Narrative:

I arrived at the aircraft at approximately XA20 for an XB00 departure. I inspected the logbook and noticed 4 MEL's. The first MEL was non functioning autothrottles. The second MEL was the autopressurization; meaning you must use the standby function. The last 2 MEL's dealt with minor cabin lighting. The write-up on the pressurization was from the day before. The crew was cruising at FL270 when the cabin started to climb. They were unable to control the cabin with either standby or manual control. They elected to do an emergency descent and were able to regain control at 14000 ft MSL with the standby system. The write-up didn't say if the cabin reached that altitude; but since there wasn't a write-up about the cabin masks; I'll assume that it didn't. My first officer was new on the airplane; having come from the airbus mot recently. He only had 2 months experience. After engine start; we did the supplemental procedure required by the MEL to check for ctlability of the outflow valve with the manual system; both AC and dc. I then noticed he had set the panel up incorrectly for standby operation; so I instructed him in the correct procedure. We finished the after start checklist then proceeded to the takeoff runway which was a very short taxi of less than 3 mins. We did the before takeoff checklist during taxi and departed. The first officer was the PF and I was the pilot monitoring. Just after takeoff; I noticed the cabin was climbing at an excessive rate. I did the after takeoff checklist then proceeded to troubleshoot the cabin problem. On cold mornings and the airplane being light; it was climbing at over 4000 FPM. We were required to use full power due to the autothrottles being inoperative. In my mind was the same scenario from the previous day. I tried manual mode to try to gain control of the cabin. I was showing about 1 1/2 psi differential during the climb. We leveled off at 11000 ft MSL with ZBW. I told ZBW that we would have to return to bdl for maintenance as we had a pressurization problem. We were starting to get vectors; when I noticed we had both AC packs off. I turned the packs on and was able to gain control of the cabin. Lesson learned: just because you have high experience in the cockpit doesn't mean you are safer. With the first officer being new to the equipment; I should have monitored the checklist more closely. We should have talked more at the gate about standby operation. I should have immediately leveled off at the first sign of trouble. If the autothrottles had been working; we would have used de-rated power for takeoff and climb allowing a slower rate of climb. With the slippery slope of working for a carrier in bankruptcy; and the associate stresses that come with that; I need to be extra vigilant to my own personal level of stress and fatigue. Sometimes you don't realize how much pressure is on you from both a company standpoint and self.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHED WITH MULTIPLE AUTOMATIC SYS DEFERRED; INCLUDING THE AUTOPRESSURIZATION SYS; FLT CREW OF B737-300 ENCOUNTER RAPIDLY CLBING CABIN DURING INITIAL CLB. AFTER INITIATING RETURN LAND; DISCOVERED PRESSURIZATION SYS PACKS HAD NOT BEEN TURNED ON.

Narrative: I ARRIVED AT THE ACFT AT APPROX XA20 FOR AN XB00 DEP. I INSPECTED THE LOGBOOK AND NOTICED 4 MEL'S. THE FIRST MEL WAS NON FUNCTIONING AUTOTHROTTLES. THE SECOND MEL WAS THE AUTOPRESSURIZATION; MEANING YOU MUST USE THE STANDBY FUNCTION. THE LAST 2 MEL'S DEALT WITH MINOR CABIN LIGHTING. THE WRITE-UP ON THE PRESSURIZATION WAS FROM THE DAY BEFORE. THE CREW WAS CRUISING AT FL270 WHEN THE CABIN STARTED TO CLB. THEY WERE UNABLE TO CTL THE CABIN WITH EITHER STANDBY OR MANUAL CTL. THEY ELECTED TO DO AN EMER DSCNT AND WERE ABLE TO REGAIN CTL AT 14000 FT MSL WITH THE STANDBY SYS. THE WRITE-UP DIDN'T SAY IF THE CABIN REACHED THAT ALT; BUT SINCE THERE WASN'T A WRITE-UP ABOUT THE CABIN MASKS; I'LL ASSUME THAT IT DIDN'T. MY FO WAS NEW ON THE AIRPLANE; HAVING COME FROM THE AIRBUS MOT RECENTLY. HE ONLY HAD 2 MONTHS EXPERIENCE. AFTER ENG START; WE DID THE SUPPLEMENTAL PROC REQUIRED BY THE MEL TO CHK FOR CTLABILITY OF THE OUTFLOW VALVE WITH THE MANUAL SYS; BOTH AC AND DC. I THEN NOTICED HE HAD SET THE PANEL UP INCORRECTLY FOR STANDBY OP; SO I INSTRUCTED HIM IN THE CORRECT PROC. WE FINISHED THE AFTER START CHKLIST THEN PROCEEDED TO THE TKOF RWY WHICH WAS A VERY SHORT TAXI OF LESS THAN 3 MINS. WE DID THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST DURING TAXI AND DEPARTED. THE FO WAS THE PF AND I WAS THE PLT MONITORING. JUST AFTER TKOF; I NOTICED THE CABIN WAS CLBING AT AN EXCESSIVE RATE. I DID THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST THEN PROCEEDED TO TROUBLESHOOT THE CABIN PROB. ON COLD MORNINGS AND THE AIRPLANE BEING LIGHT; IT WAS CLBING AT OVER 4000 FPM. WE WERE REQUIRED TO USE FULL PWR DUE TO THE AUTOTHROTTLES BEING INOP. IN MY MIND WAS THE SAME SCENARIO FROM THE PREVIOUS DAY. I TRIED MANUAL MODE TO TRY TO GAIN CTL OF THE CABIN. I WAS SHOWING ABOUT 1 1/2 PSI DIFFERENTIAL DURING THE CLB. WE LEVELED OFF AT 11000 FT MSL WITH ZBW. I TOLD ZBW THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO RETURN TO BDL FOR MAINT AS WE HAD A PRESSURIZATION PROB. WE WERE STARTING TO GET VECTORS; WHEN I NOTICED WE HAD BOTH AC PACKS OFF. I TURNED THE PACKS ON AND WAS ABLE TO GAIN CTL OF THE CABIN. LESSON LEARNED: JUST BECAUSE YOU HAVE HIGH EXPERIENCE IN THE COCKPIT DOESN'T MEAN YOU ARE SAFER. WITH THE FO BEING NEW TO THE EQUIP; I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE CHKLIST MORE CLOSELY. WE SHOULD HAVE TALKED MORE AT THE GATE ABOUT STANDBY OP. I SHOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY LEVELED OFF AT THE FIRST SIGN OF TROUBLE. IF THE AUTOTHROTTLES HAD BEEN WORKING; WE WOULD HAVE USED DE-RATED PWR FOR TKOF AND CLB ALLOWING A SLOWER RATE OF CLB. WITH THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF WORKING FOR A CARRIER IN BANKRUPTCY; AND THE ASSOCIATE STRESSES THAT COME WITH THAT; I NEED TO BE EXTRA VIGILANT TO MY OWN PERSONAL LEVEL OF STRESS AND FATIGUE. SOMETIMES YOU DON'T REALIZE HOW MUCH PRESSURE IS ON YOU FROM BOTH A COMPANY STANDPOINT AND SELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.