Narrative:

Landing at an airport embedded within a flight restricted zone (frz) without a security clearance/assigned pin number. Prior to the scheduled departure date, current IFR en route low altitude charts, and various other resources where used for review and flight planning. The pilot duties were shared by myself and a second pilot. The other pilot called the dayton flight service station to obtain both a flight briefing and to file a plan departing (mgy) and arrival at (W32). Dayton clearance cleared our aircraft as filed. Potomac approach advised to use the manne four arrival into the washington dc area. A few minutes later, approach had asked for our intentions on getting into the washington executive hyde airport. Approach responded we could expect vectors for the VOR 5 approach into the airport. Our aircraft was cleared for the VOR 5 approach into washington executive hyde (W32). Additionally, the controller had asked if we had the cancellation procedures. Our reply was no. The controller then gave the instructions. After landing, airport security approached me and stated that potomac approach had just called to inquire if we had a pin number. Not understanding the question, I had asked, 'what is a pin number?' the security officer then proceeded to explain what the pin number was needed for: a security/authorization pass for landing and taking off at that airport. All aircraft members presented the appropriate identification. The security officer could not understand how potomac approach had cleared our aircraft to land without a pin number. Several phone calls were made by the officer to determine the cause, but no cause could be found. I contacted both altoona and leesburg flight service stations. Both the altoona FSS briefer and leesburg FSS briefer stated that dayton FSS should not have allowed for the filing of the flight plan into the washington area frz without additional questioning. The altoona briefer in particular mentioned that dayton FSS should have referred us to the leesburg FSS for a briefing into the area. It amazes me how we still got into the area, received a clearance to land, and landed with no controller asking if we had the proper authorization to do so. This raises several questions: why didn't the dayton FSS briefer ask for a pin, when a pin is required to land at the washington executive hyde airport? Shouldn't dayton FSS have provided a number (or handed us off) to leesburg approach for briefing? Why isn't this information posted/available to all FSS stations within the united states? If flying into the washington dc area requires a security clearance of some fashion, shouldn't a clearance identification (pin) be included on the IFR paper strip that is passed from controller to controller? How did potomac approach allow us into the area without a pin? Shouldn't they have first inquired of such? Why wasn't the frz noted on the IFR en route low altitude charts? Why is it not possible to have an alerting system in place to alert the briefer when an attempt is made to file to an airport residing in a frz? Possible remedies to the problem include: training of new procedures for all FSS briefers on what is required for flts into a frz and how to respond in an accurate manner. Training of new procedures for all frz controllers. Modify software used by briefers to display flags/warnings on flts into a frz. Modify software used by briefers to require a valid pin for flts landing at airports embedded within a frz. New descriptor added to IFR strips showing controllers the pin for flts into a frz. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter advised that there has been no subsequent contact by any agency regarding the incident. He feels the lack of contact is more the result of a desire to obscure the breakdown in security the incident represents than an attempt to be 'easy' on them for their transgressions. He related that post incident discussions with the leesburg FSS revealed that they should have never been allowed to file the flight plan and that they should have been directed to contact leesburg directly for complete information on the restrictions appropriate to their flight. He stated that he knew nothing about a pin number until the subject was raisedby airport security. During his discussions with the tsa representative, he was told he had been followed by blackhawk helicopters. Both he and the airport security individual who met him state they never saw such helicopters at any time. The reporter believes that multiple federal agencies, FSS briefers, clearance delivery, en route and approach control controllers, failed in their responsibilities to ensure compliance with operational restrictions within the washington frz. He feels that those failures, combined with the difficulty in accessing the required information from federal resources, were responsible not only for the subsequent violation of airspace but also for placing his aircraft and its passenger in jeopardy for violating the innermost security circle of this protected airspace. Thus making vulnerable to intercept and, in a worse case scenario, possibly hostile action against them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWO PLTS OF M20J ARE ALLOWED TO LAND AT W32 WITHIN THE DCA FRZ WITHOUT THE REQUIRED PLT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER DESPITE A FSS BRIEFING, FILING AN IFR FLT PLAN AND PCT APCH CTL HANDLING ON ARR. NEITHER THE PLTS NOR THE ACFT WERE AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE INTO OR OUT OF W32 AS REQUIRED BY SFAR 94.

Narrative: LNDG AT AN ARPT EMBEDDED WITHIN A FLIGHT RESTRICTED ZONE (FRZ) WITHOUT A SECURITY CLRNC/ASSIGNED PIN NUMBER. PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED DEP DATE, CURRENT IFR ENRTE LOW ALT CHARTS, AND VARIOUS OTHER RESOURCES WHERE USED FOR REVIEW AND FLT PLANNING. THE PLT DUTIES WERE SHARED BY MYSELF AND A SECOND PLT. THE OTHER PLT CALLED THE DAYTON FLT SVC STATION TO OBTAIN BOTH A FLT BRIEFING AND TO FILE A PLAN DEPARTING (MGY) AND ARR AT (W32). DAYTON CLRNC CLRED OUR ACFT AS FILED. POTOMAC APCH ADVISED TO USE THE MANNE FOUR ARR INTO THE WASHINGTON DC AREA. A FEW MINUTES LATER, APCH HAD ASKED FOR OUR INTENTIONS ON GETTING INTO THE WASHINGTON EXECUTIVE HYDE ARPT. APCH RESPONDED WE COULD EXPECT VECTORS FOR THE VOR 5 APCH INTO THE ARPT. OUR ACFT WAS CLRED FOR THE VOR 5 APCH INTO WASHINGTON EXECUTIVE HYDE (W32). ADDITIONALLY, THE CTLR HAD ASKED IF WE HAD THE CANCELLATION PROCS. OUR REPLY WAS NO. THE CTLR THEN GAVE THE INSTRUCTIONS. AFTER LNDG, ARPT SECURITY APCHED ME AND STATED THAT POTOMAC APCH HAD JUST CALLED TO INQUIRE IF WE HAD A PIN NUMBER. NOT UNDERSTANDING THE QUESTION, I HAD ASKED, 'WHAT IS A PIN NUMBER?' THE SECURITY OFFICER THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN WHAT THE PIN NUMBER WAS NEEDED FOR: A SECURITY/AUTHORIZATION PASS FOR LNDG AND TAKING OFF AT THAT ARPT. ALL ACFT MEMBERS PRESENTED THE APPROPRIATE ID. THE SECURITY OFFICER COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW POTOMAC APCH HAD CLRED OUR ACFT TO LAND WITHOUT A PIN NUMBER. SEVERAL PHONE CALLS WERE MADE BY THE OFFICER TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE, BUT NO CAUSE COULD BE FOUND. I CONTACTED BOTH ALTOONA AND LEESBURG FLT SVC STATIONS. BOTH THE ALTOONA FSS BRIEFER AND LEESBURG FSS BRIEFER STATED THAT DAYTON FSS SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED FOR THE FILING OF THE FLT PLAN INTO THE WASHINGTON AREA FRZ WITHOUT ADDITIONAL QUESTIONING. THE ALTOONA BRIEFER IN PARTICULAR MENTIONED THAT DAYTON FSS SHOULD HAVE REFERRED US TO THE LEESBURG FSS FOR A BRIEFING INTO THE AREA. IT AMAZES ME HOW WE STILL GOT INTO THE AREA, RECEIVED A CLRNC TO LAND, AND LANDED WITH NO CTLR ASKING IF WE HAD THE PROPER AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO. THIS RAISES SEVERAL QUESTIONS: WHY DIDN'T THE DAYTON FSS BRIEFER ASK FOR A PIN, WHEN A PIN IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT THE WASHINGTON EXECUTIVE HYDE ARPT? SHOULDN'T DAYTON FSS HAVE PROVIDED A NUMBER (OR HANDED US OFF) TO LEESBURG APCH FOR BRIEFING? WHY ISN'T THIS INFO POSTED/AVAILABLE TO ALL FSS STATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES? IF FLYING INTO THE WASHINGTON DC AREA REQUIRES A SECURITY CLRNC OF SOME FASHION, SHOULDN'T A CLRNC ID (PIN) BE INCLUDED ON THE IFR PAPER STRIP THAT IS PASSED FROM CTLR TO CTLR? HOW DID POTOMAC APCH ALLOW US INTO THE AREA WITHOUT A PIN? SHOULDN'T THEY HAVE FIRST INQUIRED OF SUCH? WHY WASN'T THE FRZ NOTED ON THE IFR ENRTE LOW ALT CHARTS? WHY IS IT NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVE AN ALERTING SYSTEM IN PLACE TO ALERT THE BRIEFER WHEN AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO FILE TO AN ARPT RESIDING IN A FRZ? POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO THE PROB INCLUDE: TRAINING OF NEW PROCS FOR ALL FSS BRIEFERS ON WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR FLTS INTO A FRZ AND HOW TO RESPOND IN AN ACCURATE MANNER. TRAINING OF NEW PROCS FOR ALL FRZ CTLRS. MODIFY SOFTWARE USED BY BRIEFERS TO DISPLAY FLAGS/WARNINGS ON FLTS INTO A FRZ. MODIFY SOFTWARE USED BY BRIEFERS TO REQUIRE A VALID PIN FOR FLTS LNDG AT ARPTS EMBEDDED WITHIN A FRZ. NEW DESCRIPTOR ADDED TO IFR STRIPS SHOWING CTLRS THE PIN FOR FLTS INTO A FRZ. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR ADVISED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSEQUENT CONTACT BY ANY AGENCY REGARDING THE INCIDENT. HE FEELS THE LACK OF CONTACT IS MORE THE RESULT OF A DESIRE TO OBSCURE THE BREAKDOWN IN SECURITY THE INCIDENT REPRESENTS THAN AN ATTEMPT TO BE 'EASY' ON THEM FOR THEIR TRANSGRESSIONS. HE RELATED THAT POST INCIDENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEESBURG FSS REVEALED THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO FILE THE FLT PLAN AND THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO CONTACT LEESBURG DIRECTLY FOR COMPLETE INFO ON THE RESTRICTIONS APPROPRIATE TO THEIR FLT. HE STATED THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT A PIN NUMBER UNTIL THE SUBJECT WAS RAISEDBY ARPT SECURITY. DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TSA REPRESENTATIVE, HE WAS TOLD HE HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY BLACKHAWK HELICOPTERS. BOTH HE AND THE ARPT SECURITY INDIVIDUAL WHO MET HIM STATE THEY NEVER SAW SUCH HELICOPTERS AT ANY TIME. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT MULTIPLE FEDERAL AGENCIES, FSS BRIEFERS, CLRNC DELIVERY, ENRTE AND APCH CTL CTLRS, FAILED IN THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS WITHIN THE WASHINGTON FRZ. HE FEELS THAT THOSE FAILURES, COMBINED WITH THE DIFFICULTY IN ACCESSING THE REQUIRED INFO FROM FEDERAL RESOURCES, WERE RESPONSIBLE NOT ONLY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF AIRSPACE BUT ALSO FOR PLACING HIS ACFT AND ITS PAX IN JEOPARDY FOR VIOLATING THE INNERMOST SECURITY CIRCLE OF THIS PROTECTED AIRSPACE. THUS MAKING VULNERABLE TO INTERCEPT AND, IN A WORSE CASE SCENARIO, POSSIBLY HOSTILE ACTION AGAINST THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.