|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||navaid : dvv.vortac|
|Altitude||msl single value : 10000|
|Controlling Facilities||tracon : d01.tracon|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||descent : intermediate altitude|
|Route In Use||arrival : on vectors|
|Affiliation||government : faa|
|Function||controller : approach|
|Qualification||controller : radar|
|Experience||controller military : 4|
controller non radar : 3
controller radar : 23
controller supervisory : 4
flight time total : 60
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Anomaly||other anomaly other|
|Independent Detector||other controllera|
|Resolutory Action||controller : issued new clearance|
|Problem Areas||ATC Human Performance|
|ATC Facility||procedure or policy : d01.tracon|
On feb/fri/05 at XA30Z; while working the FR2 position; I had to pull air carrier X out of the final approach sequence because they did not see the airport. We were landing on runways 16L&right. There had been difficulties with this runway confign in the past and this had an effect on my decision to take the action I did. A den approach controller had recently been decertified because of a loss of separation while landing on runways 16L&right. Runway 16R is a relatively new runway and no procedures had been developed for having 2 final position crossing/balancing traffic in this confign. This event happened between the time the new procedures were being developed for this landing confign and the time they were implemented. We were briefed tough; to be extra careful and to ensure that we met all necessary final intercept requirements. One of our controllers had been decertified and tensions were high. This was also soon after an MD80 landed short of the runway at den airport because they were not set up for a stable approach. We had just been briefed to ensure all aircraft were set up for a 'stable' approach. Given these circumstances; and the fact I needed to ensure wake turbulence separation with traffic in trail; I elected to take air carrier X out of the sequence and I immediately put them back on final for landing. Pressure like this from my management is not only confusing; it is unsafe. I feel pressure is being put upon me and my co-workers to push the safety envelope to avoid pilot inquiries. They are also compromising safety in pursuit of unrelated issues. I thin an unbiased third party should investigate whether this 'heavy handed' management technique is affecting safety and human performance at den approach.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: D01 CTLR DESCRIBES ACTIONS TAKEN TO RE-SEQUENCE AN ACFT THAT COULD NOT IDENT THE ARPT FOR A VISUAL APCH AND RELAYS CONCERN REGARDING POSSIBLE DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS A RESULT.
Narrative: ON FEB/FRI/05 AT XA30Z; WHILE WORKING THE FR2 POS; I HAD TO PULL ACR X OUT OF THE FINAL APCH SEQUENCE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT SEE THE ARPT. WE WERE LNDG ON RWYS 16L&R. THERE HAD BEEN DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS RWY CONFIGN IN THE PAST AND THIS HAD AN EFFECT ON MY DECISION TO TAKE THE ACTION I DID. A DEN APCH CTLR HAD RECENTLY BEEN DECERTIFIED BECAUSE OF A LOSS OF SEPARATION WHILE LNDG ON RWYS 16L&R. RWY 16R IS A RELATIVELY NEW RWY AND NO PROCS HAD BEEN DEVELOPED FOR HAVING 2 FINAL POS XING/BALANCING TFC IN THIS CONFIGN. THIS EVENT HAPPENED BTWN THE TIME THE NEW PROCS WERE BEING DEVELOPED FOR THIS LNDG CONFIGN AND THE TIME THEY WERE IMPLEMENTED. WE WERE BRIEFED TOUGH; TO BE EXTRA CAREFUL AND TO ENSURE THAT WE MET ALL NECESSARY FINAL INTERCEPT REQUIREMENTS. ONE OF OUR CTLRS HAD BEEN DECERTIFIED AND TENSIONS WERE HIGH. THIS WAS ALSO SOON AFTER AN MD80 LANDED SHORT OF THE RWY AT DEN ARPT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT SET UP FOR A STABLE APCH. WE HAD JUST BEEN BRIEFED TO ENSURE ALL ACFT WERE SET UP FOR A 'STABLE' APCH. GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES; AND THE FACT I NEEDED TO ENSURE WAKE TURB SEPARATION WITH TFC IN TRAIL; I ELECTED TO TAKE ACR X OUT OF THE SEQUENCE AND I IMMEDIATELY PUT THEM BACK ON FINAL FOR LNDG. PRESSURE LIKE THIS FROM MY MGMNT IS NOT ONLY CONFUSING; IT IS UNSAFE. I FEEL PRESSURE IS BEING PUT UPON ME AND MY CO-WORKERS TO PUSH THE SAFETY ENVELOPE TO AVOID PLT INQUIRIES. THEY ARE ALSO COMPROMISING SAFETY IN PURSUIT OF UNRELATED ISSUES. I THIN AN UNBIASED THIRD PARTY SHOULD INVESTIGATE WHETHER THIS 'HVY HANDED' MGMNT TECHNIQUE IS AFFECTING SAFETY AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE AT DEN APCH.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.