I asked him to prepare a revised flight plan; perhaps with a different redispatch point or to consider a double redispatch. He was busy working up an alternate plan; but could not make the numbers work. I asked him to contact shanwick clearance directly to work out a new clearance; which he did. Throughout these conversations satcom kept disconnecting our call. I had to call him at least 5 times and was working on a phone patch via HF. In the meantime; I instructed the copilot to not respond to the datalink clearance. There is only one option on the clearance message page 'send'; which I understand to mean we accept the clearance. We then received this datalink message; '/pikclya.fsm eggx air carrier XXX rcl received shanwick clearance not acknowledged send datalink acceptance now end of message.' I could not find any way to clear the page or to otherwise indicate that I wanted to decline the clearance. I finally hit the 'send' prompt; figuring that they were talking to dispatch at this point. Apparently; they were. At xa:46Z; we received the following via datalink; '/pikclya.clx eggx clearance air carrier XXX cleared to jfk via somax nat echo somax 49/20 46/30 44/40 43/50 42/60 dovey FM somax mntn F370 M084 ATC/level change reclrnc 2 end of message.' I called dispatch immediately and told him we could not accept this clearance due to our MEL altitude restriction. He said he was on it right away. I asked if I should try contacting clearance directly at this point because we were again faced with an unacceptable datalink clearance with no ability to do anything but press the 'send' prompt; thus accepting the clearance. He said it wasn't necessary; but I was trying anyway; as time was running short. I was unable to reach him on the usual frequency; so I asked shannon control on which frequency I could reach shanwick clearance delivery. He gave us both frequencys. I explained to them that we couldn't take higher than FL350 and could not go as low as FL310. At that point dispatch had done the coordination for us to cross the nat tracks from east to F by 30W at FL340 M .84. We received this clearance verbally and read it back. The time was xb:00Z. We were still coordinating with dispatch to have him rerun the flight plan with the new route; while I was simultaneously entering the new route into the FMC. I had entered and executed the first 2 points: somax and then 48N 020W with the copilot's acknowledgement. By the time we crossed somax; I had entered; but not yet executed; the subsequent points because they had not yet been verified by the copilot; who had been equally busy discussing the new clearance with shannon control. We were both still scrambling to ensure that we had a valid clearance; that dispatch was working on our flight plan and that we were going where we were supposed to be going at the right altitude and airspeed; not to mention accomplishing class 2 navigation procedures. A couple of minutes later; we received a SELCAL from shanwick radio. He stated that ATC was conducting an 'intervention' on us and did I have any comment. I did not understand what he meant. Two thoughts crossed my mind. One was that the ads was not set correctly and we had sent an erroneous emergency report. I was concerned that he meant to inform us that we were being 'intercepted.' I had previously checked the ads page on the ground to ensure that it was not set on 'emergency;' but I rechked it again to be sure. That page was normal. The terminology 'intervention' was confusing to me; so I told shanwick that I did not understand the term and could he explain it? He told me to 'stand by.' I did not think he was awaiting the response; 'ads reset;' as he did not use the terminology 'confirm ads.' I looked throughout the fom and was unable to find any reference to an 'intervention.' I sent an advisory ACARS message to dispatch informing him of this radio call and asked if he could check from his end. The last thing we needed at this point was to be intercepted! The other more likely possibility was that ads had sent an incorrect report and this was their rather dramatic way of informing us of this. I recalled that the 3RD position of the position report had not yet executed in the FMC when we crossed somax and we were logged onto eggx at that point. Dispatch agreed that he also thought this was the intent of their radio transmission. When shanwick returned on the radio; he did indicate that there would be no 'interception' by fighter jets; but that the 'intervention' was a report that would be filed. Our flight proceeded without further incident to jfk. What I took away from this flight incident was the following: satcom is absolutely essential for all international flts; especially with two-pilot crews. Intermittent satcom is a problem and would be really much better if it were more reliable. Without satcom; or a really good HF phone patch; we never could have done the coordination to have had this flight continue to jfk versus a return to lhr for refueling or diversion short of jfk. Fuel is always an issue. Personally; I really make an effort to adhere to air carrier's new fuel policy; but each time I get burnt like this; it makes me want to carry more fuel to cover such a contingency. If there is a MEL item such as this; and air carrier does not want us to tanker fuel; there needs to be some advance coordination between dispatch and oceanic clearance delivery to agree on some priority for tracks/altitude/airspeed assignments before all the acceptable rtes are assigned to other aircraft. The results of the coordination should be discussed with the captain or written in the remarks section of the flight plan. This flight incident put ahuge workload on a two-pilot flight crew. I felt that we handled everything remarkably well given the circumstances; but I'm skeptical that any random flight crew would not have been task saturated and ended up either accepting an illegal clearance or flight plan or diverting the flight. There needs to be a change to the oceanic datalink software to allow pilots to either 'accept;' 'standby;' or 'reject' a clearance (and contact clearance delivery by voice) as opposed to 'send.' there should be a revision to the cockpit software to allow a review of all outgoing ads messages; not just the position page. In a two-pilot cockpit; in which task saturation is an issue; one pilot should have the discretion to go ahead and copy as well as enter the new route into the FMC without consulting the other pilot; as long as due care is exercised; and that the route is later verified to be correct by the other pilot. There should be a review of the company's decision to fly these long haul international flts unaugmented. If everything goes without incident; it may appear to be acceptable. When things go awry; it puts an unduly high burden on the flight crew. It thinks it's asking too much of an already overworked; often fatigued; and undoubtedly stressed pilot group; to answer that the low percentage of en route diversions do not indicate that a problem exists. There needs to be some mechanism to allow a captain or maintenance controller to change the priority of any given MEL item. It cannot be left solely up to the aircraft router without the possibility of being overridden. One further comment; throughout my career at air carrier X; I have always been very proud to tell anyone who's willing to listen that one of the reasons I have always felt fortunate to work here as opposed to any other carrier; even through this difficult period; is that I always thought that our airplanes were maintained at the highest level; with very few deferrals and no question of a captain's authority with regard to accepting their aircraft as being ready for flight. Recently; for the first time; I have started to question our commitment to maintaining the highest possible standard. I am trying to be objective in my thoughts about this; and I truly hope that I am mistaken; but I think it worth mentioning. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: subsequent investigation by the reporter regarding the 'ATC intervention' determined that it was a phrase used to indicate the development of a report detailing problems with the cpdlc delivery of oceanic clrnces. Some question remains as to whether the word 'intervention' is actually the proper word. The explanation was delivered second hand by the radio operator on HF. The reporter's company is investigating further. Reporter emphasized the pragmatic effect of this entire episode was the almost total removal of both members of the minimum required flight crew from the primary tasks of aviating and navigating. Only through strong cockpit discipline and good luck did the event result in neither a navigation error or other abnormal or hazardous event which could have resulted from the numerous distractions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 CAPT ENRTE FROM EGLL TO JFK DESCRIBES DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING ACCEPTABLE OCEANIC CLRNC WHICH WILL SATISFY BOTH THE NEEDS OF ATC AND MEETS OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY A MEL ITEM WHICH LIMITS ACCEPTABLE ALTS AND TRACKS. RESULTING IN COMMUNICATIONS CLUTTER AND PROCEDURAL DISTRACTIONS WHICH PROVE TO BE NEARLY OVERWHELMING.

Narrative: DURING REVIEW OF FLT PAPERS; WE NOTED A DEFERRED MAINT ITEM: L ENG HIGH PRESSURE SHUTOFF VALVE (HPSOV) INOP AND LOCKED IN CLOSED POSITION. FLT ALT WAS RESTRICTED TO 35000 FT OR BELOW; AS WELL AS OTHER NOTES WHICH REQUIRED FLT CREW ACTION DURING COCKPIT PREP; TKOF; AND APCH. IN THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE SECOND TIME THIS WEEK I HAD BEEN DISPATCHED WITH A PNEUMATIC VALVE DEFERRAL (CAN WAIT 10 DAYS FOR REPAIR); I ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE MAINT SUPVR AT EGLL. HE WAS NOT THERE SO I CALLED MAINT CTL TO EXPRESS MY CONCERN THAT WE WERE WASTING TOO MUCH FUEL ON THESE DEFERRALS; BOTH IN RESTRICTED ALTS AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL APU USAGE; NOT TO MENTION ADDITIONAL CREW WORKLOAD. EGLL-JFK IS FLOWN BY AN UNAUGMENTED CREW; EVEN THOUGH THE FLT TIME FREQUENTLY GOES OVER 8 HRS (OUR ACTUAL TIME ON THIS FLT WAS 7:59) AND OUR LINE HOLDERS ARE ASSIGNED TO FLY 12 SUCH ATLANTIC CROSSINGS PER MONTH). MAINT CTL ADVISED ME THAT THE MAINT COMPUTER ASSIGNS THE REPAIR PRIORITY AUTOMATICALLY AND THAT IT CANNOT BE CHANGED. ONLY THE ACFT ROUTER DECIDED WHEN TO BRING THE ACFT IN FOR REPAIR. MAINT CTL INFORMED ME THAT OUR ACFT WOULD FLY 2 ADDITIONAL CROSSINGS BEFORE BEING ROUTED FOR REPAIR. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD NOT REFUSE THE ACFT; BUT THAT I WANTED TO RAISE THE PRIORITY TO A HIGHER LEVEL. HE ADVISED ME THAT I DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DO THAT; NOR DID HE. I ACCEPTED THE ACFT. I THEN TALKED TO THE RELEASING DISPATCHER ABOUT THE FLT PLAN; WX ISSUES; AND THE MAINT ALT RESTRICTION. NOTHING OF NOTE ON THE FLT; GOOD WX ENRTE AND AT JFK; NO DELAYS OUTBOUND OR AN ARR. I ACCEPTED THE DISPATCHER'S FLT PLAN RELEASE #2 WITH AN ENRTE REDISPATCH; 120 MIN ETOPS; TOTAL CLRED FUEL OF 127200 LBS; INCLUDING 5000 LBS HOLD; 5000 LBS EXTRA FUEL; NO ALTERNATE; LNDG AT JFK WITH 18000 LBS. WE DEPARTED AND ACCOMPLISHED ALL NORMAL ETOPS CHKLIST ITEMS AS REQUIRED. AT XA:01Z; WE REQUESTED OCEANIC CLRNC VIA DATALINK. OUR REQUEST WAS FOR TRACK 'E' CROSSING SOMAX AT XB:02Z; FL340; M.84. IN OPTIONAL TEXT WE ENTERED; '2ND NAT F FL340 MAX 350.' WE WERE ENTERING THE SHANWICK OCA FROM THE SHANNON OCEANIC TRANSITION AREA (SOTA) AT FIX SOMAX. WE RECEIVED OUR CLRNC AT XA:20Z. THE CLRNC READ; '/PIKCLYA.CL EGGX CLRNC ACR XXX CLRED TO JFK VIA SOMAX NAT ECHO SOMAX 49/20 46/30 44/40 43/50 42/60 DOVEY FM SOMAX MNTN F310 M084 ATC/LEVEL CHANGE NOT BEFORE XB:02 AT SOMAX END OF MESSAGE.' I KNEW RIGHT AWAY THIS WOULD PRESENT A FUEL ISSUE; SO I CALLED DISPATCH VIA SATCOM USING HIGH PRIORITY. HE AGREED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO COMPLETE THE FLT. I ASKED HIM TO PREPARE A REVISED FLT PLAN; PERHAPS WITH A DIFFERENT REDISPATCH POINT OR TO CONSIDER A DOUBLE REDISPATCH. HE WAS BUSY WORKING UP AN ALTERNATE PLAN; BUT COULD NOT MAKE THE NUMBERS WORK. I ASKED HIM TO CONTACT SHANWICK CLRNC DIRECTLY TO WORK OUT A NEW CLRNC; WHICH HE DID. THROUGHOUT THESE CONVERSATIONS SATCOM KEPT DISCONNECTING OUR CALL. I HAD TO CALL HIM AT LEAST 5 TIMES AND WAS WORKING ON A PHONE PATCH VIA HF. IN THE MEANTIME; I INSTRUCTED THE COPLT TO NOT RESPOND TO THE DATALINK CLRNC. THERE IS ONLY ONE OPTION ON THE CLRNC MESSAGE PAGE 'SEND'; WHICH I UNDERSTAND TO MEAN WE ACCEPT THE CLRNC. WE THEN RECEIVED THIS DATALINK MESSAGE; '/PIKCLYA.FSM EGGX ACR XXX RCL RECEIVED SHANWICK CLRNC NOT ACKNOWLEDGED SEND DATALINK ACCEPTANCE NOW END OF MESSAGE.' I COULD NOT FIND ANY WAY TO CLEAR THE PAGE OR TO OTHERWISE INDICATE THAT I WANTED TO DECLINE THE CLRNC. I FINALLY HIT THE 'SEND' PROMPT; FIGURING THAT THEY WERE TALKING TO DISPATCH AT THIS POINT. APPARENTLY; THEY WERE. AT XA:46Z; WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING VIA DATALINK; '/PIKCLYA.CLX EGGX CLRNC ACR XXX CLEARED TO JFK VIA SOMAX NAT ECHO SOMAX 49/20 46/30 44/40 43/50 42/60 DOVEY FM SOMAX MNTN F370 M084 ATC/LEVEL CHANGE RECLRNC 2 END OF MESSAGE.' I CALLED DISPATCH IMMEDIATELY AND TOLD HIM WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS CLRNC DUE TO OUR MEL ALT RESTRICTION. HE SAID HE WAS ON IT RIGHT AWAY. I ASKED IF I SHOULD TRY CONTACTING CLRNC DIRECTLY AT THIS POINT BECAUSE WE WERE AGAIN FACED WITH AN UNACCEPTABLE DATALINK CLRNC WITH NO ABILITY TO DO ANYTHING BUT PRESS THE 'SEND' PROMPT; THUS ACCEPTING THE CLRNC. HE SAID IT WASN'T NECESSARY; BUT I WAS TRYING ANYWAY; AS TIME WAS RUNNING SHORT. I WAS UNABLE TO REACH HIM ON THE USUAL FREQ; SO I ASKED SHANNON CTL ON WHICH FREQ I COULD REACH SHANWICK CLRNC DELIVERY. HE GAVE US BOTH FREQS. I EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT WE COULDN'T TAKE HIGHER THAN FL350 AND COULD NOT GO AS LOW AS FL310. AT THAT POINT DISPATCH HAD DONE THE COORDINATION FOR US TO CROSS THE NAT TRACKS FROM E TO F BY 30W AT FL340 M .84. WE RECEIVED THIS CLRNC VERBALLY AND READ IT BACK. THE TIME WAS XB:00Z. WE WERE STILL COORDINATING WITH DISPATCH TO HAVE HIM RERUN THE FLT PLAN WITH THE NEW RTE; WHILE I WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY ENTERING THE NEW RTE INTO THE FMC. I HAD ENTERED AND EXECUTED THE FIRST 2 POINTS: SOMAX AND THEN 48N 020W WITH THE COPLT'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. BY THE TIME WE CROSSED SOMAX; I HAD ENTERED; BUT NOT YET EXECUTED; THE SUBSEQUENT POINTS BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT YET BEEN VERIFIED BY THE COPLT; WHO HAD BEEN EQUALLY BUSY DISCUSSING THE NEW CLRNC WITH SHANNON CTL. WE WERE BOTH STILL SCRAMBLING TO ENSURE THAT WE HAD A VALID CLRNC; THAT DISPATCH WAS WORKING ON OUR FLT PLAN AND THAT WE WERE GOING WHERE WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE GOING AT THE RIGHT ALT AND AIRSPD; NOT TO MENTION ACCOMPLISHING CLASS 2 NAVIGATION PROCS. A COUPLE OF MINUTES LATER; WE RECEIVED A SELCAL FROM SHANWICK RADIO. HE STATED THAT ATC WAS CONDUCTING AN 'INTERVENTION' ON US AND DID I HAVE ANY COMMENT. I DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HE MEANT. TWO THOUGHTS CROSSED MY MIND. ONE WAS THAT THE ADS WAS NOT SET CORRECTLY AND WE HAD SENT AN ERRONEOUS EMER RPT. I WAS CONCERNED THAT HE MEANT TO INFORM US THAT WE WERE BEING 'INTERCEPTED.' I HAD PREVIOUSLY CHECKED THE ADS PAGE ON THE GND TO ENSURE THAT IT WAS NOT SET ON 'EMER;' BUT I RECHKED IT AGAIN TO BE SURE. THAT PAGE WAS NORMAL. THE TERMINOLOGY 'INTERVENTION' WAS CONFUSING TO ME; SO I TOLD SHANWICK THAT I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE TERM AND COULD HE EXPLAIN IT? HE TOLD ME TO 'STAND BY.' I DID NOT THINK HE WAS AWAITING THE RESPONSE; 'ADS RESET;' AS HE DID NOT USE THE TERMINOLOGY 'CONFIRM ADS.' I LOOKED THROUGHOUT THE FOM AND WAS UNABLE TO FIND ANY REFERENCE TO AN 'INTERVENTION.' I SENT AN ADVISORY ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH INFORMING HIM OF THIS RADIO CALL AND ASKED IF HE COULD CHK FROM HIS END. THE LAST THING WE NEEDED AT THIS POINT WAS TO BE INTERCEPTED! THE OTHER MORE LIKELY POSSIBILITY WAS THAT ADS HAD SENT AN INCORRECT RPT AND THIS WAS THEIR RATHER DRAMATIC WAY OF INFORMING US OF THIS. I RECALLED THAT THE 3RD POSITION OF THE POSITION RPT HAD NOT YET EXECUTED IN THE FMC WHEN WE CROSSED SOMAX AND WE WERE LOGGED ONTO EGGX AT THAT POINT. DISPATCH AGREED THAT HE ALSO THOUGHT THIS WAS THE INTENT OF THEIR RADIO XMISSION. WHEN SHANWICK RETURNED ON THE RADIO; HE DID INDICATE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO 'INTERCEPTION' BY FIGHTER JETS; BUT THAT THE 'INTERVENTION' WAS A RPT THAT WOULD BE FILED. OUR FLT PROCEEDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT TO JFK. WHAT I TOOK AWAY FROM THIS FLT INCIDENT WAS THE FOLLOWING: SATCOM IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR ALL INTL FLTS; ESPECIALLY WITH TWO-PLT CREWS. INTERMITTENT SATCOM IS A PROB AND WOULD BE REALLY MUCH BETTER IF IT WERE MORE RELIABLE. WITHOUT SATCOM; OR A REALLY GOOD HF PHONE PATCH; WE NEVER COULD HAVE DONE THE COORDINATION TO HAVE HAD THIS FLT CONTINUE TO JFK VERSUS A RETURN TO LHR FOR REFUELING OR DIVERSION SHORT OF JFK. FUEL IS ALWAYS AN ISSUE. PERSONALLY; I REALLY MAKE AN EFFORT TO ADHERE TO ACR'S NEW FUEL POLICY; BUT EACH TIME I GET BURNT LIKE THIS; IT MAKES ME WANT TO CARRY MORE FUEL TO COVER SUCH A CONTINGENCY. IF THERE IS A MEL ITEM SUCH AS THIS; AND ACR DOES NOT WANT US TO TANKER FUEL; THERE NEEDS TO BE SOME ADVANCE COORDINATION BETWEEN DISPATCH AND OCEANIC CLRNC DELIVERY TO AGREE ON SOME PRIORITY FOR TRACKS/ALT/AIRSPD ASSIGNMENTS BEFORE ALL THE ACCEPTABLE RTES ARE ASSIGNED TO OTHER ACFT. THE RESULTS OF THE COORDINATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE CAPT OR WRITTEN IN THE REMARKS SECTION OF THE FLT PLAN. THIS FLT INCIDENT PUT AHUGE WORKLOAD ON A TWO-PLT FLT CREW. I FELT THAT WE HANDLED EVERYTHING REMARKABLY WELL GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES; BUT I'M SKEPTICAL THAT ANY RANDOM FLT CREW WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TASK SATURATED AND ENDED UP EITHER ACCEPTING AN ILLEGAL CLRNC OR FLT PLAN OR DIVERTING THE FLT. THERE NEEDS TO BE A CHANGE TO THE OCEANIC DATALINK SOFTWARE TO ALLOW PLTS TO EITHER 'ACCEPT;' 'STANDBY;' OR 'REJECT' A CLRNC (AND CONTACT CLRNC DELIVERY BY VOICE) AS OPPOSED TO 'SEND.' THERE SHOULD BE A REVISION TO THE COCKPIT SOFTWARE TO ALLOW A REVIEW OF ALL OUTGOING ADS MESSAGES; NOT JUST THE POSITION PAGE. IN A TWO-PLT COCKPIT; IN WHICH TASK SATURATION IS AN ISSUE; ONE PLT SHOULD HAVE THE DISCRETION TO GO AHEAD AND COPY AS WELL AS ENTER THE NEW RTE INTO THE FMC WITHOUT CONSULTING THE OTHER PLT; AS LONG AS DUE CARE IS EXERCISED; AND THAT THE RTE IS LATER VERIFIED TO BE CORRECT BY THE OTHER PLT. THERE SHOULD BE A REVIEW OF THE COMPANY'S DECISION TO FLY THESE LONG HAUL INTL FLTS UNAUGMENTED. IF EVERYTHING GOES WITHOUT INCIDENT; IT MAY APPEAR TO BE ACCEPTABLE. WHEN THINGS GO AWRY; IT PUTS AN UNDULY HIGH BURDEN ON THE FLT CREW. IT THINKS IT'S ASKING TOO MUCH OF AN ALREADY OVERWORKED; OFTEN FATIGUED; AND UNDOUBTEDLY STRESSED PLT GROUP; TO ANSWER THAT THE LOW PERCENTAGE OF ENRTE DIVERSIONS DO NOT INDICATE THAT A PROB EXISTS. THERE NEEDS TO BE SOME MECHANISM TO ALLOW A CAPT OR MAINT CTLR TO CHANGE THE PRIORITY OF ANY GIVEN MEL ITEM. IT CANNOT BE LEFT SOLELY UP TO THE ACFT ROUTER WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING OVERRIDDEN. ONE FURTHER COMMENT; THROUGHOUT MY CAREER AT ACR X; I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN VERY PROUD TO TELL ANYONE WHO'S WILLING TO LISTEN THAT ONE OF THE REASONS I HAVE ALWAYS FELT FORTUNATE TO WORK HERE AS OPPOSED TO ANY OTHER CARRIER; EVEN THROUGH THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD; IS THAT I ALWAYS THOUGHT THAT OUR AIRPLANES WERE MAINTAINED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL; WITH VERY FEW DEFERRALS AND NO QUESTION OF A CAPT'S AUTHORITY WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTING THEIR ACFT AS BEING READY FOR FLT. RECENTLY; FOR THE FIRST TIME; I HAVE STARTED TO QUESTION OUR COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE STANDARD. I AM TRYING TO BE OBJECTIVE IN MY THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS; AND I TRULY HOPE THAT I AM MISTAKEN; BUT I THINK IT WORTH MENTIONING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION BY THE RPTR REGARDING THE 'ATC INTERVENTION' DETERMINED THAT IT WAS A PHRASE USED TO INDICATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RPT DETAILING PROBS WITH THE CPDLC DELIVERY OF OCEANIC CLRNCES. SOME QUESTION REMAINS AS TO WHETHER THE WORD 'INTERVENTION' IS ACTUALLY THE PROPER WORD. THE EXPLANATION WAS DELIVERED SECOND HAND BY THE RADIO OPERATOR ON HF. THE RPTR'S COMPANY IS INVESTIGATING FURTHER. RPTR EMPHASIZED THE PRAGMATIC EFFECT OF THIS ENTIRE EPISODE WAS THE ALMOST TOTAL REMOVAL OF BOTH MEMBERS OF THE MINIMUM REQUIRED FLT CREW FROM THE PRIMARY TASKS OF AVIATING AND NAVIGATING. ONLY THROUGH STRONG COCKPIT DISCIPLINE AND GOOD LUCK DID THE EVENT RESULT IN NEITHER A NAV ERROR OR OTHER ABNORMAL OR HAZARDOUS EVENT WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED FROM THE NUMEROUS DISTRACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.