Narrative:

Taxied out for departure from elp. I briefed the first officer to expect me to use an 'adverse condition profile' for takeoff, as the winds were gusting to 35 KTS from the west right down runway 26L. We taxied into position and held, while a company B737-200 aircraft departed runway 22 ahead of us. The runways intersect at the departure ends. The -200 was airborne and at or about our 1 O'clock position. When the tower cleared us for takeoff, the -200 was already well out of the way, so I advanced power and we started the departure roll. I had briefed the first officer I would use the increased vr (152 KTS) because of the gusty winds, so he was in the picture as to my intentions. We reached V1, which he called, and vr, which he also called out, and I continued down the runway until reaching 152 KIAS, at which point I rotated to a 15 degree nose up attitude and began climbing out. At the point at which I came back into the cockpit to a full 'heads down' position to monitor the climb, we encountered a radical rolling moment to the right. I used full aileron (I think to the stops) and a little left rudder to counter it and was still unable to keep the wings completely level. We also lost 30 KTS of indicated airspeed during the roll. We deviated about 5 degrees off heading to the right because of the rolling movement, which I corrected and we continued the climb out, cleaning up normally. In retrospect, the situation was probably my fault, in that I did not consider the implications of the -200 wake turbulence we might encounter right at the juncture of the runways. Having said that, however, I also feel the tower deserves a little criticism for not considering it, either. To be fair, though, they were probably doing everything correctly from their standpoint, since the -200 was not a heavy jet and did not necessitate a longer wait for our takeoff clearance behind them. I feel we encountered windshear, along with the wake turbulence from the -200, at about 150 ft AGL. Had I not decided to use the increased vr for the takeoff, the situation might well have had very serious consequences. The extra 20 KTS I was carrying at the point we encountered the turbulence was a real cushion. So far as safety is concerned, in my opinion, I feel we should probably do more to train for these types of sits, though I am not sure we could duplicate the situation in a simulator without readouts from the aircraft. I offer this report so that it might not happen to someone else. Consider the implications of intersecting flight paths, even when the actual aircraft itself is not a factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 CAPT RPTED THAT WAKE TURB WAS ENCOUNTERED AT ELP, CAUSING A RADICAL ROLLING MOMENT.

Narrative: TAXIED OUT FOR DEP FROM ELP. I BRIEFED THE FO TO EXPECT ME TO USE AN 'ADVERSE CONDITION PROFILE' FOR TKOF, AS THE WINDS WERE GUSTING TO 35 KTS FROM THE W RIGHT DOWN RWY 26L. WE TAXIED INTO POS AND HELD, WHILE A COMPANY B737-200 ACFT DEPARTED RWY 22 AHEAD OF US. THE RWYS INTERSECT AT THE DEP ENDS. THE -200 WAS AIRBORNE AND AT OR ABOUT OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS. WHEN THE TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF, THE -200 WAS ALREADY WELL OUT OF THE WAY, SO I ADVANCED PWR AND WE STARTED THE DEP ROLL. I HAD BRIEFED THE FO I WOULD USE THE INCREASED VR (152 KTS) BECAUSE OF THE GUSTY WINDS, SO HE WAS IN THE PICTURE AS TO MY INTENTIONS. WE REACHED V1, WHICH HE CALLED, AND VR, WHICH HE ALSO CALLED OUT, AND I CONTINUED DOWN THE RWY UNTIL REACHING 152 KIAS, AT WHICH POINT I ROTATED TO A 15 DEG NOSE UP ATTITUDE AND BEGAN CLBING OUT. AT THE POINT AT WHICH I CAME BACK INTO THE COCKPIT TO A FULL 'HEADS DOWN' POS TO MONITOR THE CLB, WE ENCOUNTERED A RADICAL ROLLING MOMENT TO THE R. I USED FULL AILERON (I THINK TO THE STOPS) AND A LITTLE L RUDDER TO COUNTER IT AND WAS STILL UNABLE TO KEEP THE WINGS COMPLETELY LEVEL. WE ALSO LOST 30 KTS OF INDICATED AIRSPD DURING THE ROLL. WE DEVIATED ABOUT 5 DEGS OFF HDG TO THE R BECAUSE OF THE ROLLING MOVEMENT, WHICH I CORRECTED AND WE CONTINUED THE CLBOUT, CLEANING UP NORMALLY. IN RETROSPECT, THE SIT WAS PROBABLY MY FAULT, IN THAT I DID NOT CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE -200 WAKE TURB WE MIGHT ENCOUNTER RIGHT AT THE JUNCTURE OF THE RWYS. HAVING SAID THAT, HOWEVER, I ALSO FEEL THE TWR DESERVES A LITTLE CRITICISM FOR NOT CONSIDERING IT, EITHER. TO BE FAIR, THOUGH, THEY WERE PROBABLY DOING EVERYTHING CORRECTLY FROM THEIR STANDPOINT, SINCE THE -200 WAS NOT A HVY JET AND DID NOT NECESSITATE A LONGER WAIT FOR OUR TKOF CLRNC BEHIND THEM. I FEEL WE ENCOUNTERED WINDSHEAR, ALONG WITH THE WAKE TURB FROM THE -200, AT ABOUT 150 FT AGL. HAD I NOT DECIDED TO USE THE INCREASED VR FOR THE TKOF, THE SIT MIGHT WELL HAVE HAD VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. THE EXTRA 20 KTS I WAS CARRYING AT THE POINT WE ENCOUNTERED THE TURB WAS A REAL CUSHION. SO FAR AS SAFETY IS CONCERNED, IN MY OPINION, I FEEL WE SHOULD PROBABLY DO MORE TO TRAIN FOR THESE TYPES OF SITS, THOUGH I AM NOT SURE WE COULD DUPLICATE THE SIT IN A SIMULATOR WITHOUT READOUTS FROM THE ACFT. I OFFER THIS RPT SO THAT IT MIGHT NOT HAPPEN TO SOMEONE ELSE. CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERSECTING FLT PATHS, EVEN WHEN THE ACTUAL ACFT ITSELF IS NOT A FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.