Narrative:

Original communication with sjc tower included the following instructions. Tower: 'cross mid-field at or above 1500 ft, enter downwind for runway 29, report midfield.' aircraft X: 'aircraft X midfield' (I had identified runway 29). Tower: 'cleared to land runway 29, caution wake turbulence for landing south. Aircraft Y on parallel runway.' aircraft X: 'cleared to land runway 29, traffic in sight.' on downwind I again identified the three parallel runways (30R, 30L, and 29) runway 29 is 100 ft wide and starts approximately 2500 ft from the threshold of runway 30L. I completed the preflight checklist and stabilized the aircraft at 85 KTS and an approximately 500 FPM descent profile. While turning left base to final I noted the position of traffic and planned to intercept intended runway (29) # at a 10 degree offset. When established on final, I noted the VASI (located at the approach end of runway 30L) and lost visual contact with runway 29. I executed a flair and landing on runway 30L and continued rollout. During the roll out, I heard sjc tower advise aircraft Y jet to 'go around, airplane on runway, go around.' at that point, I realized I had inadvertently landed on runway 30L instead of runway 29. Despite having identified the correct runway three times, I had reviewed the airport chart, and clearly saw the runway both midfield and downwind, I proceeded to and landed on the wrong runway. I had flown to sjc on one other occasion on an IFR flight plan, which terminated with a straight in, visual approach to runway 29. I believe that I should have re-established visual contact with runway 29 on final and verified the cues of the 2500 ft difference between thresholds and the 100 ft vs 150 ft width of the runways. Also, I might have been distracted by noting my glide position on the runway 30L VASI and then proceeded to it. Finally, I should have also verified the runway identification number on short final and aborted the landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C210 LANDS ON WRONG RWY AT SJC REQUIRING ACR GAR.

Narrative: ORIGINAL COM WITH SJC TWR INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. TOWER: 'CROSS MID-FIELD AT OR ABOVE 1500 FT, ENTER DOWNWIND FOR RWY 29, RPT MIDFIELD.' ACFT X: 'ACFT X MIDFIELD' (I HAD IDENTIFIED RWY 29). TOWER: 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 29, CAUTION WAKE TURB FOR LNDG S. ACFT Y ON PARALLEL RWY.' ACFT X: 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 29, TFC IN SIGHT.' ON DOWNWIND I AGAIN IDENTIFIED THE THREE PARALLEL RWYS (30R, 30L, AND 29) RWY 29 IS 100 FT WIDE AND STARTS APPROX 2500 FT FROM THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 30L. I COMPLETED THE PREFLT CHKLIST AND STABILIZED THE ACFT AT 85 KTS AND AN APPROX 500 FPM DSCNT PROFILE. WHILE TURNING LEFT BASE TO FINAL I NOTED THE POS OF TFC AND PLANNED TO INTERCEPT INTENDED RWY (29) # AT A 10 DEG OFFSET. WHEN ESTABLISHED ON FINAL, I NOTED THE VASI (LOCATED AT THE APCH END OF RWY 30L) AND LOST VISUAL CONTACT WITH RWY 29. I EXECUTED A FLAIR AND LNDG ON RWY 30L AND CONTINUED ROLLOUT. DURING THE ROLL OUT, I HEARD SJC TWR ADVISE ACFT Y JET TO 'GO AROUND, AIRPLANE ON RWY, GO AROUND.' AT THAT POINT, I REALIZED I HAD INADVERTENTLY LANDED ON RWY 30L INSTEAD OF RWY 29. DESPITE HAVING IDENTIFIED THE CORRECT RWY THREE TIMES, I HAD REVIEWED THE ARPT CHART, AND CLRLY SAW THE RWY BOTH MIDFIELD AND DOWNWIND, I PROCEEDED TO AND LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY. I HAD FLOWN TO SJC ON ONE OTHER OCCASION ON AN IFR FLT PLAN, WHICH TERMINATED WITH A STRAIGHT IN, VISUAL APCH TO RWY 29. I BELIEVE THAT I SHOULD HAVE RE-ESTABLISHED VISUAL CONTACT WITH RWY 29 ON FINAL AND VERIFIED THE CUES OF THE 2500 FT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THRESHOLDS AND THE 100 FT VS 150 FT WIDTH OF THE RWYS. ALSO, I MIGHT HAVE BEEN DISTRACTED BY NOTING MY GLIDE POSITION ON THE RWY 30L VASI AND THEN PROCEEDED TO IT. FINALLY, I SHOULD HAVE ALSO VERIFIED THE RWY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ON SHORT FINAL AND ABORTED THE LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.