Narrative:

I was the dispatcher in charge of planning flight from fll to den. The WX in the upper mississippi and arkansas area was socked in with heavy thunderstorms -- tops up to FL450. Part of this system was a line of storms that pushed into alabama and the florida panhandle, as well as throughout georgia. Knowing I had the choice to file out over the gulf of mexico for this route, and the knowledge I had that the storms were not as prevalent in the vicinity of the 'Q' rtes, I planned on filing these airways for this flight. Captain was not verbally briefed over phone prior to departure, and flight departed on time after aircraft had been swapped due to mechanical on prior assigned aircraft. South of pie VOR, captain contacted dispatch control on company frequency and advised that the aircraft was VOR capable and not q-nav equipped. I was aware of this, and realized flight was filed navigation code '/a,' and was going out onto the r-nav rtes. The week prior, I had a similar situation with the same flight, and the question arose 'can I dispatch this '/a' aircraft on the Q rtes?' I contacted ZHU and was advised by their traffic management unit that it would not be a problem. Subsequently, the flight was rted a different way per an ATC request for WX avoidance, and the situation never went past the planning stage. Remembering this situation from a week prior, I assumed no further issues with event flight and event day. However, further researching into this situation, captain and I realized that it is unacceptable to go out on these rtes with the navigation capability event aircraft had on this day. Captain and I worked a route direct cty, then szw, then aex as filed, which would have kept this aircraft within its navigation capabilities and safely skirted south of the majority of the major cells from the storm system. I believe the unavailability of our pilot read file system and total physical lack of a dispatch read file system contributed heavily to this incident. The company policy as stated in the pilot read file expressly states that the filing of these rtes, with this navigation capability type, should not be allowed by the dispatcher, ATC, and the captain. I believe more training and more knowledge-based materials should be given to dispatchers regarding company policy (which in further research is also FAA policy regarding the new change of rtes), and that center tmu controllers should be as familiar with these policies as much as dispatchers and pilots. The simple fact that the captain on the flight caught the error once already airborne has also helped me to learn more about creating some of my own, or revising, checks and balance system. I will always get more information from other sources if I ever have a question regarding policies and procedures, and will most certainly not stop with an answer from an FAA ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD83 FLT CREW AND DISPATCHER PLAN A FLT OVERWATER TO AVOID WX WITH AN ACFT NOT EQUIPPED FOR CLASS II NAV.

Narrative: I WAS THE DISPATCHER IN CHARGE OF PLANNING FLT FROM FLL TO DEN. THE WX IN THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI AND ARKANSAS AREA WAS SOCKED IN WITH HEAVY TSTMS -- TOPS UP TO FL450. PART OF THIS SYS WAS A LINE OF STORMS THAT PUSHED INTO ALABAMA AND THE FLORIDA PANHANDLE, AS WELL AS THROUGHOUT GEORGIA. KNOWING I HAD THE CHOICE TO FILE OUT OVER THE GULF OF MEXICO FOR THIS RTE, AND THE KNOWLEDGE I HAD THAT THE STORMS WERE NOT AS PREVALENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE 'Q' RTES, I PLANNED ON FILING THESE AIRWAYS FOR THIS FLT. CAPT WAS NOT VERBALLY BRIEFED OVER PHONE PRIOR TO DEP, AND FLT DEPARTED ON TIME AFTER ACFT HAD BEEN SWAPPED DUE TO MECHANICAL ON PRIOR ASSIGNED ACFT. S OF PIE VOR, CAPT CONTACTED DISPATCH CTL ON COMPANY FREQ AND ADVISED THAT THE ACFT WAS VOR CAPABLE AND NOT Q-NAV EQUIPPED. I WAS AWARE OF THIS, AND REALIZED FLT WAS FILED NAV CODE '/A,' AND WAS GOING OUT ONTO THE R-NAV RTES. THE WK PRIOR, I HAD A SIMILAR SIT WITH THE SAME FLT, AND THE QUESTION AROSE 'CAN I DISPATCH THIS '/A' ACFT ON THE Q RTES?' I CONTACTED ZHU AND WAS ADVISED BY THEIR TFC MGMNT UNIT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A PROB. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE FLT WAS RTED A DIFFERENT WAY PER AN ATC REQUEST FOR WX AVOIDANCE, AND THE SIT NEVER WENT PAST THE PLANNING STAGE. REMEMBERING THIS SIT FROM A WK PRIOR, I ASSUMED NO FURTHER ISSUES WITH EVENT FLT AND EVENT DAY. HOWEVER, FURTHER RESEARCHING INTO THIS SIT, CAPT AND I REALIZED THAT IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO GO OUT ON THESE RTES WITH THE NAV CAPABILITY EVENT ACFT HAD ON THIS DAY. CAPT AND I WORKED A RTE DIRECT CTY, THEN SZW, THEN AEX AS FILED, WHICH WOULD HAVE KEPT THIS ACFT WITHIN ITS NAV CAPABILITIES AND SAFELY SKIRTED S OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MAJOR CELLS FROM THE STORM SYS. I BELIEVE THE UNAVAILABILITY OF OUR PLT READ FILE SYS AND TOTAL PHYSICAL LACK OF A DISPATCH READ FILE SYS CONTRIBUTED HEAVILY TO THIS INCIDENT. THE COMPANY POLICY AS STATED IN THE PLT READ FILE EXPRESSLY STATES THAT THE FILING OF THESE RTES, WITH THIS NAV CAPABILITY TYPE, SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED BY THE DISPATCHER, ATC, AND THE CAPT. I BELIEVE MORE TRAINING AND MORE KNOWLEDGE-BASED MATERIALS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DISPATCHERS REGARDING COMPANY POLICY (WHICH IN FURTHER RESEARCH IS ALSO FAA POLICY REGARDING THE NEW CHANGE OF RTES), AND THAT CTR TMU CTLRS SHOULD BE AS FAMILIAR WITH THESE POLICIES AS MUCH AS DISPATCHERS AND PLTS. THE SIMPLE FACT THAT THE CAPT ON THE FLT CAUGHT THE ERROR ONCE ALREADY AIRBORNE HAS ALSO HELPED ME TO LEARN MORE ABOUT CREATING SOME OF MY OWN, OR REVISING, CHKS AND BALANCE SYS. I WILL ALWAYS GET MORE INFO FROM OTHER SOURCES IF I EVER HAVE A QUESTION REGARDING POLICIES AND PROCS, AND WILL MOST CERTAINLY NOT STOP WITH AN ANSWER FROM AN FAA ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.