Narrative:

On the localizer outside the FAF with a clearance for the approach. In light to moderate turbulence, my altitude was 120 ft low during a planned airspeed decrease. During correcting my altitude, the first officer on the trip started banging his finger on the altimeter instead of making the proper verbal call. This being very distracting, I made a hand gesture to get him to stop. At this time, the first officer became very abusive, yelling at me during the rest of the approach. The WX was at minimums for the localizer approach and I had to focus on the approach and ignore the ravings of the first officer. This created an unsafe condition in the cockpit during a critical phase of flight. This being a part 135 trip, a higher level of professionalism is required. I am very concerned about the mental stability of this airman. Contributing factors: 1) lack of knowledge of far and operations specifications on the part of first officer, 2) poor training and lack of support for CRM on the company's part. The only action that I can take is to refuse to fly with this first officer, which may lead to my termination. Conclusion: I have never seen a company allow its first officer's to run all over a captain. It is unsafe to have a first officer throwing a temper tantrum on the final phase of a minimums non precision approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LR35 PIC'S RPT ON AN EMOTIONAL OUTBREAK BY THE FO CREATING A TRAUMATIC SCENE IN THE COCKPIT RELATED TO CREW COORD PROCS DURING A NON PRECISION LOC APCH INTO ICT, KS.

Narrative: ON THE LOC OUTSIDE THE FAF WITH A CLRNC FOR THE APCH. IN LIGHT TO MODERATE TURB, MY ALT WAS 120 FT LOW DURING A PLANNED AIRSPD DECREASE. DURING CORRECTING MY ALT, THE FO ON THE TRIP STARTED BANGING HIS FINGER ON THE ALTIMETER INSTEAD OF MAKING THE PROPER VERBAL CALL. THIS BEING VERY DISTRACTING, I MADE A HAND GESTURE TO GET HIM TO STOP. AT THIS TIME, THE FO BECAME VERY ABUSIVE, YELLING AT ME DURING THE REST OF THE APCH. THE WX WAS AT MINIMUMS FOR THE LOC APCH AND I HAD TO FOCUS ON THE APCH AND IGNORE THE RAVINGS OF THE FO. THIS CREATED AN UNSAFE CONDITION IN THE COCKPIT DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. THIS BEING A PART 135 TRIP, A HIGHER LEVEL OF PROFESSIONALISM IS REQUIRED. I AM VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE MENTAL STABILITY OF THIS AIRMAN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF FAR AND OPS SPECS ON THE PART OF FO, 2) POOR TRAINING AND LACK OF SUPPORT FOR CRM ON THE COMPANY'S PART. THE ONLY ACTION THAT I CAN TAKE IS TO REFUSE TO FLY WITH THIS FO, WHICH MAY LEAD TO MY TERMINATION. CONCLUSION: I HAVE NEVER SEEN A COMPANY ALLOW ITS FO'S TO RUN ALL OVER A CAPT. IT IS UNSAFE TO HAVE A FO THROWING A TEMPER TANTRUM ON THE FINAL PHASE OF A MINIMUMS NON PRECISION APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.