Narrative:

Both pilots PIC qualified. Reporter assigned sic; and not flying. This was a part 135 passenger flight. The passenger arrived early. Both pilots busy getting aircraft ready for flight. The captain obtained the clearance; which included the lga 9 departure. The captain initially could not find the chart for this departure procedure; but eventually located it. Both the captain and I rushed to get the flight underway. After takeoff; we could not contact departure control for about 30-60 seconds. During that time it became obvious that neither the captain nor I had the slightest understanding of the departure procedure. He thought I had reviewed the procedure; and I thought he had prepared for it. After the communication problem with departure control was resolved; we received (immediate) radar vectors. I do not believe we were close to any other traffic. (We were TCASII equipped.) the problem arose from our hurried departure. Contributing factors were that pilots and passenger had to be transported by bus from the FBO to the aircraft. We wanted to quickly start the engines to get the air conditioning operating (it was hot!). The appropriate chart was on the captain's yoke; so I assumed he was familiar with it. He had asked me a question about the departure (initial heading; which I answered incorrectly) and so the captain assumed I was prepared for the departure. Surprisingly; a contributing factor was that it was only a short taxi to the departure runway; which reduced our time to discover our errors and misunderstandings. (I frequently review the fpr during taxi.) corrective actions to this shoddy operation are numerous. Even though I was not clear about the departure procedure; I failed to state (or assert) that fact to the captain. In my desire to 'get underway;' I was willing to assume the captain had things under control. I should have clearly stated my confusion. This was especially true because neither the captain nor I had ever flown to lga airport before this day. We knew what the first fix was; but not how to get to it (coate intersection). We both failed in our briefing responsibilities. An appropriate brief would have pointed out our misunderstandings. Ironically; the captain and I had flown together frequently over the past 3 yrs; and I certainly trusted him to prepare for departures; because he had always been thorough in the past. I suspect he likewise trusted me to do the same. The radio problem was only a minor distraction; but which only triggered the realization that neither of us knew which way to go. The chain of events would have been broken if I had been honest enough to announce my ignorance. This occurrence would not have happened if there had been better crew communication. Apparently the captain did not understand the departure any better than I. A personal corrective action would be to refrain from doing anything I was 'uncomfortable' with. Secondly; and importantly; this incident has emphasized to me that my preflight briefing ('crew brief' in the checklist) is something I need to give more attention to. The briefings I have allowed as PIC and as sic are insufficient.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FALCON 10 CREW DEPARTING ON THE LGA 9 DEP DID NOT PRE-BRIEF OR FLY THE DEP AND WERE VECTORED BY NEW YORK ARTCC.

Narrative: BOTH PLTS PIC QUALIFIED. RPTR ASSIGNED SIC; AND NOT FLYING. THIS WAS A PART 135 PAX FLT. THE PAX ARRIVED EARLY. BOTH PLTS BUSY GETTING ACFT READY FOR FLT. THE CAPT OBTAINED THE CLRNC; WHICH INCLUDED THE LGA 9 DEP. THE CAPT INITIALLY COULD NOT FIND THE CHART FOR THIS DEP PROC; BUT EVENTUALLY LOCATED IT. BOTH THE CAPT AND I RUSHED TO GET THE FLT UNDERWAY. AFTER TKOF; WE COULD NOT CONTACT DEP CTL FOR ABOUT 30-60 SECONDS. DURING THAT TIME IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I HAD THE SLIGHTEST UNDERSTANDING OF THE DEP PROC. HE THOUGHT I HAD REVIEWED THE PROC; AND I THOUGHT HE HAD PREPARED FOR IT. AFTER THE COM PROB WITH DEP CTL WAS RESOLVED; WE RECEIVED (IMMEDIATE) RADAR VECTORS. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE WERE CLOSE TO ANY OTHER TFC. (WE WERE TCASII EQUIPPED.) THE PROB AROSE FROM OUR HURRIED DEP. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THAT PLTS AND PAX HAD TO BE TRANSPORTED BY BUS FROM THE FBO TO THE ACFT. WE WANTED TO QUICKLY START THE ENGS TO GET THE AIR CONDITIONING OPERATING (IT WAS HOT!). THE APPROPRIATE CHART WAS ON THE CAPT'S YOKE; SO I ASSUMED HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH IT. HE HAD ASKED ME A QUESTION ABOUT THE DEP (INITIAL HDG; WHICH I ANSWERED INCORRECTLY) AND SO THE CAPT ASSUMED I WAS PREPARED FOR THE DEP. SURPRISINGLY; A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THAT IT WAS ONLY A SHORT TAXI TO THE DEP RWY; WHICH REDUCED OUR TIME TO DISCOVER OUR ERRORS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS. (I FREQUENTLY REVIEW THE FPR DURING TAXI.) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO THIS SHODDY OP ARE NUMEROUS. EVEN THOUGH I WAS NOT CLR ABOUT THE DEP PROC; I FAILED TO STATE (OR ASSERT) THAT FACT TO THE CAPT. IN MY DESIRE TO 'GET UNDERWAY;' I WAS WILLING TO ASSUME THE CAPT HAD THINGS UNDER CTL. I SHOULD HAVE CLRLY STATED MY CONFUSION. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE BECAUSE NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I HAD EVER FLOWN TO LGA ARPT BEFORE THIS DAY. WE KNEW WHAT THE FIRST FIX WAS; BUT NOT HOW TO GET TO IT (COATE INTXN). WE BOTH FAILED IN OUR BRIEFING RESPONSIBILITIES. AN APPROPRIATE BRIEF WOULD HAVE POINTED OUT OUR MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IRONICALLY; THE CAPT AND I HAD FLOWN TOGETHER FREQUENTLY OVER THE PAST 3 YRS; AND I CERTAINLY TRUSTED HIM TO PREPARE FOR DEPS; BECAUSE HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN THOROUGH IN THE PAST. I SUSPECT HE LIKEWISE TRUSTED ME TO DO THE SAME. THE RADIO PROB WAS ONLY A MINOR DISTR; BUT WHICH ONLY TRIGGERED THE REALIZATION THAT NEITHER OF US KNEW WHICH WAY TO GO. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS WOULD HAVE BEEN BROKEN IF I HAD BEEN HONEST ENOUGH TO ANNOUNCE MY IGNORANCE. THIS OCCURRENCE WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF THERE HAD BEEN BETTER CREW COM. APPARENTLY THE CAPT DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE DEP ANY BETTER THAN I. A PERSONAL CORRECTIVE ACTION WOULD BE TO REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING I WAS 'UNCOMFORTABLE' WITH. SECONDLY; AND IMPORTANTLY; THIS INCIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED TO ME THAT MY PREFLT BRIEFING ('CREW BRIEF' IN THE CHKLIST) IS SOMETHING I NEED TO GIVE MORE ATTN TO. THE BRIEFINGS I HAVE ALLOWED AS PIC AND AS SIC ARE INSUFFICIENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.