Narrative:

I was PIC of flight air carrier X on date. We were position and hold on runway 21R at dtw airport. Tower issued a takeoff clearance 'flight air carrier Y clear for takeoff runway 21R turn left to a heading of 120 degrees.' we realized it was the wrong flight number but we were the only aircraft position and hold on runway 21R. Therefore, the first officer read back the takeoff clearance without including the heading assignment. The tower did not question our readback. I thought I heard a turn to a 190 degree heading, the first officer did not recall any heading assignment. The first officer was flying and after a frequency change to departure I noticed we were still on runway heading. I asked departure if the heading assignment was 190 degrees. The controller replied negative and then assigned a left turn to 090 degrees. After we were established on the 090 degrees we received an RA. Departure then alerted us to the traffic. The assigned turn to 090 degrees directly resulted in a loss of separation and an RA for both aircraft involved. While the assigned turn by TRACON was directly responsible for this incident, there were several contributing factors and opportunities to change the outcome. 1) our failure to clarify the clearance containing the wrong flight number. Had we clarified we would have had another chance to hear the proper heading assignment. 2) a heading reminder from the tower with the frequency change would have alerted us to the error. Many tower controllers gratefully use this technique. 3) a flight crew reminder in the form of a note on the yoke clip, setting the assigned heading as a course in a standby VOR, or setting the heading bug to the assigned heading. 4) in my conversation with a TRACON supervisor after the incident I found when I inquired whether our assigned heading was 190 degrees the controller assumed we were on a 190 degree heading. Our actual heading was still a runway heading of 210 degrees. She then issued the turn to 090 degrees, which was a 100 degree change in direction from the heading she thought we were on. She would have issued a turn to 110 degrees if she had known our actual heading was 210 degrees. 5) recent change in procedure changed our climb out profile. The new procedure is to climb at V2 + 10 KTS (134 KTS in this case) until 400 ft AGL and then vcl + 15 KTS (144 KTS) until the MSA of 2800 ft MSL. Normal climb out previously would have been 160-180 KTS resulting in a lower altitude and further distance from the airport and conflicting traffic. Tfacon may not be fully aware of this change, which has just been implemented within the last month.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SERIES OF ERRORS, BOTH BY THE DEP CTLR AND THE SF34 PLTS, CAUSED A CONFLICT TO OCCUR.

Narrative: I WAS PIC OF FLT ACR X ON DATE. WE WERE POS AND HOLD ON RWY 21R AT DTW ARPT. TWR ISSUED A TKOF CLRNC 'FLT ACR Y CLR FOR TKOF RWY 21R TURN L TO A HEADING OF 120 DEGS.' WE REALIZED IT WAS THE WRONG FLT NUMBER BUT WE WERE THE ONLY ACFT POS AND HOLD ON RWY 21R. THEREFORE, THE FO READ BACK THE TKOF CLRNC WITHOUT INCLUDING THE HEADING ASSIGNMENT. THE TWR DID NOT QUESTION OUR READBACK. I THOUGHT I HEARD A TURN TO A 190 DEG HDG, THE FO DID NOT RECALL ANY HEADING ASSIGNMENT. THE FO WAS FLYING AND AFTER A FREQ CHANGE TO DEP I NOTICED WE WERE STILL ON RWY HEADING. I ASKED DEP IF THE HEADING ASSIGNMENT WAS 190 DEGS. THE CTLR REPLIED NEGATIVE AND THEN ASSIGNED A L TURN TO 090 DEGS. AFTER WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON THE 090 DEGS WE RECEIVED AN RA. DEP THEN ALERTED US TO THE TFC. THE ASSIGNED TURN TO 090 DEGS DIRECTLY RESULTED IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION AND AN RA FOR BOTH ACFT INVOLVED. WHILE THE ASSIGNED TURN BY TRACON WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS INCIDENT, THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO CHANGE THE OUTCOME. 1) OUR FAILURE TO CLARIFY THE CLRNC CONTAINING THE WRONG FLT NUMBER. HAD WE CLARIFIED WE WOULD HAVE HAD ANOTHER CHANCE TO HEAR THE PROPER HEADING ASSIGNMENT. 2) A HEADING REMINDER FROM THE TWR WITH THE FREQ CHANGE WOULD HAVE ALERTED US TO THE ERROR. MANY TWR CTLRS GRATEFULLY USE THIS TECHNIQUE. 3) A FLT CREW REMINDER IN THE FORM OF A NOTE ON THE YOKE CLIP, SETTING THE ASSIGNED HEADING AS A COURSE IN A STANDBY VOR, OR SETTING THE HEADING BUG TO THE ASSIGNED HEADING. 4) IN MY CONVERSATION WITH A TRACON SUPVR AFTER THE INCIDENT I FOUND WHEN I INQUIRED WHETHER OUR ASSIGNED HEADING WAS 190 DEGS THE CTLR ASSUMED WE WERE ON A 190 DEG HDG. OUR ACTUAL HEADING WAS STILL A RWY HEADING OF 210 DEGS. SHE THEN ISSUED THE TURN TO 090 DEGS, WHICH WAS A 100 DEG CHANGE IN DIRECTION FROM THE HEADING SHE THOUGHT WE WERE ON. SHE WOULD HAVE ISSUED A TURN TO 110 DEGS IF SHE HAD KNOWN OUR ACTUAL HEADING WAS 210 DEGS. 5) RECENT CHANGE IN PROC CHANGED OUR CLBOUT PROFILE. THE NEW PROC IS TO CLB AT V2 + 10 KTS (134 KTS IN THIS CASE) UNTIL 400 FT AGL AND THEN VCL + 15 KTS (144 KTS) UNTIL THE MSA OF 2800 FT MSL. NORMAL CLBOUT PREVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE BEEN 160-180 KTS RESULTING IN A LOWER ALT AND FURTHER DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT AND CONFLICTING TFC. TFACON MAY NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF THIS CHANGE, WHICH HAS JUST BEEN IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE LAST MONTH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.