Narrative:

Arrival was from south on SWEED7. We were told to expect runway 18L. Standard vectors were issued for the left downwind. The approach controller gave us a descent abeam the airport and told us it would be a short approach. He then handed us off to the final controller. The final controller gave us a 'slow to 170 KTS and then left turn 270 degrees.' we were already at 170 KTS and we made the turn to 270 degrees. We were now on base looking at the final. The controller then started calling traffic that was on the final. The statement was 'fast moving traffic right to left at the 2 O'clock position.' both the first officer and I saw the traffic, but we decided not to call it because of the spacing. We did not want to follow traffic that would be arriving at the same point on the final at the same time as us. In addition, we were headed directly at this aircraft on final with a pretty good closure rate and I was anticipating another turn to the right for some more spacing. The controller called the traffic again with a very concerned tone in his voice. It appeared that this plan for traffic separation was based on us calling the traffic and taking care of the separation ourselves. Unfortunately, we saw that the controller was putting us into a precarious position that would require some special maneuvering to avoid a loss of separation. We did not want to call the traffic and be put in that situation. I believe it was his third traffic call to us with a frantic tone that he said 'traffic 12 O'clock position.' I made the command decision to call the traffic and begin maneuvering to remove ourselves from this situation. As I was calling the traffic, we received a TCASII alert and I informed the controller that we would have to turn to the right before we could turn left to join the final. Fortunately, we only weighed 36K for landing, so we had slow maneuvering speeds. We could not go wide because of the final to runway 18R. We could not turn right very far because of other traffic on final to runway 18L. We had to configure to landing immediately to be able to slow down and it required s-turns to the left of the final to get our spacing back. It tasked both me and the first officer with a very high workload in flying and avoiding traffic. I am curious what the plan was if we would not have called the traffic. It did appear that a back-up plan existed. The controller was very busy and the frequency was congested at the time. I am not sure what pressure he was under at the time. We got a late handoff to the tower and he let us know that we had 3 mi on the traffic at that time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARJ ON VECTORS FOR VISUAL APCH TO CVG EXPERIENCED TCASII RA WITH PRECEDING TFC.

Narrative: ARR WAS FROM S ON SWEED7. WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 18L. STANDARD VECTORS WERE ISSUED FOR THE L DOWNWIND. THE APCH CTLR GAVE US A DSCNT ABEAM THE ARPT AND TOLD US IT WOULD BE A SHORT APCH. HE THEN HANDED US OFF TO THE FINAL CTLR. THE FINAL CTLR GAVE US A 'SLOW TO 170 KTS AND THEN L TURN 270 DEGS.' WE WERE ALREADY AT 170 KTS AND WE MADE THE TURN TO 270 DEGS. WE WERE NOW ON BASE LOOKING AT THE FINAL. THE CTLR THEN STARTED CALLING TFC THAT WAS ON THE FINAL. THE STATEMENT WAS 'FAST MOVING TFC R TO L AT THE 2 O'CLOCK POS.' BOTH THE FO AND I SAW THE TFC, BUT WE DECIDED NOT TO CALL IT BECAUSE OF THE SPACING. WE DID NOT WANT TO FOLLOW TFC THAT WOULD BE ARRIVING AT THE SAME POINT ON THE FINAL AT THE SAME TIME AS US. IN ADDITION, WE WERE HEADED DIRECTLY AT THIS ACFT ON FINAL WITH A PRETTY GOOD CLOSURE RATE AND I WAS ANTICIPATING ANOTHER TURN TO THE R FOR SOME MORE SPACING. THE CTLR CALLED THE TFC AGAIN WITH A VERY CONCERNED TONE IN HIS VOICE. IT APPEARED THAT THIS PLAN FOR TFC SEPARATION WAS BASED ON US CALLING THE TFC AND TAKING CARE OF THE SEPARATION OURSELVES. UNFORTUNATELY, WE SAW THAT THE CTLR WAS PUTTING US INTO A PRECARIOUS POS THAT WOULD REQUIRE SOME SPECIAL MANEUVERING TO AVOID A LOSS OF SEPARATION. WE DID NOT WANT TO CALL THE TFC AND BE PUT IN THAT SIT. I BELIEVE IT WAS HIS THIRD TFC CALL TO US WITH A FRANTIC TONE THAT HE SAID 'TFC 12 O'CLOCK POS.' I MADE THE COMMAND DECISION TO CALL THE TFC AND BEGIN MANEUVERING TO REMOVE OURSELVES FROM THIS SIT. AS I WAS CALLING THE TFC, WE RECEIVED A TCASII ALERT AND I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE R BEFORE WE COULD TURN L TO JOIN THE FINAL. FORTUNATELY, WE ONLY WEIGHED 36K FOR LNDG, SO WE HAD SLOW MANEUVERING SPDS. WE COULD NOT GO WIDE BECAUSE OF THE FINAL TO RWY 18R. WE COULD NOT TURN R VERY FAR BECAUSE OF OTHER TFC ON FINAL TO RWY 18L. WE HAD TO CONFIGURE TO LNDG IMMEDIATELY TO BE ABLE TO SLOW DOWN AND IT REQUIRED S-TURNS TO THE L OF THE FINAL TO GET OUR SPACING BACK. IT TASKED BOTH ME AND THE FO WITH A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD IN FLYING AND AVOIDING TFC. I AM CURIOUS WHAT THE PLAN WAS IF WE WOULD NOT HAVE CALLED THE TFC. IT DID APPEAR THAT A BACK-UP PLAN EXISTED. THE CTLR WAS VERY BUSY AND THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED AT THE TIME. I AM NOT SURE WHAT PRESSURE HE WAS UNDER AT THE TIME. WE GOT A LATE HDOF TO THE TWR AND HE LET US KNOW THAT WE HAD 3 MI ON THE TFC AT THAT TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.