Narrative:

ATIS recorded by first officer. On initial taxi, tower asked if we had new ATIS. First officer responded 'negative,' ground directed us to pick up new ATIS. First officer recorded new ATIS as I monitored ground control and taxied the aircraft. First officer advised 'only change was the altimeter setting.' taxied up to and held short of standard hold short line (B4). Tower noted we had passed the ILS hold short line. Another carrier's aircraft was on final, tower asked them if they would be able to land as we were encroaching into ILS critical area. Aircraft on final indicated 'no problem, we are landing.' we were cleared into position, and subsequently for takeoff without event. How problem arose: my failure to review the ATIS information directly, or to have a thorough and complete brief of all components of ATIS. Contributing factors: complacency, being accustomed to holding short of this runway at B4 hold line. Assuming with good VMC conditions the ILS critical area was not in effect. How discovered: tower stated our failure to hold short of ILS hold short line. Corrective actions: none available at the time of incident, however in the future I will ensure to note and comply with such ATIS information, and to receive full ATIS briefs rather than 'highlights.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON TAXI OUT FOR TKOF, A CRJ CREW IS ADVISED BY LGA GND CTL THAT THEY HAD CROSSED THE ILS CRITICAL AREA LINE.

Narrative: ATIS RECORDED BY FO. ON INITIAL TAXI, TWR ASKED IF WE HAD NEW ATIS. FO RESPONDED 'NEGATIVE,' GND DIRECTED US TO PICK UP NEW ATIS. FO RECORDED NEW ATIS AS I MONITORED GND CTL AND TAXIED THE ACFT. FO ADVISED 'ONLY CHANGE WAS THE ALTIMETER SETTING.' TAXIED UP TO AND HELD SHORT OF STANDARD HOLD SHORT LINE (B4). TWR NOTED WE HAD PASSED THE ILS HOLD SHORT LINE. ANOTHER CARRIER'S ACFT WAS ON FINAL, TWR ASKED THEM IF THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO LAND AS WE WERE ENCROACHING INTO ILS CRITICAL AREA. ACFT ON FINAL INDICATED 'NO PROB, WE ARE LNDG.' WE WERE CLRED INTO POS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY FOR TKOF WITHOUT EVENT. HOW PROB AROSE: MY FAILURE TO REVIEW THE ATIS INFO DIRECTLY, OR TO HAVE A THOROUGH AND COMPLETE BRIEF OF ALL COMPONENTS OF ATIS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: COMPLACENCY, BEING ACCUSTOMED TO HOLDING SHORT OF THIS RWY AT B4 HOLD LINE. ASSUMING WITH GOOD VMC CONDITIONS THE ILS CRITICAL AREA WAS NOT IN EFFECT. HOW DISCOVERED: TWR STATED OUR FAILURE TO HOLD SHORT OF ILS HOLD SHORT LINE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: NONE AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT, HOWEVER IN THE FUTURE I WILL ENSURE TO NOTE AND COMPLY WITH SUCH ATIS INFO, AND TO RECEIVE FULL ATIS BRIEFS RATHER THAN 'HIGHLIGHTS.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.