Narrative:

Upon landing, the operations agent commented that she could not figure out how mci had put all the freight in the forward hold and stayed within the load sheet limits. Upon closer examination, it turns out that they didn't. We had followed all the company procedures before pushback in mci, but could not have caught this error. All the numbers for the passenger weight, the forward hold weight, the aft hold weight and the operational weight all added up correctly to the zero fuel weight and showed us correctly in trim. The problem was that the operations agent used a forward hold weight of 4915 pounds and 164 equivalent pieces. If you look at the back of a -700 load sheet, you will see that 154 total pieces and a weight of 4614 pounds is all you can have. He got around that by adding another 10 pieces at 301 pounds onto 154 pieces to come up with 164 pieces and 4915 pounds. This is over the forward hold limit by about 300 pounds. I had the ramp agent go down and actually count the freight in the forward hold and it was in fact 4900 pounds. This was all freight that was supposed to go through so we removed enough freight to stay in limits, accomplished the load sheet and departed. We also verified what was actually loaded in the aft bin. The point to learn from this is that even though all the numbers added up correctly, we were given bad numbers to add up! We have no audit procedure to check that the forward and aft hold numbers are correct, but they looked reasonable when we looked at them in the cockpit. An automated method of accomplishing the load sheet, either through the loadable confign software or the gate readers at the top of the jetway would catch an error like this because it would be over the limit.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLT CREW FLIES FIRST TRIP SEGMENT WITH FORWARD CARGO HOLD 300 LBS OVER THE LOAD LIMIT.

Narrative: UPON LNDG, THE OPS AGENT COMMENTED THAT SHE COULD NOT FIGURE OUT HOW MCI HAD PUT ALL THE FREIGHT IN THE FORWARD HOLD AND STAYED WITHIN THE LOAD SHEET LIMITS. UPON CLOSER EXAM, IT TURNS OUT THAT THEY DIDN'T. WE HAD FOLLOWED ALL THE COMPANY PROCS BEFORE PUSHBACK IN MCI, BUT COULD NOT HAVE CAUGHT THIS ERROR. ALL THE NUMBERS FOR THE PAX WT, THE FORWARD HOLD WT, THE AFT HOLD WT AND THE OPERATIONAL WT ALL ADDED UP CORRECTLY TO THE ZERO FUEL WT AND SHOWED US CORRECTLY IN TRIM. THE PROB WAS THAT THE OPS AGENT USED A FORWARD HOLD WT OF 4915 LBS AND 164 EQUIVALENT PIECES. IF YOU LOOK AT THE BACK OF A -700 LOAD SHEET, YOU WILL SEE THAT 154 TOTAL PIECES AND A WT OF 4614 LBS IS ALL YOU CAN HAVE. HE GOT AROUND THAT BY ADDING ANOTHER 10 PIECES AT 301 LBS ONTO 154 PIECES TO COME UP WITH 164 PIECES AND 4915 LBS. THIS IS OVER THE FORWARD HOLD LIMIT BY ABOUT 300 LBS. I HAD THE RAMP AGENT GO DOWN AND ACTUALLY COUNT THE FREIGHT IN THE FORWARD HOLD AND IT WAS IN FACT 4900 LBS. THIS WAS ALL FREIGHT THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO GO THROUGH SO WE REMOVED ENOUGH FREIGHT TO STAY IN LIMITS, ACCOMPLISHED THE LOAD SHEET AND DEPARTED. WE ALSO VERIFIED WHAT WAS ACTUALLY LOADED IN THE AFT BIN. THE POINT TO LEARN FROM THIS IS THAT EVEN THOUGH ALL THE NUMBERS ADDED UP CORRECTLY, WE WERE GIVEN BAD NUMBERS TO ADD UP! WE HAVE NO AUDIT PROC TO CHK THAT THE FORWARD AND AFT HOLD NUMBERS ARE CORRECT, BUT THEY LOOKED REASONABLE WHEN WE LOOKED AT THEM IN THE COCKPIT. AN AUTOMATED METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHING THE LOAD SHEET, EITHER THROUGH THE LOADABLE CONFIGN SOFTWARE OR THE GATE READERS AT THE TOP OF THE JETWAY WOULD CATCH AN ERROR LIKE THIS BECAUSE IT WOULD BE OVER THE LIMIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.