Narrative:

After departure we received an ECAM message for a bscu #1 fault and an autobrake fault along with an abnormal lgciu indication on the wheel page. As we rotated and I was looking towards the gear handle in anticipation of the gear up call, I saw the red unlock light come on just before the gear was selected up. We consulted with moc and reset the bscu switch to bscu #2. We then had a bscu #2 fault. We cycled the switch back to bscu #1 and still had the fault. Moc suggested we switch back to the bscu #2 fault since that is what they were indicating. They advised that as long as we did not have bscu #1 and #2 faulted at the same time that we would still have normal braking. After referencing fcom #3 in the expanded part of the landing gear section, the impression we were getting was that one of the lgciu's was having a problem. On approach when landing gear was selected down we received a red unlock light on the left main gear. Descent was stopped and we told tower of our unsafe gear indication. We were cleared for holding. We cycled the landing gear and the unlock light returned. The captain called the 1ST flight attendant and told her of our indications and that we would be a few mins consult ting with moc and that he would get back to her. The captain made an announcement to the passenger that we had an indication problem that we wanted to consult with our maintenance department about. We reached moc and consulted with them on what indications we had which pointed to an lgciu #1 problem. I confirmed with them that having 3 green triangles on the wheel page, confirmed that the gear was down as this is actually the primary indicator. Referencing fcom #3 again we prepared for a landing with alternate braking and only reverse thrust on engine #2. As this would be a normal landing but with alternate braking the vehicles were asked to stand by. The 1ST flight attendant was told that we in fact had an indication that all 3 gears were down and locked but that the captain had asked for the vehicles to be at the runway as a precaution, because we were landing with alternate brakes. The passenger were told that our gear indication had been sorted out and that a safe landing would be made shortly. The landing was uneventful. On postflt inspection we found that the left main inboard tire tread had separated from the tire. In the process it damaged the wing flap and an area in the wheel well just above the tire. A mechanic pointed out an area where a cannon plug looked to be damaged and said that it could have led to the indication problems that we had. The landing gear doors were opened in search of other damage or pieces of the tire, none were found. As a result we called the dispatcher and told him of our find and that there might be undiscovered tire debris on the departure runway. We also relayed this information to soc. The captain then called the duty officer and relayed the events above and asked if we needed to call or notify anyone else and he said no that an event report should do it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER TKOF AN A320 ECAM INDICATED A BRAKE STEERING CTL UNIT FAULT, AN AUTOBRAKE FAULT AND A LNDG GEAR CTL ABNORMALITY. AFTER LNDG IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A TIRE FAILURE ON TKOF DAMAGED COMPONENTS.

Narrative: AFTER DEP WE RECEIVED AN ECAM MESSAGE FOR A BSCU #1 FAULT AND AN AUTOBRAKE FAULT ALONG WITH AN ABNORMAL LGCIU INDICATION ON THE WHEEL PAGE. AS WE ROTATED AND I WAS LOOKING TOWARDS THE GEAR HANDLE IN ANTICIPATION OF THE GEAR UP CALL, I SAW THE RED UNLOCK LIGHT COME ON JUST BEFORE THE GEAR WAS SELECTED UP. WE CONSULTED WITH MOC AND RESET THE BSCU SWITCH TO BSCU #2. WE THEN HAD A BSCU #2 FAULT. WE CYCLED THE SWITCH BACK TO BSCU #1 AND STILL HAD THE FAULT. MOC SUGGESTED WE SWITCH BACK TO THE BSCU #2 FAULT SINCE THAT IS WHAT THEY WERE INDICATING. THEY ADVISED THAT AS LONG AS WE DID NOT HAVE BSCU #1 AND #2 FAULTED AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE WOULD STILL HAVE NORMAL BRAKING. AFTER REFING FCOM #3 IN THE EXPANDED PART OF THE LNDG GEAR SECTION, THE IMPRESSION WE WERE GETTING WAS THAT ONE OF THE LGCIU'S WAS HAVING A PROB. ON APCH WHEN LNDG GEAR WAS SELECTED DOWN WE RECEIVED A RED UNLOCK LIGHT ON THE L MAIN GEAR. DSCNT WAS STOPPED AND WE TOLD TWR OF OUR UNSAFE GEAR INDICATION. WE WERE CLRED FOR HOLDING. WE CYCLED THE LNDG GEAR AND THE UNLOCK LIGHT RETURNED. THE CAPT CALLED THE 1ST FLT ATTENDANT AND TOLD HER OF OUR INDICATIONS AND THAT WE WOULD BE A FEW MINS CONSULT TING WITH MOC AND THAT HE WOULD GET BACK TO HER. THE CAPT MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX THAT WE HAD AN INDICATION PROB THAT WE WANTED TO CONSULT WITH OUR MAINT DEPT ABOUT. WE REACHED MOC AND CONSULTED WITH THEM ON WHAT INDICATIONS WE HAD WHICH POINTED TO AN LGCIU #1 PROB. I CONFIRMED WITH THEM THAT HAVING 3 GREEN TRIANGLES ON THE WHEEL PAGE, CONFIRMED THAT THE GEAR WAS DOWN AS THIS IS ACTUALLY THE PRIMARY INDICATOR. REFING FCOM #3 AGAIN WE PREPARED FOR A LNDG WITH ALTERNATE BRAKING AND ONLY REVERSE THRUST ON ENG #2. AS THIS WOULD BE A NORMAL LNDG BUT WITH ALTERNATE BRAKING THE VEHICLES WERE ASKED TO STAND BY. THE 1ST FLT ATTENDANT WAS TOLD THAT WE IN FACT HAD AN INDICATION THAT ALL 3 GEARS WERE DOWN AND LOCKED BUT THAT THE CAPT HAD ASKED FOR THE VEHICLES TO BE AT THE RWY AS A PRECAUTION, BECAUSE WE WERE LNDG WITH ALTERNATE BRAKES. THE PAX WERE TOLD THAT OUR GEAR INDICATION HAD BEEN SORTED OUT AND THAT A SAFE LNDG WOULD BE MADE SHORTLY. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. ON POSTFLT INSPECTION WE FOUND THAT THE L MAIN INBOARD TIRE TREAD HAD SEPARATED FROM THE TIRE. IN THE PROCESS IT DAMAGED THE WING FLAP AND AN AREA IN THE WHEEL WELL JUST ABOVE THE TIRE. A MECH POINTED OUT AN AREA WHERE A CANNON PLUG LOOKED TO BE DAMAGED AND SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE LED TO THE INDICATION PROBS THAT WE HAD. THE LNDG GEAR DOORS WERE OPENED IN SEARCH OF OTHER DAMAGE OR PIECES OF THE TIRE, NONE WERE FOUND. AS A RESULT WE CALLED THE DISPATCHER AND TOLD HIM OF OUR FIND AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE UNDISCOVERED TIRE DEBRIS ON THE DEP RWY. WE ALSO RELAYED THIS INFO TO SOC. THE CAPT THEN CALLED THE DUTY OFFICER AND RELAYED THE EVENTS ABOVE AND ASKED IF WE NEEDED TO CALL OR NOTIFY ANYONE ELSE AND HE SAID NO THAT AN EVENT RPT SHOULD DO IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.