Narrative:

On taxi to den runway 34R the flaps indicated that the leading edge devices were not in the takeoff position. (The leading edge flaps transit light, 'on.') we cycled the flaps up, down to 2 and back to 1 to make sure the handle was properly in the detent but we still had the same indication. We then told ground that we needed some extra time and they told us to just stay in the line-up for runway 34R. The captain then told me to contact maintenance controller on the #2 radio and coordinate the deferral while he monitored ground frequency on the #1 radio. I did this and maintenance controller told me to collar the appropriate stall warning circuit breaker with a deferral sticker and we would be good to go since the overhead leading edge device lights were operational. Maintenance controller also sent us updated paperwork. The captain then took control of the paperwork and said we were good to go. I collared the circuit breaker with a deferral sticker (as directed by maintenance controller) cleared off the radio with maintenance controller and continued with my checklist items for takeoff (runway data). This was a very busy time for me. I finished my checklist items just as we were given takeoff clearance. At our destination the captain taking the jet from us told us he didn't think our flight was flown legally. He showed us that we needed both stall warning system (not just an operational stall warning system) to fly with the leading edge device deferral. I then reviewed the paperwork and agreed. My captain and I discussed the mistake and how to avoid it in the future.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-500 CREW CONTACTED THE ACR MAINT CTLR AND WAS TOLD TO DEACTIVATE ONE OF THE ACFT STICK SHAKER SYS IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE MEL.

Narrative: ON TAXI TO DEN RWY 34R THE FLAPS INDICATED THAT THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES WERE NOT IN THE TKOF POS. (THE LEADING EDGE FLAPS TRANSIT LIGHT, 'ON.') WE CYCLED THE FLAPS UP, DOWN TO 2 AND BACK TO 1 TO MAKE SURE THE HANDLE WAS PROPERLY IN THE DETENT BUT WE STILL HAD THE SAME INDICATION. WE THEN TOLD GND THAT WE NEEDED SOME EXTRA TIME AND THEY TOLD US TO JUST STAY IN THE LINE-UP FOR RWY 34R. THE CAPT THEN TOLD ME TO CONTACT MAINT CTLR ON THE #2 RADIO AND COORDINATE THE DEFERRAL WHILE HE MONITORED GND FREQ ON THE #1 RADIO. I DID THIS AND MAINT CTLR TOLD ME TO COLLAR THE APPROPRIATE STALL WARNING CIRCUIT BREAKER WITH A DEFERRAL STICKER AND WE WOULD BE GOOD TO GO SINCE THE OVERHEAD LEADING EDGE DEVICE LIGHTS WERE OPERATIONAL. MAINT CTLR ALSO SENT US UPDATED PAPERWORK. THE CAPT THEN TOOK CTL OF THE PAPERWORK AND SAID WE WERE GOOD TO GO. I COLLARED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER WITH A DEFERRAL STICKER (AS DIRECTED BY MAINT CTLR) CLRED OFF THE RADIO WITH MAINT CTLR AND CONTINUED WITH MY CHKLIST ITEMS FOR TKOF (RWY DATA). THIS WAS A VERY BUSY TIME FOR ME. I FINISHED MY CHKLIST ITEMS JUST AS WE WERE GIVEN TKOF CLRNC. AT OUR DEST THE CAPT TAKING THE JET FROM US TOLD US HE DIDN'T THINK OUR FLT WAS FLOWN LEGALLY. HE SHOWED US THAT WE NEEDED BOTH STALL WARNING SYS (NOT JUST AN OPERATIONAL STALL WARNING SYS) TO FLY WITH THE LEADING EDGE DEVICE DEFERRAL. I THEN REVIEWED THE PAPERWORK AND AGREED. MY CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE MISTAKE AND HOW TO AVOID IT IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.