Narrative:

The aircraft was towed to the gate from a remote spot, and did not arrive at the gate until 15 mins prior to scheduled departure. I was not able to board or get to the flight deck until 5 mins prior to scheduled departure. I began my preflight and was immediately interrupted by the local service representative asking about how much fuel to load on the aircraft. At that time, I had no paperwork, and was unable to provide any information. I continued the preflight of the flight deck area. As I returned to the flight deck, some paperwork had arrived, but it was very incomplete. It was only a partial preliminary, an incomplete message, and a flight plan which was reduced in size and spacing, and very difficult to read. At this time the first officer was loading the flight plan into the INS, and the aircraft still had not been fueled to original release fuel of 188000 ponds. I sent an ACARS message to dispatch. I had been observing the aircraft being fueled and saw that total fuel was now above release fuel, now at about 194000. The captain told the company mechanic to go down to the fuel truck and stop the fueling. We sent an ACARS message to dispatch informing them of the new weight which authorized the fuel load of 194000 pounds. Shortly thereafter, the service rep came to the flight deck with a new flight plan with a fuel load of 194000 pounds. We also received an ACARS message stating we were now on release #4. Paperwork regarding the fuel loaded was completely unfamiliar to me and in a different format, with several items of needed information missing. I began a check of the fueling only to find that no fuel density had been provided. I asked the mechanic to inquire about the fuel density. While he was doing this, I performed the check using fuel densities of 6.7 and 6.55 pounds per gallon; both checks were satisfactory. The mechanic returned and said the fuel density was 6.7. The fuel slip did not show any distribution, just total amount, so I brought out the company manual to verify the distribution. At this time the preflight check was commenced and completed, as well as the before start check, followed by pushback and start sequence. While monitoring the start sequence, I was able to observe the fuel distribution and noticed a non-standard fuel distribution. I said to the captain and first officer that the fuel was loaded nonstandard and needed to be corrected. I sent an ACARS to dispatch specifying the fuel distribution and asking whether the cg would be acceptable in this configuration. Dispatch responded by referring me to the communication. I looked at this, but his answer was not in response to question, so I sent another request asking if the fuel distribution was ok. The dispatcher's response did not answer my question about cg. I stated to the captain that this really needed to be cleared up, and we called the mechanic forward. He agreed the fueling was nonstandard, and we all agreed a return to the gate was needed to redistribute the fuel load. At this time, ATC requested the aircraft be moved to accommodate an inbound aircraft to the gate. We taxied the aircraft to a remote area. We called service for a fuel truck, but were informed this could take up to an hour. The mechanic said he could try to redistribute the fuel from the refueling panel under the left wing, if he was able to get a stand or air stairs to reach it. The mechanic accessed the panel, and the fuel was transferred at a slow rate. It took about 90 mins to transfer fuel until it was in accordance with normal distribution. During this entire taxi sequence and redistribution of fuel, we burned approximately 7000 pounds of fuel and now had a total of approximately 187000 pounds. We sent an ACARS message to dispatch indicating the fuel on board of 187000. Dispatch responded by issuing release #5, authorizing a release fuel of 187000. It was now about 4-1/2 hours since scheduled departure. The first weight tab and takeoff performance data listed the aircraft takeoff weight at approximately 664000 pounds. When the dispatcher issued release #5 authorizing the reduced fuel load of 187000, he also sent new weight tab and new takeoff performance numbers showing our zero fuel weight and takeoff weight of about 30000 pounds less. The crew noticed this and we were suspect about the change. I sent an ACARS message to dispatch asking how -- why the takeoff weight was reduced by 30000 pounds. The dispatcher sent back a message saying the reduced takeoff weight was correct because the passenger load was less than projected, we accepted this confirmation. Additionally, the company loadmaster onboard came to the cockpit. He agreed that the numbers were correct, because there had been less passenger boarded than anticipated. I filled out a new speed card based on the new takeoff gross weight. In comparing the original set of takeoff speeds, stabilizer setting and pitch angle to the second set, we accepted the numbers as safe. A normal and uneventful takeoff was performed, with the first officer flying. During takeoff and climb, he noted to the captain and myself that the aircraft handled normally and nothing was unusual at rotation or climb. We checked the fuel on board at top of climb and noticed that the flight plan fuel figures were based on a fuel load of 194000 over burn. We watched the fuel throughout the flight. The over burn remained steady at about 2000 to 2300 pounds. I have lost some confidence in my company, in their ability to provide accurate information in a timely manner in critical sits.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUEL BOARDED BY CONTRACT SVC COMPANY ON B747-200 DID NOT CONFORM TO PROPER DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS. SIGNIFICANT DELAY REQUIRED TO TRANSFER FUEL TO PROPER TANKS. COMPANY DISPATCH FUNCTION WAS NOT RESPONSIVE OR HELPFUL IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROB.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS TOWED TO THE GATE FROM A REMOTE SPOT, AND DID NOT ARRIVE AT THE GATE UNTIL 15 MINS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED DEP. I WAS NOT ABLE TO BOARD OR GET TO THE FLT DECK UNTIL 5 MINS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED DEP. I BEGAN MY PREFLT AND WAS IMMEDIATELY INTERRUPTED BY THE LOCAL SVC REPRESENTATIVE ASKING ABOUT HOW MUCH FUEL TO LOAD ON THE ACFT. AT THAT TIME, I HAD NO PAPERWORK, AND WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE ANY INFO. I CONTINUED THE PREFLT OF THE FLT DECK AREA. AS I RETURNED TO THE FLT DECK, SOME PAPERWORK HAD ARRIVED, BUT IT WAS VERY INCOMPLETE. IT WAS ONLY A PARTIAL PRELIMINARY, AN INCOMPLETE MESSAGE, AND A FLT PLAN WHICH WAS REDUCED IN SIZE AND SPACING, AND VERY DIFFICULT TO READ. AT THIS TIME THE FO WAS LOADING THE FLT PLAN INTO THE INS, AND THE ACFT STILL HAD NOT BEEN FUELED TO ORIGINAL RELEASE FUEL OF 188000 PONDS. I SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH. I HAD BEEN OBSERVING THE ACFT BEING FUELED AND SAW THAT TOTAL FUEL WAS NOW ABOVE RELEASE FUEL, NOW AT ABOUT 194000. THE CAPT TOLD THE COMPANY MECH TO GO DOWN TO THE FUEL TRUCK AND STOP THE FUELING. WE SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH INFORMING THEM OF THE NEW WEIGHT WHICH AUTHORIZED THE FUEL LOAD OF 194000 LBS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE SVC REP CAME TO THE FLT DECK WITH A NEW FLT PLAN WITH A FUEL LOAD OF 194000 LBS. WE ALSO RECEIVED AN ACARS MESSAGE STATING WE WERE NOW ON RELEASE #4. PAPERWORK REGARDING THE FUEL LOADED WAS COMPLETELY UNFAMILIAR TO ME AND IN A DIFFERENT FORMAT, WITH SEVERAL ITEMS OF NEEDED INFO MISSING. I BEGAN A CHK OF THE FUELING ONLY TO FIND THAT NO FUEL DENSITY HAD BEEN PROVIDED. I ASKED THE MECH TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE FUEL DENSITY. WHILE HE WAS DOING THIS, I PERFORMED THE CHK USING FUEL DENSITIES OF 6.7 AND 6.55 POUNDS PER GALLON; BOTH CHKS WERE SATISFACTORY. THE MECH RETURNED AND SAID THE FUEL DENSITY WAS 6.7. THE FUEL SLIP DID NOT SHOW ANY DISTRIBUTION, JUST TOTAL AMOUNT, SO I BROUGHT OUT THE COMPANY MANUAL TO VERIFY THE DISTRIBUTION. AT THIS TIME THE PREFLT CHK WAS COMMENCED AND COMPLETED, AS WELL AS THE BEFORE START CHK, FOLLOWED BY PUSHBACK AND START SEQUENCE. WHILE MONITORING THE START SEQUENCE, I WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE THE FUEL DISTRIBUTION AND NOTICED A NON-STANDARD FUEL DISTRIBUTION. I SAID TO THE CAPT AND FO THAT THE FUEL WAS LOADED NONSTANDARD AND NEEDED TO BE CORRECTED. I SENT AN ACARS TO DISPATCH SPECIFYING THE FUEL DISTRIBUTION AND ASKING WHETHER THE CG WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN THIS CONFIGURATION. DISPATCH RESPONDED BY REFERRING ME TO THE COM. I LOOKED AT THIS, BUT HIS ANSWER WAS NOT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, SO I SENT ANOTHER REQUEST ASKING IF THE FUEL DISTRIBUTION WAS OK. THE DISPATCHER'S RESPONSE DID NOT ANSWER MY QUESTION ABOUT CG. I STATED TO THE CAPT THAT THIS REALLY NEEDED TO BE CLRED UP, AND WE CALLED THE MECH FORWARD. HE AGREED THE FUELING WAS NONSTANDARD, AND WE ALL AGREED A RETURN TO THE GATE WAS NEEDED TO REDISTRIBUTE THE FUEL LOAD. AT THIS TIME, ATC REQUESTED THE ACFT BE MOVED TO ACCOMMODATE AN INBOUND ACFT TO THE GATE. WE TAXIED THE ACFT TO A REMOTE AREA. WE CALLED SVC FOR A FUEL TRUCK, BUT WERE INFORMED THIS COULD TAKE UP TO AN HR. THE MECH SAID HE COULD TRY TO REDISTRIBUTE THE FUEL FROM THE REFUELING PANEL UNDER THE L WING, IF HE WAS ABLE TO GET A STAND OR AIR STAIRS TO REACH IT. THE MECH ACCESSED THE PANEL, AND THE FUEL WAS TRANSFERRED AT A SLOW RATE. IT TOOK ABOUT 90 MINS TO TRANSFER FUEL UNTIL IT WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL DISTRIBUTION. DURING THIS ENTIRE TAXI SEQUENCE AND REDISTRIBUTION OF FUEL, WE BURNED APPROX 7000 POUNDS OF FUEL AND NOW HAD A TOTAL OF APPROX 187000 POUNDS. WE SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH INDICATING THE FUEL ON BOARD OF 187000. DISPATCH RESPONDED BY ISSUING RELEASE #5, AUTHORIZING A RELEASE FUEL OF 187000. IT WAS NOW ABOUT 4-1/2 HRS SINCE SCHEDULED DEP. THE FIRST WEIGHT TAB AND TKOF PERFORMANCE DATA LISTED THE ACFT TKOF WEIGHT AT APPROX 664000 POUNDS. WHEN THE DISPATCHER ISSUED RELEASE #5 AUTHORIZING THE REDUCED FUEL LOAD OF 187000, HE ALSO SENT NEW WEIGHT TAB AND NEW TKOF PERFORMANCE NUMBERS SHOWING OUR ZERO FUEL WEIGHT AND TKOF WEIGHT OF ABOUT 30000 POUNDS LESS. THE CREW NOTICED THIS AND WE WERE SUSPECT ABOUT THE CHANGE. I SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH ASKING HOW -- WHY THE TKOF WEIGHT WAS REDUCED BY 30000 POUNDS. THE DISPATCHER SENT BACK A MESSAGE SAYING THE REDUCED TKOF WEIGHT WAS CORRECT BECAUSE THE PAX LOAD WAS LESS THAN PROJECTED, WE ACCEPTED THIS CONFIRMATION. ADDITIONALLY, THE COMPANY LOADMASTER ONBOARD CAME TO THE COCKPIT. HE AGREED THAT THE NUMBERS WERE CORRECT, BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN LESS PAX BOARDED THAN ANTICIPATED. I FILLED OUT A NEW SPD CARD BASED ON THE NEW TKOF GROSS WEIGHT. IN COMPARING THE ORIGINAL SET OF TKOF SPDS, STAB SETTING AND PITCH ANGLE TO THE SECOND SET, WE ACCEPTED THE NUMBERS AS SAFE. A NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL TKOF WAS PERFORMED, WITH THE FO FLYING. DURING TKOF AND CLB, HE NOTED TO THE CAPT AND MYSELF THAT THE ACFT HANDLED NORMALLY AND NOTHING WAS UNUSUAL AT ROTATION OR CLB. WE CHKED THE FUEL ON BOARD AT TOP OF CLB AND NOTICED THAT THE FLT PLAN FUEL FIGURES WERE BASED ON A FUEL LOAD OF 194000 OVER BURN. WE WATCHED THE FUEL THROUGHOUT THE FLT. THE OVER BURN REMAINED STEADY AT ABOUT 2000 TO 2300 POUNDS. I HAVE LOST SOME CONFIDENCE IN MY COMPANY, IN THEIR ABILITY TO PROVIDE ACCURATE INFO IN A TIMELY MANNER IN CRITICAL SITS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.