Narrative:

The before takeoff checklist was completed. We were then cleared for takeoff from T10 on runway 32L. I pushed the power up slightly and noted a GS of 13 KTS prior to lining up. I then xferred control of the aircraft to the first officer. The throttles were advanced toward the 'flx/mct' detent and almost immediately the engine experienced 1 compressor stall with an associated ECAM, engine fail and significant yaw. I noted the egt was in the red (I believe in excess of 700 degrees C). The throttles were immediately brought back to idle and I took control of the aircraft. Directional control was maintained with differential braking and my tiller. The first officer notified the tower that we were aborting and I asked him to perform the ECAM as I was exiting the runway. I also asked him to pull the evacuate/evacuation qrc in case we needed to evacuate/evacuation. It was nighttime and there were numerous aircraft on taxiway T. I was aware of all other aircraft position at all times. Continuing a slow taxi 2 aircraft reported seeing flames and/or a fire on the #1 engine during the takeoff roll. We had no indication of a fire in the cockpit, but we assumed severe engine damage and per the ECAM discharged one of the bottles. I instructed the first officer to contact the tower to see if there was a visible fire, and both tower and another aircraft said there was no fire present. I coordinated with the purser to check the condition of the engine and to post someone at the appropriate area to view the condition of the engine. They reported seeing no indications of fire or flames. I continued taxiing toward the penalty box and the APU was started in preparation for an immediate shutdown of #2 when parked. Hot brakes were considered but were not an issue since maximum automatic braking was not used. ATC and the cabin crew were all the while monitoring the engine, and were instructed to notify us immediately of any flames. Men and equipment were dispatched immediately by the tower prior to us even being able to coordination. Upon receiving ATC clearance to the penalty box we agreed to bring the aircraft to a stop and evacuate/evacuation if the inspection from the crash fire rescue equipment squad indicated a fire in the tailpipe. This decision was made with careful consideration with regard to safety of passenger and crew. Based on the information we had both internally in the cockpit and externally through visual contact it was not appropriate to evacuate/evacuation on an active taxiway with numerous aircraft taxiing. Upon arrival at the penalty box, we were in contact with crash fire rescue equipment on 119.25 and I had made eye contact with the ground personnel. He indicated that there was a contained fire in the tailpipe of the engine. At that time we fired the second bottle and a flame was still visible. I ordered an evacuate/evacuation from the forward exits (1L and 1R) and from the aft right side only (2R) due to men and equipment in the vicinity of 2L. The evacuate/evacuation was accomplished with the qrc in accordance with SOP. I proceeded to the forward exits and helped people off. At this time there were only about 5 passenger left to deplane. First officer proceeded to the aft cabin to assist the remaining passenger off. I then departed 1L and guided the passenger toward the grassy area behind the penalty box, keeping them away from the active txwys. The firefighters were doing the same. I secured medical attention for flight attendant as she had a laceration on her chin which was bleeding quite badly. To my knowledge only 2 minor injuries were sustained -- flight attendant and a passenger with a sprained ankle. I feel that the entire process from pushback to evacuate/evacuation was performed as safely and professionally as it could have. Using all available resources gave us the confidence to make the decisions we made. The coordinated efforts of all involved should be commended. Supplemental information from acn 627641: the captain talked with crash fire rescue equipment and although we had no cockpit indications, they informed us that they saw some contained flames inside the engine. We shot the second fire bottle for the engine. Crash fire rescue equipment informed us that they still saw some contained flames inside the engine.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 CREW HAD AN ENG STALL AT THE BEGINNING OF TKOF ROLL. THE CAPT EVACED THE ACFT AFTER FLAMES WERE SEEN IN THE ENG.

Narrative: THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR TKOF FROM T10 ON RWY 32L. I PUSHED THE PWR UP SLIGHTLY AND NOTED A GS OF 13 KTS PRIOR TO LINING UP. I THEN XFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT TO THE FO. THE THROTTLES WERE ADVANCED TOWARD THE 'FLX/MCT' DETENT AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE ENG EXPERIENCED 1 COMPRESSOR STALL WITH AN ASSOCIATED ECAM, ENG FAIL AND SIGNIFICANT YAW. I NOTED THE EGT WAS IN THE RED (I BELIEVE IN EXCESS OF 700 DEGS C). THE THROTTLES WERE IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT BACK TO IDLE AND I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT. DIRECTIONAL CTL WAS MAINTAINED WITH DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING AND MY TILLER. THE FO NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT WE WERE ABORTING AND I ASKED HIM TO PERFORM THE ECAM AS I WAS EXITING THE RWY. I ALSO ASKED HIM TO PULL THE EVAC QRC IN CASE WE NEEDED TO EVAC. IT WAS NIGHTTIME AND THERE WERE NUMEROUS ACFT ON TXWY T. I WAS AWARE OF ALL OTHER ACFT POS AT ALL TIMES. CONTINUING A SLOW TAXI 2 ACFT RPTED SEEING FLAMES AND/OR A FIRE ON THE #1 ENG DURING THE TKOF ROLL. WE HAD NO INDICATION OF A FIRE IN THE COCKPIT, BUT WE ASSUMED SEVERE ENG DAMAGE AND PER THE ECAM DISCHARGED ONE OF THE BOTTLES. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO CONTACT THE TWR TO SEE IF THERE WAS A VISIBLE FIRE, AND BOTH TWR AND ANOTHER ACFT SAID THERE WAS NO FIRE PRESENT. I COORDINATED WITH THE PURSER TO CHK THE CONDITION OF THE ENG AND TO POST SOMEONE AT THE APPROPRIATE AREA TO VIEW THE CONDITION OF THE ENG. THEY RPTED SEEING NO INDICATIONS OF FIRE OR FLAMES. I CONTINUED TAXIING TOWARD THE PENALTY BOX AND THE APU WAS STARTED IN PREPARATION FOR AN IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN OF #2 WHEN PARKED. HOT BRAKES WERE CONSIDERED BUT WERE NOT AN ISSUE SINCE MAX AUTO BRAKING WAS NOT USED. ATC AND THE CABIN CREW WERE ALL THE WHILE MONITORING THE ENG, AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY OF ANY FLAMES. MEN AND EQUIP WERE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY BY THE TWR PRIOR TO US EVEN BEING ABLE TO COORD. UPON RECEIVING ATC CLRNC TO THE PENALTY BOX WE AGREED TO BRING THE ACFT TO A STOP AND EVAC IF THE INSPECTION FROM THE CFR SQUAD INDICATED A FIRE IN THE TAILPIPE. THIS DECISION WAS MADE WITH CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WITH REGARD TO SAFETY OF PAX AND CREW. BASED ON THE INFO WE HAD BOTH INTERNALLY IN THE COCKPIT AND EXTERNALLY THROUGH VISUAL CONTACT IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE TO EVAC ON AN ACTIVE TXWY WITH NUMEROUS ACFT TAXIING. UPON ARR AT THE PENALTY BOX, WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH CFR ON 119.25 AND I HAD MADE EYE CONTACT WITH THE GND PERSONNEL. HE INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A CONTAINED FIRE IN THE TAILPIPE OF THE ENG. AT THAT TIME WE FIRED THE SECOND BOTTLE AND A FLAME WAS STILL VISIBLE. I ORDERED AN EVAC FROM THE FORWARD EXITS (1L AND 1R) AND FROM THE AFT R SIDE ONLY (2R) DUE TO MEN AND EQUIP IN THE VICINITY OF 2L. THE EVAC WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE QRC IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOP. I PROCEEDED TO THE FORWARD EXITS AND HELPED PEOPLE OFF. AT THIS TIME THERE WERE ONLY ABOUT 5 PAX LEFT TO DEPLANE. FO PROCEEDED TO THE AFT CABIN TO ASSIST THE REMAINING PAX OFF. I THEN DEPARTED 1L AND GUIDED THE PAX TOWARD THE GRASSY AREA BEHIND THE PENALTY BOX, KEEPING THEM AWAY FROM THE ACTIVE TXWYS. THE FIREFIGHTERS WERE DOING THE SAME. I SECURED MEDICAL ATTN FOR FLT ATTENDANT AS SHE HAD A LACERATION ON HER CHIN WHICH WAS BLEEDING QUITE BADLY. TO MY KNOWLEDGE ONLY 2 MINOR INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED -- FLT ATTENDANT AND A PAX WITH A SPRAINED ANKLE. I FEEL THAT THE ENTIRE PROCESS FROM PUSHBACK TO EVAC WAS PERFORMED AS SAFELY AND PROFESSIONALLY AS IT COULD HAVE. USING ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES GAVE US THE CONFIDENCE TO MAKE THE DECISIONS WE MADE. THE COORDINATED EFFORTS OF ALL INVOLVED SHOULD BE COMMENDED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 627641: THE CAPT TALKED WITH CFR AND ALTHOUGH WE HAD NO COCKPIT INDICATIONS, THEY INFORMED US THAT THEY SAW SOME CONTAINED FLAMES INSIDE THE ENG. WE SHOT THE SECOND FIRE BOTTLE FOR THE ENG. CFR INFORMED US THAT THEY STILL SAW SOME CONTAINED FLAMES INSIDE THE ENG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.