Narrative:

During the busiest time in our pushback at isp while 2 engines were in the start phase and setting brakes and adjusting air conditioning, tower called us to give a change in clearance of some kind. We did not respond because we were unable to process a clearance change while performing several complex tasks at start-up. I don't believe that the captain heard the transmission because of his communications with the tug driver. I should have stated, 'stand by' when I got a break in the sequence of tasks. We complete our tasks and checklist and then called for taxi. The controller seemed agitated that we did not acknowledge his original transmission and proceeded with taxi instructions to runway 33. We requested runway 24 for weight and performance needs. The controller began to chastise us on the open frequency about the need to make that request before pushback because of the problems it creates for the new york controllers and that he repeatedly told our pilots this and wonders why they don't change our habits. I told him that I would pass this on to our chief pilots so that we can get it on our 10-7 pages. We proceeded to runway 24 with no other distrs and took off as assigned. I was the PF and we received various changes in heading and then an assigned altitude of 4000 ft. While flying on a southerly heading and looking for traffic, we heard the altitude alert and both called 4000 ft for 5000 ft. I realized that we were above our assigned altitude by about 400 ft and began a descent immediately to 4000 ft. We reached a maximum altitude of approximately 4700 ft before returning to 4000 ft. No conflict with traffic was observed visually or on TCASII and no call was given by ATC departure as to our excursion. Flight continued uneventfully. Lessons learned: I learn something new on almost every flight I make, but sometimes they are learned the hard way. I was very distraction mentally by the controller's handling of our taxi phase and let it occupy my thoughts at a very critical phase of flight, even though I have always vowed that I would not let things like this happen to me. In the future, I will not let myself become distraction from the tasks of flying the airplane! Recommendations for ATC: be professional. Put it on the ATIS if this is a continuing issue. Don't transmit clrncs during critical phases with complex information. This is a growing problem in the system. Supplemental information from acn 614931: neither of the pilots heard the altitude alerter which should have 'sounded' at 3000 ft. Both of us heard the alerter 'sound' at 4700 ft, at which time PF initiated a descent to 4000 ft. We initially suspected that the 'altitude alerter' warnings verified that the alerter was operating properly. Thus, we concluded that both pilots missed the alerter warning at about 3000 ft and further did not properly monitor the required leveloff. It is abundantly clear that we placed too much confidence in a warning system which neither pilot heard during a critical phase of flight. This departure was being 'hand flown.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ISP GND CTLR REPORTEDLY CHASTISED B737 FLT CREW DURING BUSY TAXI FOR NOT RESPONDING TO INITIAL CALL. RPTR BELIEVES HE WAS MENTALLY DISTR, RESULTING IN A 700 FT OVERSHOOT FROM ASSIGNED ALT ON DEP.

Narrative: DURING THE BUSIEST TIME IN OUR PUSHBACK AT ISP WHILE 2 ENGS WERE IN THE START PHASE AND SETTING BRAKES AND ADJUSTING AIR CONDITIONING, TWR CALLED US TO GIVE A CHANGE IN CLRNC OF SOME KIND. WE DID NOT RESPOND BECAUSE WE WERE UNABLE TO PROCESS A CLRNC CHANGE WHILE PERFORMING SEVERAL COMPLEX TASKS AT START-UP. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE CAPT HEARD THE XMISSION BECAUSE OF HIS COMS WITH THE TUG DRIVER. I SHOULD HAVE STATED, 'STAND BY' WHEN I GOT A BREAK IN THE SEQUENCE OF TASKS. WE COMPLETE OUR TASKS AND CHKLIST AND THEN CALLED FOR TAXI. THE CTLR SEEMED AGITATED THAT WE DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE HIS ORIGINAL XMISSION AND PROCEEDED WITH TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO RWY 33. WE REQUESTED RWY 24 FOR WT AND PERFORMANCE NEEDS. THE CTLR BEGAN TO CHASTISE US ON THE OPEN FREQ ABOUT THE NEED TO MAKE THAT REQUEST BEFORE PUSHBACK BECAUSE OF THE PROBS IT CREATES FOR THE NEW YORK CTLRS AND THAT HE REPEATEDLY TOLD OUR PLTS THIS AND WONDERS WHY THEY DON'T CHANGE OUR HABITS. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD PASS THIS ON TO OUR CHIEF PLTS SO THAT WE CAN GET IT ON OUR 10-7 PAGES. WE PROCEEDED TO RWY 24 WITH NO OTHER DISTRS AND TOOK OFF AS ASSIGNED. I WAS THE PF AND WE RECEIVED VARIOUS CHANGES IN HDG AND THEN AN ASSIGNED ALT OF 4000 FT. WHILE FLYING ON A SOUTHERLY HDG AND LOOKING FOR TFC, WE HEARD THE ALT ALERT AND BOTH CALLED 4000 FT FOR 5000 FT. I REALIZED THAT WE WERE ABOVE OUR ASSIGNED ALT BY ABOUT 400 FT AND BEGAN A DSCNT IMMEDIATELY TO 4000 FT. WE REACHED A MAX ALT OF APPROX 4700 FT BEFORE RETURNING TO 4000 FT. NO CONFLICT WITH TFC WAS OBSERVED VISUALLY OR ON TCASII AND NO CALL WAS GIVEN BY ATC DEP AS TO OUR EXCURSION. FLT CONTINUED UNEVENTFULLY. LESSONS LEARNED: I LEARN SOMETHING NEW ON ALMOST EVERY FLT I MAKE, BUT SOMETIMES THEY ARE LEARNED THE HARD WAY. I WAS VERY DISTR MENTALLY BY THE CTLR'S HANDLING OF OUR TAXI PHASE AND LET IT OCCUPY MY THOUGHTS AT A VERY CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT, EVEN THOUGH I HAVE ALWAYS VOWED THAT I WOULD NOT LET THINGS LIKE THIS HAPPEN TO ME. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT LET MYSELF BECOME DISTR FROM THE TASKS OF FLYING THE AIRPLANE! RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ATC: BE PROFESSIONAL. PUT IT ON THE ATIS IF THIS IS A CONTINUING ISSUE. DON'T XMIT CLRNCS DURING CRITICAL PHASES WITH COMPLEX INFO. THIS IS A GROWING PROB IN THE SYS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 614931: NEITHER OF THE PLTS HEARD THE ALT ALERTER WHICH SHOULD HAVE 'SOUNDED' AT 3000 FT. BOTH OF US HEARD THE ALERTER 'SOUND' AT 4700 FT, AT WHICH TIME PF INITIATED A DSCNT TO 4000 FT. WE INITIALLY SUSPECTED THAT THE 'ALT ALERTER' WARNINGS VERIFIED THAT THE ALERTER WAS OPERATING PROPERLY. THUS, WE CONCLUDED THAT BOTH PLTS MISSED THE ALERTER WARNING AT ABOUT 3000 FT AND FURTHER DID NOT PROPERLY MONITOR THE REQUIRED LEVELOFF. IT IS ABUNDANTLY CLR THAT WE PLACED TOO MUCH CONFIDENCE IN A WARNING SYS WHICH NEITHER PLT HEARD DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. THIS DEP WAS BEING 'HAND FLOWN.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.