Narrative:

En route WX had been good, but an area of rain showers and thunderstorms were in the vicinity of bhm and extended east from there. Bhm ATIS indicated light winds and runway 6, but our WX radar indicated a storm on the approach to runway 6. On initial contact, bhm approach confirmed the storm on approach to runway 6 and advised us to plan the ILS to runway 24. That approach was generally clear of storms -- although substantial maneuvering would be required to remain clear of WX while approaching the intercept point. The aircraft ahead of us used a WX-free corridor for a wide right base and accepted clearance for the ILS to runway 24. We planned to follow his path through the same corridor. Established on the ILS, the aircraft ahead announced that the localizer and GS had suddenly failed. Approach control offered him a surveillance approach, which he accepted and completed. Likewise, they offered us a surveillance approach. I will tell you that on perhaps a 15 mi right base in a storm-free corridor and with a storm-free final, but with storms in all other quadrants -- answering the question, 'are we allowed to accept a surveillance approach?' is a dicey problem to solve at best. A rushed thumbing through company fom approach/landing section made it fairly clear that we could accept the offer. We flew the approach, concerned primarily with the best 'escape' route in the event we had to miss (WX along the straight-ahead miss corridor, ridge lines along either side). The approach was comfortable and resulted in an uneventful landing on runway 24. In about 1 hour, while reviewing flight manual, I chanced across section X which describes the surveillance approach in much the same terms as in the operating manual, except for one thing. A paragraph has been recently added indicating that these approachs are not authorized except in an emergency. Our situation may have been a bit dicey, but it was certainly no emergency. I'm still inclined to think that under the particular conditions that existed there that day, the best and safest choice was the choice I made -- even if it wasn't absolutely 'kosher.' since surveillance approachs are apparently no longer acceptable under our operating specifications, I urge that the operating manual be 'adjusted' to clarify this fact much as the prohibition against back course approachs is made abundantly clear.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: F100 CREW WAS REQUIRED TO FLY A SURVEILLANCE APCH 'ASR' TO RWY 24 AT BHM BECAUSE THE ILS GS FAILED.

Narrative: ENRTE WX HAD BEEN GOOD, BUT AN AREA OF RAIN SHOWERS AND TSTMS WERE IN THE VICINITY OF BHM AND EXTENDED E FROM THERE. BHM ATIS INDICATED LIGHT WINDS AND RWY 6, BUT OUR WX RADAR INDICATED A STORM ON THE APCH TO RWY 6. ON INITIAL CONTACT, BHM APCH CONFIRMED THE STORM ON APCH TO RWY 6 AND ADVISED US TO PLAN THE ILS TO RWY 24. THAT APCH WAS GENERALLY CLR OF STORMS -- ALTHOUGH SUBSTANTIAL MANEUVERING WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REMAIN CLR OF WX WHILE APCHING THE INTERCEPT POINT. THE ACFT AHEAD OF US USED A WX-FREE CORRIDOR FOR A WIDE R BASE AND ACCEPTED CLRNC FOR THE ILS TO RWY 24. WE PLANNED TO FOLLOW HIS PATH THROUGH THE SAME CORRIDOR. ESTABLISHED ON THE ILS, THE ACFT AHEAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE LOC AND GS HAD SUDDENLY FAILED. APCH CTL OFFERED HIM A SURVEILLANCE APCH, WHICH HE ACCEPTED AND COMPLETED. LIKEWISE, THEY OFFERED US A SURVEILLANCE APCH. I WILL TELL YOU THAT ON PERHAPS A 15 MI R BASE IN A STORM-FREE CORRIDOR AND WITH A STORM-FREE FINAL, BUT WITH STORMS IN ALL OTHER QUADRANTS -- ANSWERING THE QUESTION, 'ARE WE ALLOWED TO ACCEPT A SURVEILLANCE APCH?' IS A DICEY PROB TO SOLVE AT BEST. A RUSHED THUMBING THROUGH COMPANY FOM APCH/LNDG SECTION MADE IT FAIRLY CLR THAT WE COULD ACCEPT THE OFFER. WE FLEW THE APCH, CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH THE BEST 'ESCAPE' RTE IN THE EVENT WE HAD TO MISS (WX ALONG THE STRAIGHT-AHEAD MISS CORRIDOR, RIDGE LINES ALONG EITHER SIDE). THE APCH WAS COMFORTABLE AND RESULTED IN AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 24. IN ABOUT 1 HR, WHILE REVIEWING FLT MANUAL, I CHANCED ACROSS SECTION X WHICH DESCRIBES THE SURVEILLANCE APCH IN MUCH THE SAME TERMS AS IN THE OPERATING MANUAL, EXCEPT FOR ONE THING. A PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN RECENTLY ADDED INDICATING THAT THESE APCHS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED EXCEPT IN AN EMER. OUR SIT MAY HAVE BEEN A BIT DICEY, BUT IT WAS CERTAINLY NO EMER. I'M STILL INCLINED TO THINK THAT UNDER THE PARTICULAR CONDITIONS THAT EXISTED THERE THAT DAY, THE BEST AND SAFEST CHOICE WAS THE CHOICE I MADE -- EVEN IF IT WASN'T ABSOLUTELY 'KOSHER.' SINCE SURVEILLANCE APCHS ARE APPARENTLY NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE UNDER OUR OPERATING SPECS, I URGE THAT THE OPERATING MANUAL BE 'ADJUSTED' TO CLARIFY THIS FACT MUCH AS THE PROHIBITION AGAINST BACK COURSE APCHS IS MADE ABUNDANTLY CLR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.