Narrative:

Informed first officer not to place ink pen in the hole of the first officer's window release handle. We had an FAA inspector on the cockpit jumpseat for 2 consecutive flts. Prior to our initial taxi, I asked the first officer to remove his pen from the window handle assembly. I explained to him that the window may not open from the outside in the event of a ground emergency with his pen blocking the handle, and that he should place the pen in another spot. The first officer continued to place his pen in the same hold several times on the next 2 flts with the FAA inspector observing his actions with several reminders not to do this action. On the third and final flight of the day, he continued to put his pen in the handle and informed me he had never heard of anything wrong with doing this, so he continued to do the same thing. I don't think we need an operations manual change, but I feel there is a lack of understanding with safety related procedures or techniques that may not be addressed in our manuals, and an increased level of complacency when these issues are addressed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 CAPT ASKED THE FO TO NOT PLACE HIS PEN IN THE WINDOW SLIDER BECAUSE IT MIGHT NOT OPEN IN AN EMER FROM THE OUTSIDE. THE FO REFUSES.

Narrative: INFORMED FO NOT TO PLACE INK PEN IN THE HOLE OF THE FO'S WINDOW RELEASE HANDLE. WE HAD AN FAA INSPECTOR ON THE COCKPIT JUMPSEAT FOR 2 CONSECUTIVE FLTS. PRIOR TO OUR INITIAL TAXI, I ASKED THE FO TO REMOVE HIS PEN FROM THE WINDOW HANDLE ASSEMBLY. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THE WINDOW MAY NOT OPEN FROM THE OUTSIDE IN THE EVENT OF A GND EMER WITH HIS PEN BLOCKING THE HANDLE, AND THAT HE SHOULD PLACE THE PEN IN ANOTHER SPOT. THE FO CONTINUED TO PLACE HIS PEN IN THE SAME HOLD SEVERAL TIMES ON THE NEXT 2 FLTS WITH THE FAA INSPECTOR OBSERVING HIS ACTIONS WITH SEVERAL REMINDERS NOT TO DO THIS ACTION. ON THE THIRD AND FINAL FLT OF THE DAY, HE CONTINUED TO PUT HIS PEN IN THE HANDLE AND INFORMED ME HE HAD NEVER HEARD OF ANYTHING WRONG WITH DOING THIS, SO HE CONTINUED TO DO THE SAME THING. I DON'T THINK WE NEED AN OPS MANUAL CHANGE, BUT I FEEL THERE IS A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING WITH SAFETY RELATED PROCS OR TECHNIQUES THAT MAY NOT BE ADDRESSED IN OUR MANUALS, AND AN INCREASED LEVEL OF COMPLACENCY WHEN THESE ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.