Narrative:

I arrived in vicinity of ixd shortly after XA00. I had been awake and working since early morning the previous morning, and had flown over 8 hours. I had not taken any time for even a short nap. I felt that I was 'awake enough' when I began the last leg, and had decided that I would get a hotel if there were any WX to be concerned about, but the WX was perfect, so I continued on. When I began a visual approach at ixd, I deployed speed brakes, and as I slowed through gear extension speed, I lowered the gear. When I retracted the speed brakes, the annunciator remained on, indicating that either they had not retracted, or were asymmetrical. It seemed to take me a while to remember that the proper action was to kill power to the brakes, as that automatically retracts them. I was then very late in noticing that, though the gear switch was in the down position, the gear lights had not illuminated. I performed the emergency extension procedure over the runway, and then somewhat groggily decided that I ought to go around, as I was not going to get stopped on the remaining runway. My judgement in departing on the last leg was spectacularly bad, and though no accident or incident resulted, it was a very close call. I flew night freight when I was younger, and I believed that I was immune to 'back side of the clock' fatigue. I am not, and though rest and duty rules will probably never fly for part 91 pilots, they should at least think about setting personal standards and evaluating those standards as they age.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SINGLE PLT BECAME SO FATIGUED DURING APCH TO IXD, THAT HE EXECUTED A GAR AFTER BECOMING CONFUSED BY A GEAR PROB.

Narrative: I ARRIVED IN VICINITY OF IXD SHORTLY AFTER XA00. I HAD BEEN AWAKE AND WORKING SINCE EARLY MORNING THE PREVIOUS MORNING, AND HAD FLOWN OVER 8 HRS. I HAD NOT TAKEN ANY TIME FOR EVEN A SHORT NAP. I FELT THAT I WAS 'AWAKE ENOUGH' WHEN I BEGAN THE LAST LEG, AND HAD DECIDED THAT I WOULD GET A HOTEL IF THERE WERE ANY WX TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT, BUT THE WX WAS PERFECT, SO I CONTINUED ON. WHEN I BEGAN A VISUAL APCH AT IXD, I DEPLOYED SPD BRAKES, AND AS I SLOWED THROUGH GEAR EXTENSION SPD, I LOWERED THE GEAR. WHEN I RETRACTED THE SPD BRAKES, THE ANNUNCIATOR REMAINED ON, INDICATING THAT EITHER THEY HAD NOT RETRACTED, OR WERE ASYMMETRICAL. IT SEEMED TO TAKE ME A WHILE TO REMEMBER THAT THE PROPER ACTION WAS TO KILL PWR TO THE BRAKES, AS THAT AUTOMATICALLY RETRACTS THEM. I WAS THEN VERY LATE IN NOTICING THAT, THOUGH THE GEAR SWITCH WAS IN THE DOWN POS, THE GEAR LIGHTS HAD NOT ILLUMINATED. I PERFORMED THE EMER EXTENSION PROC OVER THE RWY, AND THEN SOMEWHAT GROGGILY DECIDED THAT I OUGHT TO GO AROUND, AS I WAS NOT GOING TO GET STOPPED ON THE REMAINING RWY. MY JUDGEMENT IN DEPARTING ON THE LAST LEG WAS SPECTACULARLY BAD, AND THOUGH NO ACCIDENT OR INCIDENT RESULTED, IT WAS A VERY CLOSE CALL. I FLEW NIGHT FREIGHT WHEN I WAS YOUNGER, AND I BELIEVED THAT I WAS IMMUNE TO 'BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK' FATIGUE. I AM NOT, AND THOUGH REST AND DUTY RULES WILL PROBABLY NEVER FLY FOR PART 91 PLTS, THEY SHOULD AT LEAST THINK ABOUT SETTING PERSONAL STANDARDS AND EVALUATING THOSE STANDARDS AS THEY AGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.