Narrative:

During preflight, the #2 stall warning test would not function. Maintenance checked the switch, checked computer diagnostics and accomplished extensive troubleshooting, eventually replacing a computer. The system checked good and was signed off. The maintenance action delayed us off the gate about 25 mins. Passing approximately 3000 ft on departure off of runway 28 (day, VFR, 210 KTS) and just beginning the turn on the swann departure, the stick shaker activated. We were clean, 210 KTS, flaps up and knew that this was a malfunctioning system and not an actual stall. We leveled off and concurred we must return to the airport. The noise and vibration made communication difficult. We requested vectors for a return to runway 33L at bwi. We were already on downwind for runway 33L when all this was occurring as a result of the normal turn on the departure. I called for flaps 5 degrees to slow things down and the stick shaker stopped activating. In time, this was only a few long mins after it started. We were already at a base turn. The first officer made a quick call to operations to inform them of our return and I notified the flight attendants of our return after he came back to communication #1. The flight attendants informed the passenger. We landed uneventfully. Immediately after clearing the runway, I stopped and apologized to the passenger for not addressing them in-flight due to noise and time constraints. In hindsight, I can see that I allowed our return to the airport to be rushed unnecessarily. The noise from the stick shaker was extremely distracting and we knew that there was no checklist in the QRH to accomplish. However, just a small extension of downwind, especially after the flaps were extended and the stick shaker stopped would have given us adequate time to accomplish all checks and make appropriate calls without being rushed. We did not check the opc for landing information as a result of being rushed, although the conditions were excellent and I did verify our landing weight was less than 114000 pounds. I also would have had time to address the passenger instead of passing that on to the flight attendants.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW HAS A STALL WARNING (STICK SHAKER) DURING DEP FROM BWI.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT, THE #2 STALL WARNING TEST WOULD NOT FUNCTION. MAINT CHKED THE SWITCH, CHKED COMPUTER DIAGNOSTICS AND ACCOMPLISHED EXTENSIVE TROUBLESHOOTING, EVENTUALLY REPLACING A COMPUTER. THE SYS CHKED GOOD AND WAS SIGNED OFF. THE MAINT ACTION DELAYED US OFF THE GATE ABOUT 25 MINS. PASSING APPROX 3000 FT ON DEP OFF OF RWY 28 (DAY, VFR, 210 KTS) AND JUST BEGINNING THE TURN ON THE SWANN DEP, THE STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED. WE WERE CLEAN, 210 KTS, FLAPS UP AND KNEW THAT THIS WAS A MALFUNCTIONING SYS AND NOT AN ACTUAL STALL. WE LEVELED OFF AND CONCURRED WE MUST RETURN TO THE ARPT. THE NOISE AND VIBRATION MADE COM DIFFICULT. WE REQUESTED VECTORS FOR A RETURN TO RWY 33L AT BWI. WE WERE ALREADY ON DOWNWIND FOR RWY 33L WHEN ALL THIS WAS OCCURRING AS A RESULT OF THE NORMAL TURN ON THE DEP. I CALLED FOR FLAPS 5 DEGS TO SLOW THINGS DOWN AND THE STICK SHAKER STOPPED ACTIVATING. IN TIME, THIS WAS ONLY A FEW LONG MINS AFTER IT STARTED. WE WERE ALREADY AT A BASE TURN. THE FO MADE A QUICK CALL TO OPS TO INFORM THEM OF OUR RETURN AND I NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS OF OUR RETURN AFTER HE CAME BACK TO COM #1. THE FLT ATTENDANTS INFORMED THE PAX. WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. IMMEDIATELY AFTER CLRING THE RWY, I STOPPED AND APOLOGIZED TO THE PAX FOR NOT ADDRESSING THEM INFLT DUE TO NOISE AND TIME CONSTRAINTS. IN HINDSIGHT, I CAN SEE THAT I ALLOWED OUR RETURN TO THE ARPT TO BE RUSHED UNNECESSARILY. THE NOISE FROM THE STICK SHAKER WAS EXTREMELY DISTRACTING AND WE KNEW THAT THERE WAS NO CHKLIST IN THE QRH TO ACCOMPLISH. HOWEVER, JUST A SMALL EXTENSION OF DOWNWIND, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE FLAPS WERE EXTENDED AND THE STICK SHAKER STOPPED WOULD HAVE GIVEN US ADEQUATE TIME TO ACCOMPLISH ALL CHKS AND MAKE APPROPRIATE CALLS WITHOUT BEING RUSHED. WE DID NOT CHK THE OPC FOR LNDG INFO AS A RESULT OF BEING RUSHED, ALTHOUGH THE CONDITIONS WERE EXCELLENT AND I DID VERIFY OUR LNDG WT WAS LESS THAN 114000 LBS. I ALSO WOULD HAVE HAD TIME TO ADDRESS THE PAX INSTEAD OF PASSING THAT ON TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.