Narrative:

It was the last leg of the day to abq. We obtained the ATIS via ACARS prior to descent; about 180 NM from abq; and it indicated a visual approach to runway 3. I briefed the visual approach; but we were not able to see the runway even after turning final; so I quickly briefed the ILS and continued on that approach. The captain directed a go around when the runway was not in sight at minimums and I flew the missed approach. Tower gave us holding instructions along with vague references to deteriorating WX conditions (such as a 'rain shower 4 mi east of final' and 'decreasing visibility to the south'). Captain briefed a company procedures ILS to runway 3 while we were in holding. When tower reported improving visibility (still no details); we asked for a vector back to the approach. I flew the entire approach. Captain again directed a go around at minimums; which I commenced. Just as I began to apply go around thrust; captain called the runway in sight and took the airplane. I relinquished control. He called for wipers and altitude callouts; which I provided to touchdown. We landed about 3000 ft down the runway and taxied to the gate uneventfully. Mistakes: 1) we should have asked tower for WX specifics (especially visibility). 2) we should have used the wipers on final; as they would have helped the captain visually acquire the runway sooner. 3) we may have momentarily deviated from stabilized approach criteria just before the captain took the airplane due to increasing thrust (although I don't believe so; since I had just begun to advance the thrust levers). Fatigue was a big player. I was slow to transition from visual to ILS callouts on the final approach. Additionally; we received 11 turbulence plot messages via ACARS during the flight; none of which were applicable to our route of flight and there were none regarding deteriorating WX at abq. Supplemental information from acn 647291: fatigue was a factor. The vagueness by tower on the field visibility was a factor. Fuel was a factor. When we shut down at the gate; I could only think of (another carrier) into little rock.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 CAPT FOLLOWING THE FO'S SECOND ILS TO MINIMUM APCH ALT TOOK ACFT CTL AND SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED LONG. BOTH PLTS MENTION FATIGUE EFFECTING THEIR DECISION.

Narrative: IT WAS THE LAST LEG OF THE DAY TO ABQ. WE OBTAINED THE ATIS VIA ACARS PRIOR TO DSCNT; ABOUT 180 NM FROM ABQ; AND IT INDICATED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 3. I BRIEFED THE VISUAL APCH; BUT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO SEE THE RWY EVEN AFTER TURNING FINAL; SO I QUICKLY BRIEFED THE ILS AND CONTINUED ON THAT APCH. THE CAPT DIRECTED A GAR WHEN THE RWY WAS NOT IN SIGHT AT MINIMUMS AND I FLEW THE MISSED APCH. TWR GAVE US HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS ALONG WITH VAGUE REFS TO DETERIORATING WX CONDITIONS (SUCH AS A 'RAIN SHOWER 4 MI E OF FINAL' AND 'DECREASING VISIBILITY TO THE S'). CAPT BRIEFED A COMPANY PROCS ILS TO RWY 3 WHILE WE WERE IN HOLDING. WHEN TWR RPTED IMPROVING VISIBILITY (STILL NO DETAILS); WE ASKED FOR A VECTOR BACK TO THE APCH. I FLEW THE ENTIRE APCH. CAPT AGAIN DIRECTED A GAR AT MINIMUMS; WHICH I COMMENCED. JUST AS I BEGAN TO APPLY GAR THRUST; CAPT CALLED THE RWY IN SIGHT AND TOOK THE AIRPLANE. I RELINQUISHED CTL. HE CALLED FOR WIPERS AND ALT CALLOUTS; WHICH I PROVIDED TO TOUCHDOWN. WE LANDED ABOUT 3000 FT DOWN THE RWY AND TAXIED TO THE GATE UNEVENTFULLY. MISTAKES: 1) WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED TWR FOR WX SPECIFICS (ESPECIALLY VISIBILITY). 2) WE SHOULD HAVE USED THE WIPERS ON FINAL; AS THEY WOULD HAVE HELPED THE CAPT VISUALLY ACQUIRE THE RWY SOONER. 3) WE MAY HAVE MOMENTARILY DEVIATED FROM STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA JUST BEFORE THE CAPT TOOK THE AIRPLANE DUE TO INCREASING THRUST (ALTHOUGH I DON'T BELIEVE SO; SINCE I HAD JUST BEGUN TO ADVANCE THE THRUST LEVERS). FATIGUE WAS A BIG PLAYER. I WAS SLOW TO TRANSITION FROM VISUAL TO ILS CALLOUTS ON THE FINAL APCH. ADDITIONALLY; WE RECEIVED 11 TURB PLOT MESSAGES VIA ACARS DURING THE FLT; NONE OF WHICH WERE APPLICABLE TO OUR RTE OF FLT AND THERE WERE NONE REGARDING DETERIORATING WX AT ABQ. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 647291: FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR. THE VAGUENESS BY TWR ON THE FIELD VISIBILITY WAS A FACTOR. FUEL WAS A FACTOR. WHEN WE SHUT DOWN AT THE GATE; I COULD ONLY THINK OF (ANOTHER CARRIER) INTO LITTLE ROCK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.