Narrative:

On departure from yak in IFR conditions, I was given a clearance to depart using the published departure. I understood that to be the published SID. Instead of departing using the published departure, I departed using the SID. I subsequently realized the departure was not making sense and advised center I wanted clarification. I was then told to turn to a heading to intercept V440. I believe I should have been more familiar with the terminology, that I should have looked more closely at the departure and realized it did not make sense before accepting what I understood it to be. It was obvious when receiving the clearance, I was having difficulty understanding the clearance, since I could not locate the amber routing and that there was confusion on my part. I thought I understood the clearance, but I think it was obvious to FSS I did not. I told FSS I was having difficulty finding the clearance and yet it was not read off to me as published. I was told it was in the first pages of the charts, but I said I was using commercial charts and I later learned the departure was published on the airport diagram. I should have known this. However, when the confusion was obvious, I should have been given clarified instructions. It was a simple matter to advise me to depart and intercept V440. I take full responsibility since it is my obligation to understand the terminology, however, a near tragedy could have been averted had I been simply told the departure routing. Nevertheless, I was greatly upset by the misunderstanding and have made arrangements to obtain some intensive IFR training. I am fearful of misunderstanding such a clearance in the future and I am uncomfortable with my current rusty level of skill. I do not intend to fly IFR until I obtain additional training. This experience was far too scary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DEPARTING YAK, AK, IN INST WX CONDITIONS WITHOUT FULL UNDERSTANDING OF HIS CLRNC RESULTS IN FLYING AN UNASSIGNED INST DEP INSTEAD OF THE OBSTACLE DEP PROC THAT WAS INTENDED.

Narrative: ON DEP FROM YAK IN IFR CONDITIONS, I WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO DEPART USING THE PUBLISHED DEP. I UNDERSTOOD THAT TO BE THE PUBLISHED SID. INSTEAD OF DEPARTING USING THE PUBLISHED DEP, I DEPARTED USING THE SID. I SUBSEQUENTLY REALIZED THE DEP WAS NOT MAKING SENSE AND ADVISED CTR I WANTED CLARIFICATION. I WAS THEN TOLD TO TURN TO A HEADING TO INTERCEPT V440. I BELIEVE I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE TERMINOLOGY, THAT I SHOULD HAVE LOOKED MORE CLOSELY AT THE DEP AND REALIZED IT DID NOT MAKE SENSE BEFORE ACCEPTING WHAT I UNDERSTOOD IT TO BE. IT WAS OBVIOUS WHEN RECEIVING THE CLRNC, I WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING THE CLRNC, SINCE I COULD NOT LOCATE THE AMBER ROUTING AND THAT THERE WAS CONFUSION ON MY PART. I THOUGHT I UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC, BUT I THINK IT WAS OBVIOUS TO FSS I DID NOT. I TOLD FSS I WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY FINDING THE CLRNC AND YET IT WAS NOT READ OFF TO ME AS PUBLISHED. I WAS TOLD IT WAS IN THE FIRST PAGES OF THE CHARTS, BUT I SAID I WAS USING COMMERCIAL CHARTS AND I LATER LEARNED THE DEP WAS PUBLISHED ON THE ARPT DIAGRAM. I SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THIS. HOWEVER, WHEN THE CONFUSION WAS OBVIOUS, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CLARIFIED INSTRUCTIONS. IT WAS A SIMPLE MATTER TO ADVISE ME TO DEPART AND INTERCEPT V440. I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY SINCE IT IS MY OBLIGATION TO UNDERSTAND THE TERMINOLOGY, HOWEVER, A NEAR TRAGEDY COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED HAD I BEEN SIMPLY TOLD THE DEP ROUTING. NEVERTHELESS, I WAS GREATLY UPSET BY THE MISUNDERSTANDING AND HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO OBTAIN SOME INTENSIVE IFR TRAINING. I AM FEARFUL OF MISUNDERSTANDING SUCH A CLRNC IN THE FUTURE AND I AM UNCOMFORTABLE WITH MY CURRENT RUSTY LEVEL OF SKILL. I DO NOT INTEND TO FLY IFR UNTIL I OBTAIN ADDITIONAL TRAINING. THIS EXPERIENCE WAS FAR TOO SCARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.