Narrative:

On taxi out from the northwest ramp (FBO) at pdk airport, we were cleared to 'taxi for runway 2R, hold short runway 2L.' both myself and the captain felt we had a good understanding of the taxi route, but we did not formally brief the route. We understood that en route to the approach end of runway 2L we would have to cross runway 9/27. As we turned right out of the FBO and taxied down taxiway B, we failed to make the 45 degree right turn onto taxiway a and came upon runway 2L/20R. At this time we were engaged with our before takeoff checklist and more specifically were engaged with our departure briefing. This was obviously distracting because as we approached runway 2L/20R, the runway we were told to hold short of, we both assumed we were naturally approaching runway 9/27 as we expected. We cleared both ends of the runway and continued across. The ground controller caught our error and instructed us to now hold short of runway 2R/20L which we did. This was when we realized our error. There was no traffic conflict. Ground control redirected us without further incident. In my opinion, the 2 factors involved were the distraction of the takeoff brief and a classic case of seeing only what we expected to see. Even though afterward we both recalled reading the runway 2L/20R runway sign, it did not register with us since we were expecting to be crossing a runway on the way out. We also feel a contributing factor was the fact that this was a deadhead flight. As much as we hate to admit it, it seems that the required level of attention on deadheads is harder to maintain. To prevent this in the future, I will always brief the taxi route even at familiar airports (as this was), and whenever possible conduct the departure brief prior to taxi. Also, prior to crossing a runway, aside from simply clearing both ends, I will verbally call out and confirm the runway number to verify it is the right one.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CHALLENGER 604 FLT CREW INADVERTENTLY MISTAKE THE WRONG RWY THAT THEY ARE CLRED ACROSS. THE CTLR WAS ABLE TO ALERT THE FLT CREW BEFORE IT BECAME A HAZARD.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT FROM THE NW RAMP (FBO) AT PDK ARPT, WE WERE CLRED TO 'TAXI FOR RWY 2R, HOLD SHORT RWY 2L.' BOTH MYSELF AND THE CAPT FELT WE HAD A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE TAXI RTE, BUT WE DID NOT FORMALLY BRIEF THE RTE. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT ENRTE TO THE APCH END OF RWY 2L WE WOULD HAVE TO CROSS RWY 9/27. AS WE TURNED R OUT OF THE FBO AND TAXIED DOWN TXWY B, WE FAILED TO MAKE THE 45 DEG R TURN ONTO TXWY A AND CAME UPON RWY 2L/20R. AT THIS TIME WE WERE ENGAGED WITH OUR BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND MORE SPECIFICALLY WERE ENGAGED WITH OUR DEP BRIEFING. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY DISTRACTING BECAUSE AS WE APCHED RWY 2L/20R, THE RWY WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF, WE BOTH ASSUMED WE WERE NATURALLY APCHING RWY 9/27 AS WE EXPECTED. WE CLRED BOTH ENDS OF THE RWY AND CONTINUED ACROSS. THE GND CTLR CAUGHT OUR ERROR AND INSTRUCTED US TO NOW HOLD SHORT OF RWY 2R/20L WHICH WE DID. THIS WAS WHEN WE REALIZED OUR ERROR. THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. GND CTL REDIRECTED US WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. IN MY OPINION, THE 2 FACTORS INVOLVED WERE THE DISTR OF THE TKOF BRIEF AND A CLASSIC CASE OF SEEING ONLY WHAT WE EXPECTED TO SEE. EVEN THOUGH AFTERWARD WE BOTH RECALLED READING THE RWY 2L/20R RWY SIGN, IT DID NOT REGISTER WITH US SINCE WE WERE EXPECTING TO BE XING A RWY ON THE WAY OUT. WE ALSO FEEL A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE FACT THAT THIS WAS A DEADHEAD FLT. AS MUCH AS WE HATE TO ADMIT IT, IT SEEMS THAT THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF ATTN ON DEADHEADS IS HARDER TO MAINTAIN. TO PREVENT THIS IN THE FUTURE, I WILL ALWAYS BRIEF THE TAXI RTE EVEN AT FAMILIAR ARPTS (AS THIS WAS), AND WHENEVER POSSIBLE CONDUCT THE DEP BRIEF PRIOR TO TAXI. ALSO, PRIOR TO XING A RWY, ASIDE FROM SIMPLY CLRING BOTH ENDS, I WILL VERBALLY CALL OUT AND CONFIRM THE RWY NUMBER TO VERIFY IT IS THE RIGHT ONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.