Narrative:

On jul/thu/03, pensacola tower had an operational error involving 2 IFR aircraft (B06 and T34T). The approach control radar controller working the involved sector brought this to my attention and I began a preliminary investigation. The ntap revealed the closest point was 1.5 mi and 200 ft. The required separation is 3 mi or 1000 ft. Air carrier X had executed a missed approach off the VOR runway 8 approach. Aircraft Y was in trail doing the same approach with the same missed approach (see attachment #1). The tape review of local controller revealed that no traffic information was exchanged in reference to the aircraft and the trailing aircraft, aircraft Y was changed to departure without ensuring appropriate separation. I passed this information to my manager who then notified the pensacola tower manager. I asked, on my return to work on jul/fri/03, the status of the incident. I was advised by my manager that it had been ruled a non-occurrence. Further inquiry revealed the local controller stated visual separation was being applied until course divergence. During this incident visual separation was not an approve method of separation. Faao 7110.65 paragraph 7-2-1 (attachment #2) is very specific that other approved separation must be assured before and after the application of visual separation. In addition both aircraft must be under control of the same facility. Pensacola TRACON and pensacola tower are 2 separate facilities. In this instance, the moment local switched aircraft X to departure there was no way visual separation could be used. Local had no control over aircraft X and could not know aircraft X's assigned heading, whether the aircraft was turning or whether the aircraft was climbing, descending or at level flight. Local also had no idea what aircraft Y's heading was. Aircraft Y was changed to departure in the middle of his turn. At no time did local inquire of his heading or issue traffic on aircraft X. The reason for the requirement that both aircraft be under control of the same facility is to provide a safe environment to use visual separation with no room for misunderstanding or error. This instance was clearly not a situation where visual separation was appropriate or authority/authorized.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A P31 APCH CTLR CLAIMS THE PNS TWR DID NOT APPLY CORRECT SEPARATION PROCS BTWN A MIL HELI (B06) AND A MIL T34.

Narrative: ON JUL/THU/03, PENSACOLA TWR HAD AN OPERROR INVOLVING 2 IFR ACFT (B06 AND T34T). THE APCH CTL RADAR CTLR WORKING THE INVOLVED SECTOR BROUGHT THIS TO MY ATTN AND I BEGAN A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. THE NTAP REVEALED THE CLOSEST POINT WAS 1.5 MI AND 200 FT. THE REQUIRED SEPARATION IS 3 MI OR 1000 FT. ACR X HAD EXECUTED A MISSED APCH OFF THE VOR RWY 8 APCH. ACFT Y WAS IN TRAIL DOING THE SAME APCH WITH THE SAME MISSED APCH (SEE ATTACHMENT #1). THE TAPE REVIEW OF LCL CTLR REVEALED THAT NO TFC INFO WAS EXCHANGED IN REF TO THE ACFT AND THE TRAILING ACFT, ACFT Y WAS CHANGED TO DEP WITHOUT ENSURING APPROPRIATE SEPARATION. I PASSED THIS INFO TO MY MGR WHO THEN NOTIFIED THE PENSACOLA TWR MGR. I ASKED, ON MY RETURN TO WORK ON JUL/FRI/03, THE STATUS OF THE INCIDENT. I WAS ADVISED BY MY MGR THAT IT HAD BEEN RULED A NON-OCCURRENCE. FURTHER INQUIRY REVEALED THE LCL CTLR STATED VISUAL SEPARATION WAS BEING APPLIED UNTIL COURSE DIVERGENCE. DURING THIS INCIDENT VISUAL SEPARATION WAS NOT AN APPROVE METHOD OF SEPARATION. FAAO 7110.65 PARAGRAPH 7-2-1 (ATTACHMENT #2) IS VERY SPECIFIC THAT OTHER APPROVED SEPARATION MUST BE ASSURED BEFORE AND AFTER THE APPLICATION OF VISUAL SEPARATION. IN ADDITION BOTH ACFT MUST BE UNDER CTL OF THE SAME FACILITY. PENSACOLA TRACON AND PENSACOLA TWR ARE 2 SEPARATE FACILITIES. IN THIS INSTANCE, THE MOMENT LCL SWITCHED ACFT X TO DEP THERE WAS NO WAY VISUAL SEPARATION COULD BE USED. LCL HAD NO CTL OVER ACFT X AND COULD NOT KNOW ACFT X'S ASSIGNED HEADING, WHETHER THE ACFT WAS TURNING OR WHETHER THE ACFT WAS CLBING, DSNDING OR AT LEVEL FLT. LCL ALSO HAD NO IDEA WHAT ACFT Y'S HEADING WAS. ACFT Y WAS CHANGED TO DEP IN THE MIDDLE OF HIS TURN. AT NO TIME DID LCL INQUIRE OF HIS HEADING OR ISSUE TFC ON ACFT X. THE REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT THAT BOTH ACFT BE UNDER CTL OF THE SAME FACILITY IS TO PROVIDE A SAFE ENVIRONMENT TO USE VISUAL SEPARATION WITH NO ROOM FOR MISUNDERSTANDING OR ERROR. THIS INSTANCE WAS CLRLY NOT A SIT WHERE VISUAL SEPARATION WAS APPROPRIATE OR AUTH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.