|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||airport : lga.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Controlling Facilities||tower : stl.tower|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B757-200|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : takeoff roll|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
non adherence : published procedure
|Independent Detector||aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : config warning|
other flight crewa
other flight crewb
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : rejected takeoff|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
During taxi out, the first officer initiated the flight control check and then inputted takeoff data into the FMC from the closeout weight slip. There was a discussion about shutting down an engine due to ATC delays. Ground control called several times with updated takeoff sequences. Finally cleared for takeoff and completed the before takeoff checklist. As the throttles were advanced, the takeoff warning sounded. The throttles were immediately closed and the aircraft cleared the runway. A PA announcement was made to the passenger. It was determined that the taxi checklist had not been accomplished and that the flaps were not set for takeoff. Neither pilot noticed this during a lengthy taxi. The taxi checklist was completed and a normal takeoff was made. Why did this occur? After analyzing our actions, the following thoughts came to mind: 1) normal sequence was disrupted -- the first officer initiated the flight control check before the flaps were extended. Extending the flaps usually triggers the flight control check and the calling for the taxi checklist. 2) distrs: a) concern about fuel conservation due to delay and whether to shut down an engine. B) personal distrs -- first officer was being furloughed after this sequence of flts -- was concerned about employment prospects. C) general stress among pilots caused by layoffs and worsening working conditions.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B757 CREW REJECTS A TKOF FOR A CONFIGN WARNING AT INITIAL PWR APPLICATION SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERING THAT THEY HAD NOT COMPLETED THE TAXI CHKLIST AND FLAPS WERE NOT EXTENDED.
Narrative: DURING TAXI OUT, THE FO INITIATED THE FLT CTL CHK AND THEN INPUTTED TKOF DATA INTO THE FMC FROM THE CLOSEOUT WT SLIP. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION ABOUT SHUTTING DOWN AN ENG DUE TO ATC DELAYS. GND CTL CALLED SEVERAL TIMES WITH UPDATED TKOF SEQUENCES. FINALLY CLRED FOR TKOF AND COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. AS THE THROTTLES WERE ADVANCED, THE TKOF WARNING SOUNDED. THE THROTTLES WERE IMMEDIATELY CLOSED AND THE ACFT CLRED THE RWY. A PA ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE TO THE PAX. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE TAXI CHKLIST HAD NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND THAT THE FLAPS WERE NOT SET FOR TKOF. NEITHER PLT NOTICED THIS DURING A LENGTHY TAXI. THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND A NORMAL TKOF WAS MADE. WHY DID THIS OCCUR? AFTER ANALYZING OUR ACTIONS, THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS CAME TO MIND: 1) NORMAL SEQUENCE WAS DISRUPTED -- THE FO INITIATED THE FLT CTL CHK BEFORE THE FLAPS WERE EXTENDED. EXTENDING THE FLAPS USUALLY TRIGGERS THE FLT CTL CHK AND THE CALLING FOR THE TAXI CHKLIST. 2) DISTRS: A) CONCERN ABOUT FUEL CONSERVATION DUE TO DELAY AND WHETHER TO SHUT DOWN AN ENG. B) PERSONAL DISTRS -- FO WAS BEING FURLOUGHED AFTER THIS SEQUENCE OF FLTS -- WAS CONCERNED ABOUT EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS. C) GENERAL STRESS AMONG PLTS CAUSED BY LAYOFFS AND WORSENING WORKING CONDITIONS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.