Narrative:

We were holding short of runway 24 for arriving traffic. Once the traffic landed, we were cleared to cross runway 24 and proceed to hold short of our departure runway 17. Once we crossed runway 24, the captain asked for the 'before takeoff' checklist. I was 'heads down' reading the checklist when ground control told us to stop. He informed us that we had crossed the hold short line for runway 17. The hold short line exists about 150 yds short of the runway. The captain and I had noticed on our commercial plates that there existed a hold pad adjacent to runway 17. The hold pad was actually part of the runway environment. In addition, it was dark and raining and the taxi lights on our aircraft, although working perfectly, did not illuminate our path bright enough for the conditions. Also, after the ground controller told us we had crossed the hold short markings, he stated that they were poorly marked. The factor of poor taxi markings, our assumption was that the hold short line would be closer to the runway, the environmental factors of rain and darkness, the distraction of reading the checklist in an area I thought was safe, and poorly designed taxi lights, are all factors that led to the runway incursion. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated after crossing runway 24, the captain asked for the before takeoff checklist. He said he was head down while completing some of the remaining items on the checklist. He stated the chart he was using on the day of the incident did not show any ILS or holding position markings. He said the current chart now shows holding position marking for ILS but, does not show runway holding position markings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING TAXI FOR DEP OFF RWY 17 AT MHT, A CL65 CREW INADVERTENTLY CROSS THE HOLDING POSITION MARKINGS.

Narrative: WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 24 FOR ARRIVING TFC. ONCE THE TFC LANDED, WE WERE CLEARED TO CROSS RWY 24 AND PROCEED TO HOLD SHORT OF OUR DEP RWY 17. ONCE WE CROSSED RWY 24, THE CAPT ASKED FOR THE 'BEFORE TKOF' CHECKLIST. I WAS 'HEADS DOWN' READING THE CHECKLIST WHEN GND CTL TOLD US TO STOP. HE INFORMED US THAT WE HAD CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 17. THE HOLD SHORT LINE EXISTS ABOUT 150 YDS SHORT OF THE RWY. THE CAPT AND I HAD NOTICED ON OUR COMMERCIAL PLATES THAT THERE EXISTED A HOLD PAD ADJACENT TO RWY 17. THE HOLD PAD WAS ACTUALLY PART OF THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. IN ADDITION, IT WAS DARK AND RAINING AND THE TAXI LIGHTS ON OUR ACFT, ALTHOUGH WORKING PERFECTLY, DID NOT ILLUMINATE OUR PATH BRIGHT ENOUGH FOR THE CONDITIONS. ALSO, AFTER THE GND CTLR TOLD US WE HAD CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT MARKINGS, HE STATED THAT THEY WERE POORLY MARKED. THE FACTOR OF POOR TAXI MARKINGS, OUR ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE HOLD SHORT LINE WOULD BE CLOSER TO THE RWY, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS OF RAIN AND DARKNESS, THE DISTRACTION OF READING THE CHECKLIST IN AN AREA I THOUGHT WAS SAFE, AND POORLY DESIGNED TAXI LIGHTS, ARE ALL FACTORS THAT LED TO THE RWY INCURSION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED AFTER XING RWY 24, THE CAPT ASKED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHECKLIST. HE SAID HE WAS HEAD DOWN WHILE COMPLETING SOME OF THE REMAINING ITEMS ON THE CHECKLIST. HE STATED THE CHART HE WAS USING ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT DID NOT SHOW ANY ILS OR HOLDING POSITION MARKINGS. HE SAID THE CURRENT CHART NOW SHOWS HOLDING POSITION MARKING FOR ILS BUT, DOES NOT SHOW RWY HOLDING POSITION MARKINGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.