Narrative:

We had to do an ict turn out of stl and then we would be done with our 4 day trip. We found out that ict ran out of fuel. So we had to take an amount that could get us back to stl. The next problem was the gate agent loaded too many people onboard. So we had to deal with getting some passenger off the aircraft. So after we get everything under control we finally push back 5 min late and with only a 25 min turn in ict we start getting pressed for time. On descent below 10000 ft; we realized that we were still heavy so we put gear and flaps 9 degrees out to burn off the excess fuel. Turning final we knew it would be close; but it ended up about 400 pounds overweight. This is when the chain of events get worse. Scared; fatigued; flustered; inexperience (on both of our parts: captain a little over 2 yrs and me a little over 1 yr); we both panic. We wanted to call maintenance and report but decided not to. This was the 1ST mistake. The next one was on the weight and balance for takeoff in ict. We also indicated 400 pounds less fuel than what we had. Had I not been fatigued or if it was the 1ST leg of the trip or if ict just had fuel; this would not have been a problem. Now that I know how fast this happens and now that I have experience I can tell you that it will never happen again. I wish our company would spend more time on training and CRM. I work for an airline. They just do the bare minimum by law. Also the emb aircraft have landing weight issues. More time should be spent in training on what to do in these kinds of sits.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INEXPERIENCED AND FATIGUED FLT CREW OF E140 LAND OVERWEIGHT DUE TO FERRYING FUEL. COMPOUND PROB BY FAILING TO ADVISE MAINT OF OVERWEIGHT LNDG; AND NOT ADJUSTING WT AND BAL FOR NEXT LEG.

Narrative: WE HAD TO DO AN ICT TURN OUT OF STL AND THEN WE WOULD BE DONE WITH OUR 4 DAY TRIP. WE FOUND OUT THAT ICT RAN OUT OF FUEL. SO WE HAD TO TAKE AN AMOUNT THAT COULD GET US BACK TO STL. THE NEXT PROB WAS THE GATE AGENT LOADED TOO MANY PEOPLE ONBOARD. SO WE HAD TO DEAL WITH GETTING SOME PAX OFF THE ACFT. SO AFTER WE GET EVERYTHING UNDER CTL WE FINALLY PUSH BACK 5 MIN LATE AND WITH ONLY A 25 MIN TURN IN ICT WE START GETTING PRESSED FOR TIME. ON DSCNT BELOW 10000 FT; WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE STILL HEAVY SO WE PUT GEAR AND FLAPS 9 DEGS OUT TO BURN OFF THE EXCESS FUEL. TURNING FINAL WE KNEW IT WOULD BE CLOSE; BUT IT ENDED UP ABOUT 400 LBS OVERWEIGHT. THIS IS WHEN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS GET WORSE. SCARED; FATIGUED; FLUSTERED; INEXPERIENCE (ON BOTH OF OUR PARTS: CAPT A LITTLE OVER 2 YRS AND ME A LITTLE OVER 1 YR); WE BOTH PANIC. WE WANTED TO CALL MAINT AND RPT BUT DECIDED NOT TO. THIS WAS THE 1ST MISTAKE. THE NEXT ONE WAS ON THE WT AND BAL FOR TAKEOFF IN ICT. WE ALSO INDICATED 400 LBS LESS FUEL THAN WHAT WE HAD. HAD I NOT BEEN FATIGUED OR IF IT WAS THE 1ST LEG OF THE TRIP OR IF ICT JUST HAD FUEL; THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROB. NOW THAT I KNOW HOW FAST THIS HAPPENS AND NOW THAT I HAVE EXPERIENCE I CAN TELL YOU THAT IT WILL NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN. I WISH OUR COMPANY WOULD SPEND MORE TIME ON TRAINING AND CRM. I WORK FOR AN AIRLINE. THEY JUST DO THE BARE MINIMUM BY LAW. ALSO THE EMB ACFT HAVE LNDG WT ISSUES. MORE TIME SHOULD BE SPENT IN TRAINING ON WHAT TO DO IN THESE KINDS OF SITS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.