|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Controlling Facilities||tower : zzz.tower|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Navigation In Use||other|
|Flight Phase||climbout : takeoff|
ground : preflight
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
other flight crewb
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : became reoriented|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
During a 4 day trip, we had 6 legs with a variant model of an MD80. My training had been in december and the captain's training sometime before that. Despite my efforts to review all available training material and operating manuals in the last 2 months, I felt very unprepared for the magnitude of the differences between the 2 versions of the MD80. Frankly, during the transition training in december, I had reservations about seeing one of these jets for the first time with the standard 40 mins (and 2 terminal sprint) between flts. I would break down my concerns in the following categories: 1) significantly different scan pattern especially for the digital engine instruments making even engine starts uncomfortable and especially the scan during the takeoff roll. Also, the scroll down annunciator panel differences are significant enough to make assimilating and interpreting information during critical phases very slow. This cannot be trained through individual home study effort and can only be accomplished in the simulator or aircraft. 2) major differences in the FMS and ACARS system caused us to slow down the process to the point where we pulled out the book and had to read how to program, operating both step by step. In a couple of cases, this was exacerbated by inaccuracies in the book that were acknowledged with published corrections the very next day in the flight plan notes. 3) an overriding concern of both of these issues was my concern that the amount of focus and effort we had to expend to make these system work, combined with the bad WX we encountered, really made our job very hard. Had this situation been compounded by even a minor abnormal, we may have lost situational awareness and found ourselves in a rapidly deteriorating situation. It was most helpful to have a check airman on one of the legs. It was a very short leg so we were rushed to learn as much as we could. Simulator training would be preferred, but having a check airman on the first 2 legs would be adequate in my opinion.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN MD80 FO RPT ON THE DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED BY HIS CREW TO OPERATE THE VARIANT MODEL MD80 WITH REGARDS TO INSTRUMENTATION, FMS AND ACARS DURING COCKPIT PREPARATION AND TKOF.
Narrative: DURING A 4 DAY TRIP, WE HAD 6 LEGS WITH A VARIANT MODEL OF AN MD80. MY TRAINING HAD BEEN IN DECEMBER AND THE CAPT'S TRAINING SOMETIME BEFORE THAT. DESPITE MY EFFORTS TO REVIEW ALL AVAILABLE TRAINING MATERIAL AND OPERATING MANUALS IN THE LAST 2 MONTHS, I FELT VERY UNPREPARED FOR THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DIFFERENCES BTWN THE 2 VERSIONS OF THE MD80. FRANKLY, DURING THE TRANSITION TRAINING IN DECEMBER, I HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT SEEING ONE OF THESE JETS FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH THE STANDARD 40 MINS (AND 2 TERMINAL SPRINT) BTWN FLTS. I WOULD BREAK DOWN MY CONCERNS IN THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES: 1) SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT SCAN PATTERN ESPECIALLY FOR THE DIGITAL ENG INSTS MAKING EVEN ENG STARTS UNCOMFORTABLE AND ESPECIALLY THE SCAN DURING THE TKOF ROLL. ALSO, THE SCROLL DOWN ANNUNCIATOR PANEL DIFFERENCES ARE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO MAKE ASSIMILATING AND INTERPRETING INFO DURING CRITICAL PHASES VERY SLOW. THIS CANNOT BE TRAINED THROUGH INDIVIDUAL HOME STUDY EFFORT AND CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE SIMULATOR OR ACFT. 2) MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN THE FMS AND ACARS SYS CAUSED US TO SLOW DOWN THE PROCESS TO THE POINT WHERE WE PULLED OUT THE BOOK AND HAD TO READ HOW TO PROGRAM, OPERATING BOTH STEP BY STEP. IN A COUPLE OF CASES, THIS WAS EXACERBATED BY INACCURACIES IN THE BOOK THAT WERE ACKNOWLEDGED WITH PUBLISHED CORRECTIONS THE VERY NEXT DAY IN THE FLT PLAN NOTES. 3) AN OVERRIDING CONCERN OF BOTH OF THESE ISSUES WAS MY CONCERN THAT THE AMOUNT OF FOCUS AND EFFORT WE HAD TO EXPEND TO MAKE THESE SYS WORK, COMBINED WITH THE BAD WX WE ENCOUNTERED, REALLY MADE OUR JOB VERY HARD. HAD THIS SIT BEEN COMPOUNDED BY EVEN A MINOR ABNORMAL, WE MAY HAVE LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND FOUND OURSELVES IN A RAPIDLY DETERIORATING SIT. IT WAS MOST HELPFUL TO HAVE A CHK AIRMAN ON ONE OF THE LEGS. IT WAS A VERY SHORT LEG SO WE WERE RUSHED TO LEARN AS MUCH AS WE COULD. SIMULATOR TRAINING WOULD BE PREFERRED, BUT HAVING A CHK AIRMAN ON THE FIRST 2 LEGS WOULD BE ADEQUATE IN MY OPINION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.