Narrative:

I am a student pilot who was doing my first solo cross country. I visually inspected the fuel tanks during preflight to verify that the fuel level on the long range tanks was touching the bottom of the collar. This should have given me 24.5 gals usable fuel. The manual says the range for this amount at 65% power should be 4 hours and 30 mins reserve. I only planned on 4 hours. My flight plan was for 2 hours 46 mins total. I filed for 3 hours 16 mins to allow for possible stops at 2 airports or to allow for stronger than forecast winds. I noticed before takeoff that the fuel gauges were reading half and less, and decided they were reading about 3 gals low each. I had made this same cross country with my instructor in the reverse direction just 4 days before in the same aircraft with the same fuel load. We stopped en route about 1 hour from home and reviewed the fuel usage and visually checked the tanks. Fuel usage was to specifications. We completed the flight with 3.2 hours on the hobbs and an estimated 6+ gals left on a much warmer day. Therefore I felt confident that 24.5 gals (4 hours) would be enough with up to 75 mins reserve. The first leg of the trip went as planned to the min. On the second leg I fell behind schedule by 15 mins and attributed this to stronger winds. I elected not to land at the second airport because of the high winds. I had anticipated this might be the case and had a third airport in mind further on in a less windy area. I also thought that by cutting the corner and heading back the other direction, my headwind would become a tailwind and I could make up some time. At this point I noticed that one of the fuel gauges was reading empty. I found this quite worrisome, but I had been in the air only 2 hours 28 mins, and thought that the gauge had to be wrong, although I don't know how long it had been on empty. The engine seemed to be running normally, and I was careful to maintain 2400 rpms (65% power) altitude 7500 ft. At 2 hours 52 mins, as I was descending at 100 KIAS, preparing to land at my alternate, the engine began to sputter. It recaught at least 5 or 6 times. I'm not sure what my altitude was when it died, around 1000 ft AGL or less I would guess. Fortunately there were wide open dry wheat fields all around, and I landed without damage to person or property. The time was XA54 local. The hobbs read exactly 3 hours. On the ground, I tried to contact FSS, flight-watch, ATC and a nearby unicom without success. Finally I received a response from a good samaritan in the air at the airport I was heading for. She came out and located me and relayed a message to my home FBO. I checked the fuel tanks. The right one was empty, but the left one contained 4.5 gals according to the measuring stick. I should have had 6.4 gals. I believe the engine was having subtle performance problems, not developing the power it should have for the RPM setting. I think this accounts for the slower ground speed because on the last 12 NM I was only getting 80 KTS ground speed with an 8 KT tailwind (forecast). It should have been 103 KTS. Yet it was using fuel at a higher rate. The biggest problem was the failure to feed the last 4.5 gals in the left wing. Even with the slower ground speed and higher fuel burn, 4.5 gals should have gotten me all the way home, albeit with no reserve, but I wouldn't have known that without checking the tanks upon landing. If the fuel burn had been normal I would have got home 15 mins later than filed, but with the half hour reserve. I don't think I just misjudged the fuel level. At least 3 people checked it. Me, my instructor, and the person who filled it. I'm not a mechanic, but I don't see how the owner, my instructor or I could have known in advance or prevented this combination of aircraft performance problems. The flight plan was good, the execution was good, but the aircraft failed. It's easy to say' you should have gone to the nearest airport when you first noticed a possible fuel problem, regardless of how much fuel you should have had.' at the time, the nearest airport was still 10 NM away in a headwind. With 20/20 hindsight, if I had gone there, I probably wouldn't have made it, and would have gone down in a populated area instead of a nice big wheatfield. Furthermore, I was right about not being out of gas. The engine quit with 45 mins of fuel in the left tank. All in all I think I had the best possible outcome. The only thing I could have done differently was to have anticipated imminent engine failure and set it down in a field while I still had power. Lesson learned: 1) always fill your tanks to the top, especially on xcountries and especially when your route covers rural areas. About the time I think the problem may have started on leg 2, when my ground speed started to deteriorate, I was 30 NM from fuel. 2) flight plan for 1 hour reserve. 3) stop and fill up when your gauges read low even if you know they're wrong. 4) always carry a cell phone. 5) all of the above won't save you from engine failure. 6) if you think you might be in trouble, avoid airports that are surrounded by houses, a field would be better. 7) the most important consideration in a forced landing is not about getting maximum glide or landing into the wind, it's about touching down where you have room to roll out without hitting anything. The tailwind I had turned out to be helpful.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C152 STUDENT PLT, ON FIRST SOLO XCOUNTRY FLT, RAN OUT OF GAS AND LANDED IN A WHEAT FIELD. ACTUAL ACFT PERFORMANCE DID NOT MATCH THE INFO PROVIDED IN THE PLT'S FLT HANDBOOK.

Narrative: I AM A STUDENT PLT WHO WAS DOING MY FIRST SOLO XCOUNTRY. I VISUALLY INSPECTED THE FUEL TANKS DURING PREFLT TO VERIFY THAT THE FUEL LEVEL ON THE LONG RANGE TANKS WAS TOUCHING THE BOTTOM OF THE COLLAR. THIS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN ME 24.5 GALS USABLE FUEL. THE MANUAL SAYS THE RANGE FOR THIS AMOUNT AT 65% PWR SHOULD BE 4 HRS AND 30 MINS RESERVE. I ONLY PLANNED ON 4 HRS. MY FLT PLAN WAS FOR 2 HRS 46 MINS TOTAL. I FILED FOR 3 HRS 16 MINS TO ALLOW FOR POSSIBLE STOPS AT 2 ARPTS OR TO ALLOW FOR STRONGER THAN FORECAST WINDS. I NOTICED BEFORE TKOF THAT THE FUEL GAUGES WERE READING HALF AND LESS, AND DECIDED THEY WERE READING ABOUT 3 GALS LOW EACH. I HAD MADE THIS SAME XCOUNTRY WITH MY INSTRUCTOR IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION JUST 4 DAYS BEFORE IN THE SAME ACFT WITH THE SAME FUEL LOAD. WE STOPPED ENRTE ABOUT 1 HR FROM HOME AND REVIEWED THE FUEL USAGE AND VISUALLY CHKED THE TANKS. FUEL USAGE WAS TO SPECS. WE COMPLETED THE FLT WITH 3.2 HRS ON THE HOBBS AND AN ESTIMATED 6+ GALS LEFT ON A MUCH WARMER DAY. THEREFORE I FELT CONFIDENT THAT 24.5 GALS (4 HRS) WOULD BE ENOUGH WITH UP TO 75 MINS RESERVE. THE FIRST LEG OF THE TRIP WENT AS PLANNED TO THE MIN. ON THE SECOND LEG I FELL BEHIND SCHEDULE BY 15 MINS AND ATTRIBUTED THIS TO STRONGER WINDS. I ELECTED NOT TO LAND AT THE SECOND ARPT BECAUSE OF THE HIGH WINDS. I HAD ANTICIPATED THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE AND HAD A THIRD ARPT IN MIND FURTHER ON IN A LESS WINDY AREA. I ALSO THOUGHT THAT BY CUTTING THE CORNER AND HEADING BACK THE OTHER DIRECTION, MY HEADWIND WOULD BECOME A TAILWIND AND I COULD MAKE UP SOME TIME. AT THIS POINT I NOTICED THAT ONE OF THE FUEL GAUGES WAS READING EMPTY. I FOUND THIS QUITE WORRISOME, BUT I HAD BEEN IN THE AIR ONLY 2 HRS 28 MINS, AND THOUGHT THAT THE GAUGE HAD TO BE WRONG, ALTHOUGH I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG IT HAD BEEN ON EMPTY. THE ENG SEEMED TO BE RUNNING NORMALLY, AND I WAS CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN 2400 RPMS (65% PWR) ALT 7500 FT. AT 2 HRS 52 MINS, AS I WAS DSNDING AT 100 KIAS, PREPARING TO LAND AT MY ALTERNATE, THE ENG BEGAN TO SPUTTER. IT RECAUGHT AT LEAST 5 OR 6 TIMES. I'M NOT SURE WHAT MY ALT WAS WHEN IT DIED, AROUND 1000 FT AGL OR LESS I WOULD GUESS. FORTUNATELY THERE WERE WIDE OPEN DRY WHEAT FIELDS ALL AROUND, AND I LANDED WITHOUT DAMAGE TO PERSON OR PROPERTY. THE TIME WAS XA54 LCL. THE HOBBS READ EXACTLY 3 HRS. ON THE GND, I TRIED TO CONTACT FSS, FLIGHT-WATCH, ATC AND A NEARBY UNICOM WITHOUT SUCCESS. FINALLY I RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM A GOOD SAMARITAN IN THE AIR AT THE ARPT I WAS HEADING FOR. SHE CAME OUT AND LOCATED ME AND RELAYED A MESSAGE TO MY HOME FBO. I CHKED THE FUEL TANKS. THE R ONE WAS EMPTY, BUT THE L ONE CONTAINED 4.5 GALS ACCORDING TO THE MEASURING STICK. I SHOULD HAVE HAD 6.4 GALS. I BELIEVE THE ENG WAS HAVING SUBTLE PERFORMANCE PROBS, NOT DEVELOPING THE PWR IT SHOULD HAVE FOR THE RPM SETTING. I THINK THIS ACCOUNTS FOR THE SLOWER GND SPD BECAUSE ON THE LAST 12 NM I WAS ONLY GETTING 80 KTS GND SPD WITH AN 8 KT TAILWIND (FORECAST). IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 103 KTS. YET IT WAS USING FUEL AT A HIGHER RATE. THE BIGGEST PROB WAS THE FAILURE TO FEED THE LAST 4.5 GALS IN THE L WING. EVEN WITH THE SLOWER GND SPD AND HIGHER FUEL BURN, 4.5 GALS SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN ME ALL THE WAY HOME, ALBEIT WITH NO RESERVE, BUT I WOULDN'T HAVE KNOWN THAT WITHOUT CHKING THE TANKS UPON LNDG. IF THE FUEL BURN HAD BEEN NORMAL I WOULD HAVE GOT HOME 15 MINS LATER THAN FILED, BUT WITH THE HALF HR RESERVE. I DON'T THINK I JUST MISJUDGED THE FUEL LEVEL. AT LEAST 3 PEOPLE CHKED IT. ME, MY INSTRUCTOR, AND THE PERSON WHO FILLED IT. I'M NOT A MECH, BUT I DON'T SEE HOW THE OWNER, MY INSTRUCTOR OR I COULD HAVE KNOWN IN ADVANCE OR PREVENTED THIS COMBINATION OF ACFT PERFORMANCE PROBS. THE FLT PLAN WAS GOOD, THE EXECUTION WAS GOOD, BUT THE ACFT FAILED. IT'S EASY TO SAY' YOU SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE NEAREST ARPT WHEN YOU FIRST NOTICED A POSSIBLE FUEL PROB, REGARDLESS OF HOW MUCH FUEL YOU SHOULD HAVE HAD.' AT THE TIME, THE NEAREST ARPT WAS STILL 10 NM AWAY IN A HEADWIND. WITH 20/20 HINDSIGHT, IF I HAD GONE THERE, I PROBABLY WOULDN'T HAVE MADE IT, AND WOULD HAVE GONE DOWN IN A POPULATED AREA INSTEAD OF A NICE BIG WHEATFIELD. FURTHERMORE, I WAS RIGHT ABOUT NOT BEING OUT OF GAS. THE ENG QUIT WITH 45 MINS OF FUEL IN THE L TANK. ALL IN ALL I THINK I HAD THE BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME. THE ONLY THING I COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY WAS TO HAVE ANTICIPATED IMMINENT ENG FAILURE AND SET IT DOWN IN A FIELD WHILE I STILL HAD PWR. LESSON LEARNED: 1) ALWAYS FILL YOUR TANKS TO THE TOP, ESPECIALLY ON XCOUNTRIES AND ESPECIALLY WHEN YOUR RTE COVERS RURAL AREAS. ABOUT THE TIME I THINK THE PROB MAY HAVE STARTED ON LEG 2, WHEN MY GND SPD STARTED TO DETERIORATE, I WAS 30 NM FROM FUEL. 2) FLT PLAN FOR 1 HR RESERVE. 3) STOP AND FILL UP WHEN YOUR GAUGES READ LOW EVEN IF YOU KNOW THEY'RE WRONG. 4) ALWAYS CARRY A CELL PHONE. 5) ALL OF THE ABOVE WON'T SAVE YOU FROM ENG FAILURE. 6) IF YOU THINK YOU MIGHT BE IN TROUBLE, AVOID ARPTS THAT ARE SURROUNDED BY HOUSES, A FIELD WOULD BE BETTER. 7) THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN A FORCED LNDG IS NOT ABOUT GETTING MAX GLIDE OR LNDG INTO THE WIND, IT'S ABOUT TOUCHING DOWN WHERE YOU HAVE ROOM TO ROLL OUT WITHOUT HITTING ANYTHING. THE TAILWIND I HAD TURNED OUT TO BE HELPFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.