Narrative:

I was captain on flight into atl. We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 26R. After passing the OM and performing the before landing checklist, I noticed a small aircraft on the runway (dusk) as we approached about 800-1000 ft AGL. By the time we were at 400-500 ft AGL the aircraft was clear of runway 26R. At this point I realized the radio chatter did not sound right. I asked if we had landing clearance and we realized that we were still on approach control. We switched to tower at about 300 ft AGL and the atl tower controller was speaking quickly issuing clrncs for runway operations on runway 26L. Because of the heavy radio traffic we were not able to ask if we were cleared to land. I surveyed the runway and noticed that it was clear and elected to land. As we cleared the runway the tower controller issued us the normal clearance to hold short of runway 26L, we acknowledged and complied. The controller said nothing of us not acknowledging landing clearance. Lessons learned: the first officer did not state '1000 ft cleared to land' or 'negative clearance' as per our air carrier's operations specifications. He made a mental note of no clearance. I think it would have been helpful if he had noted out loud, 'negative clearance.' a contributing factor I believe is that approach sometimes instructs us to contact tower at the OM, sometimes the handoff to tower occurs much further out on final. It would have been helpful in this case had we been switched to tower outside of the OM. When left to switch at the marker there is a greater likelihood as happened to us to be distraction by configuring, checklists, and unexpected aircraft on the runway, etc. I think another factor in this oversight to switch to tower sooner is the routine of airline operations can lull one into complacency. Or if not complacency at least a lack of vigilance, which we normally exhibit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 CREW LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC IN ATL.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT ON FLT INTO ATL. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R. AFTER PASSING THE OM AND PERFORMING THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST, I NOTICED A SMALL ACFT ON THE RWY (DUSK) AS WE APCHED ABOUT 800-1000 FT AGL. BY THE TIME WE WERE AT 400-500 FT AGL THE ACFT WAS CLR OF RWY 26R. AT THIS POINT I REALIZED THE RADIO CHATTER DID NOT SOUND RIGHT. I ASKED IF WE HAD LNDG CLRNC AND WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE STILL ON APCH CTL. WE SWITCHED TO TWR AT ABOUT 300 FT AGL AND THE ATL TWR CTLR WAS SPEAKING QUICKLY ISSUING CLRNCS FOR RWY OPS ON RWY 26L. BECAUSE OF THE HVY RADIO TFC WE WERE NOT ABLE TO ASK IF WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. I SURVEYED THE RWY AND NOTICED THAT IT WAS CLR AND ELECTED TO LAND. AS WE CLRED THE RWY THE TWR CTLR ISSUED US THE NORMAL CLRNC TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 26L, WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND COMPLIED. THE CTLR SAID NOTHING OF US NOT ACKNOWLEDGING LNDG CLRNC. LESSONS LEARNED: THE FO DID NOT STATE '1000 FT CLRED TO LAND' OR 'NEGATIVE CLRNC' AS PER OUR ACR'S OPS SPECS. HE MADE A MENTAL NOTE OF NO CLRNC. I THINK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IF HE HAD NOTED OUT LOUD, 'NEGATIVE CLRNC.' A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR I BELIEVE IS THAT APCH SOMETIMES INSTRUCTS US TO CONTACT TWR AT THE OM, SOMETIMES THE HDOF TO TWR OCCURS MUCH FURTHER OUT ON FINAL. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN THIS CASE HAD WE BEEN SWITCHED TO TWR OUTSIDE OF THE OM. WHEN LEFT TO SWITCH AT THE MARKER THERE IS A GREATER LIKELIHOOD AS HAPPENED TO US TO BE DISTR BY CONFIGURING, CHKLISTS, AND UNEXPECTED ACFT ON THE RWY, ETC. I THINK ANOTHER FACTOR IN THIS OVERSIGHT TO SWITCH TO TWR SOONER IS THE ROUTINE OF AIRLINE OPS CAN LULL ONE INTO COMPLACENCY. OR IF NOT COMPLACENCY AT LEAST A LACK OF VIGILANCE, WHICH WE NORMALLY EXHIBIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.